Sz. Rajal. 1827

THE

HISTORY

OF

THE POLITICKS

OF

GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE,

FROM THE TIME OF

THE CONFERENCE AT PILLNITZ,

TO THE

DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN.

WITH AN

APPENDIX,

CONTAINING

A NARRATIVE OF THE ATTEMPTS MADE BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE PEACE.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

By HERBERT MARSH,

FELLOW OF ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR;

AND SOLD BY MARSH AND DUNSFORD, 49, FLEET STREET.

1800.

Entered at Stationers' Hall.

T. Bensley, *Printer of the first Two Sheets, Bolt Court, Fleet Street, London.*

PREFACE.

THE preſent war between Great Britain and France has been condemned by one claſs of writers as unneceſſary and unjuſt, while another claſs has defended it on grounds of expediency and juſtice. Writers, however, of the latter, as well as thoſe of the former deſcription, ſet out in general with the ſuppoſition, that the choice of war or peace reſted with the Britiſh government; and they endeavour to juſtify the ſuppoſed determination of the cabinet in favour of hoſtilities, by arguing that the circumſtances under which the war was begun, rendered it an evil of ſtill leſs magnitude to Great Britain than peace itſelf would have been, a poſition which their adverſaries deny. Now though it is certainly adviſeable of two evils

to chooſe the leſs, yet, as it muſt be previouſly aſcertained, which of the two really *is* the leſs, and as the calamities which may happen to aſſociate themſelves with a continuance of peace, muſt be very complicated before they can even balance the calamities which are inſeparable from war, it is not extraordinary that a defence grounded on a poſition, which, though true in the abſtract, may be doubtful in its application, ſhould not have produced univerſal conviction.

Let us ſet aſide therefore the queſtion of expediency, on which perhaps an unanimity of opinion will never prevail: let us try the merits of the cauſe on another ground, and examine whether the Britiſh government really had it in its *power* to prevent a rupture with France. If *this* queſtion be decided in the negative, no further vindication can be neceſſary. Not only in a political, but likewiſe in a moral light, the war, on our part, will then be juſtified; for whatever doubts may be entertained of the lawfulneſs of commencing hoſtilities through mere motives of policy or

expediency, no rational man will deny, that it is lawful to repel an unjuſt aggreſſion. It is not indeed the bare circumſtance, that the public declaration of war proceeded from the part of France, which will warrant us to ſay that France was the aggreſſor. In the year 1756 the great king of Pruſſia declared war on Auſtria; yet he was properly not the aggreſſor, becauſe he had received certain information that within a few months he himſelf would be attacked by Auſtria, in conjunction with Ruſſia and France. Since then, the very ſame excuſe may, before the ſubject has been fully inveſtigated, be thought applicable likewiſe to the French national convention in reſpect to its declaration of war againſt Great Britain on the 1ſt of February 1793, the queſtion of *real* aggreſſion muſt be determined by the relative conduct of the two governments antecedent to that declaration. With this view the following hiſtory has been written. It commences with the celebrated conference at Pillnitz in Auguſt 1791, becauſe at that time the firſt coalition againſt France was in agitation: and, as it is

continued to the declaration of war, it comprifes an important period of eighteen months, the events of which muft finally decide the queftion, 'Who were the aggreffors?'

The plan on which the following work has been conducted, may perhaps expofe the author to the charge of prolixity: but at a time, when falfehood is fo blended with truth, when random reports are adopted as indubitable facts, and hiftory itfelf has been almoft converted into fable, the plan appeared abfolutely neceffary, in order to enforce conviction. I have made it a rule therefore, throughout the whole work, to advance not a fingle fact, without fupporting it by unanfwerable authority: and I have not only grounded this hiftory on authentic documents, but have every where prefented thofe documents to the view of the reader. Further, to preferve diplomatic accuracy as much as poffible, I have in general quoted French documents in their original language. The whole therefore is an official report in the ftricteft fenfe.

As the Moniteur was the official French paper during the period which this history comprises, and the French themselves therefore cannot appeal from it, the first step which I took, was to examine every number of it from August 1791 to February 1793, and to transcribe all those articles in which French politicks had any reference, direct or indirect, to Great Britain. I then had recourse to the most celebrated publications of the French republicans. Brissot, Louvet, Chaussard, Dumouriez, &c. and especially the two collections which contain the private correspondence of Dumouriez with the war minister Pache and general Miranda, a correspondence which, though not generally known, throws great light on our present subject. I have likewise consulted the memoirs of the Marquis de Bouillé, Lally Tolendal's Defence of the Emigrants, the Memoirs of Bertrand de Molleville, and the collection of pieces published in defence of Louis XVI, not with the view of copying *opinions*, but of extracting *facts*, which the authors were competent to attest. The authentic correspondence of Mr. Miles with the

French minifter Le Brun and others, has afforded very material affiftance in inveftigating the mo-tives by which the French rulers were actuated in their conduct towards Great Britain: and it has furnifhed likewife much valuable information in regard to the real fentiments entertained by the Britifh government on the fubject of a war with France. Thefe fentiments have been further developed not only from his Majefty's fpeeches and the parliamentary debates, but from the *mea-fures* which were adopted by minifters, and which ftand recorded either in official notes, or authentic journals. The diplomatic papers which are quoted in this hiftory, are taken partly from the Moniteur, and partly from the two annual regif-ters; treaties, whether of peace, commerce, or alliance, are quoted from the accurate collection of profeffor Martens at Göttingen. Various other works have been occafionally confulted, as the reader will find in the courfe of the hiftory.

To the pains which I have taken in the fearch of materials I have endeavoured to add a fair and

candid uſe of them. I have ſuppreſſed no document, and no fact, which had come within my knowledge, (and I believe I have overlooked nothing of importance,) whether favourable or unfavourable to either party; and that what I have aſſerted, is indiſputably true, the reader himſelf will every where perceive, from the authority quoted in favour of each aſſertion. Whether I have been guilty of errors of judgment, and have drawn falſe concluſions from true facts, is a matter which the reader will likewiſe eaſily determine, as he is put in poſſeſſion of all thoſe premiſes which will enable him to judge for himſelf, and is therefore in leſs danger of receiving a falſe bias, even if the author has one. Indeed it is impoſſible to write a hiſtory of two living parties, without attaching oneſelf to either; or, if it is poſſible, he who poſſeſſes ſuch indifference, muſt be deſtitute of that energy, and of that ſpirit of perſeverance, which are requiſite in the collecting and the arranging of the materials for an hiſtory. With regard to myſelf, I honeſtly confeſs, that I am ſincerely attached to the preſent adminiſtration, and

that I take a decided part with it on the ſubject of the following hiſtory, not on account of any perſonal connexions, for I have not the honour of being acquainted with any one of the members of it, but becauſe a full inveſtigation of the ſubject, to which the following hiſtory relates, has convinced me, that not the Britiſh miniſtry, but the French rulers alone, were the authors of the war. Shall *the taking a decided part*, then, after an examination of the whole evidence on both ſides, be termed *partiality?* If this be admitted, the deciſion of every court of juſtice muſt be partial. But an hiſtorian muſt have already collected his materials, before he *begins* to compoſe his hiſtory; he muſt already therefore have formed a decided opinion on the reſult of thoſe materials. Conſequently, even if throughout the whole of his work he appears more attached to one party than to another, yet, if he ſuſpended his judgment till his collection of data was as complete as he could make it, that ſubſequent attachment can never deſerve the appellation of prejudice or partiality. His judgment, indeed, may be erroneous, but ſo may the

judgment of a man who is possessed of a stoical apathy, or an absolute indifference.

That historian alone can properly be called partial who *sets out* with the determination to justify, *at all events*, a particular party; who knowingly suppresses facts and documents which are unfavourable to it, and thus, by presenting his readers with a mutilated picture, deprives them of the power of forming a true judgment of the whole. This method has been very successfully practised during the present war, both at home and abroad: for, as most men want either the leisure, or the inclination, or the opportunity, to collect for themselves all those facts and documents which are necessary for the forming of a right judgment on a controverted point of history, they are seldom aware of the defectiveness of that information which an author thinks proper to lay before them; they fancy themselves in possession of every thing requisite for the illustration of the subject, and deduce therefore an inference diametrically opposite

to that which they would have deduced, had [illegible] been enabled, by a complete reprefentation of th[illegible] whole picture, to make a due eftimate of the refpective parts. Whether the following hiftory be likewife chargeable in this refpect, the public will eafily determine, becaufe every thing which appears in the leaft unfavourable to the Britifh government, has been already collected with great diligence; has been induftrioufly propagated, and is generally known. Indeed, had I been refolved, at all events, to juftify the prefent adminiftration in regard to the origin of the war, I fhould no where have been even tempted to fupprefs a fingle circumftance, which, when viewed alone, ap[illegible]ars to be unfavourable to it. For in every inftan[illegible] a bare comparifon with the actions of the Frenc[illegible] rulers is fufficient to vindicate the meafures of th[illegible] Britifh government; and the only reafon why the[illegible] meafures have been thought exceptionable by fo many well-meaning men, has been the want of an hiftorical parallel between the conduct of the French government on the one hand, and that of

I

the British government on the other, representing in what manner the former necessarily occasioned, and fully justified, the latter.

The history, now presented to the British public, I wrote originally in German*, a language, which a long residence in the university of Leipzig has rendered as familiar to me as my own. A desire of rescuing my native country from the calumnies of some German journalists, had induced me at the beginning of the year 1798, when the attention of all Europe was engaged with the threatened invasion of Great Britain, to draw up a short Essay, in the form of an Epistle, to à literary friend at Weimar, in which I endeavoured to shew, that whatever might be the issue of the important, and then doubtful conflict, the blame of its origin attached only to the rulers of France.

* It was published at Leipzig, in February 1799, under the title Historische Ueberſicht der Politik Englands und Frankreichs.

This Essay was printed in the German Mercury*, for March, 1798: and, as the period of the publication was very unfavourable to the author, the expectations of those, who were attached to the French cause, being at that time very high, it was not to be expected, that those journalists, who had asserted, that the coalition against France in 1791, was formed by the intrigues of the British cabinet, that the French rulers were solicitous for peace, but that the ministers of Great Britain, through mere hatred of the new republic, had resolved, at all events, to commence hostilities, and had so confidently repeated these assertions during several years, till at length they were received in almost every part of Germany, and in the adjacent countries, as indisputable truths †, it

* Der neue Teutsche Merkur. It is published monthly at Weimar; and the editor is the celebrated Wieland.

† An intimate friend in Leipzig, a man, in other respects extremely well informed, and moreover well-affected toward

was not to be expected, that ſuch men, under ſuch circumſtances, would ſilently permit the oracular authority, which they had ſo long enjoyed, to be queſtioned by a writer, who had given no proofs of experience in political hiſtory. The oppoſition, which was made, eſpecially by one of them *, determined me, therefore, to bring the queſtion at once to an iſſue, by laying before the public all the facts and documents, arranged in hiſtorical order, which concerned the relative politics of Great Britain and France, from the time of the coalition in 1791, to the declaration of war againſt Great Britain in February 1793. The deciſion was ſoon made: for my work had not long ap-

Great Britain, ſaid to me a few months before the preſent hiſtory (in German) left the preſs: "I heartily wiſh you ſucceſs, but I fear you have undertaken a deſperate cauſe." But he is *now* of opinion that the cauſe is perfectly good.

* Mr. Archenholz, formerly an enthuſiaſtic panegyriſt of Great Britain, and who even, in 1794, expreſsly ſaid, in his Annals of the Britiſh Hiſtory, "that the Britiſh miniſters did *not* wiſh for war." What has ſince induced him ſo vehemently to aſſert the contrary, is beſt known to himſelf.

peared, when the firſt literary reviews in Germany, though the contrary opinion had, till that time, very generally prevailed, pronounced that the Britiſh government was completely reſcued from the charges which had been laid to it, and that the origin, as well as the continuance of the war, muſt be wholly and ſolely aſcribed to the mad ambition of the French rulers*. Even the journaliſt, who had ſo virulently attacked the Eſſay inſerted in the German Mercury, has ſince thought proper to aſſume a very different tone: he has not ventured any longer to direct his invectives againſt the Britiſh government, but has turned them againſt the French Directory: and, though a candid acknowledgment of his errors was not to be

* See the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, for May 1799, No. 162; the Göttingen Review (Göttingiſche Anzeigen), 6th July, 1799, No. 106; and the analyſis which Mr. Gentz, the moſt eminent political writer now in Germany, has given of it in his Hiſtorical Journal (Hiſtoriſches Journal), for May 1799. The merits of this valuable journal are already known in England, from the extracts, which have been given of it in the Mercure Britannique.

expected from a man of his description, yet he has virtually acknowledged his inability to write a confutation*.

The work now presented to the British public, may, in one sense, be called a translation, as it was originally written in German: but as it proceeds from the author himself, it has an equal claim to the title of an original. In fact, it contains not a literal translation, but only the same narrative drawn up in another language, and supported by the same documents. In various places new matter has been added, and several alterations have been made in the arrangement of the materials. On the other hand, all allusions to German writers, with some other passages, which would have been

* In one of his journals, which appeared soon after my German work, he said, that to write a confutation would require more time and labour than he was able to bestow. This shuffling excuse, though it has not the merit of a candid confession, yet after the violent attack with which he had commenced hostilities, could proceed only from the consciousness of his inability to continue them.

uninterefting, if not unintelligible, to a Britifh reader, have been omitted.

The Appendix, containing a fhort ftatement of the attempts made by the Britifh government to reftore peace, is for the very reafon, that it is a mere appendix, neceffarily lefs diffufe: but, though the facts are compreffed into a fmall compafs, enough is given to enable the reader to form a juft opinion on the fubject. Authentic documents are here likewife invariably adduced in fupport of each fact.

With great deference I fubmit the whole to the judgment of my fellow-countrymen; and if they who have hitherto believed, either that the war might have been avoided, or that peace might have been reftored, fhould be convinced by it of the contrary, that unanimity of opinion, which is fo neceffary to carry us triumphantly through the prefent conflict, will be the refult of it. Few perfons indeed, fince the negotiation at Lifle in 1797, have afcribed the *continuance* of the war to the Britifh miniftry;

but there are thousands, who still ascribe to them its *commencement*, and consequently consider them as the original authors of every evil, which it has occasioned. If then the following history should convince those who still entertain this notion, that it is founded in error, the distrust, which throws a shackle on national energy, will be removed, the public burdens will be borne with patience, from the consideration, that it was not in the power of government to prevent the cause of them; domestic animosity will cease, and the efforts of every individual, who has not lost all affection for his country, will be directed against the French rulers, as the sole authors, as well as protractors, of the present war.

HERBERT MARSH.

August 4, 1799.

ERRATA.

Vol. I. p. 143,	Note 47,	Line 16,	for *deſtines*	read *deſtins.*
154		5	— *month*	— *mouth.*
158		2 & 5	— *year*	— *the year.*
167	— 14	13	— *will*	— *with.*
168		21	— *ambaſſy*	— *embaſſy.*
171		19	— *preſenting*	— *preventing.*
178	— 27 and 28 are miſplaced.			
181		15	— *was*	— *were.*
184		13	— *to contribute*	— *contribute.*
198		22 }	— 19	— 15
206		8 }		
227		4	— *ſend*	— *ſent.*
Vol. II. p. 9		5	— *been*	— *has been.*
14		9	— *wrote he*	— *he wrote.*
41		11	— *has*	— *had.*
119		19	— *even*	— *ever.*
256	— 31	11	— *ſort*	— *ſors.*

CONTENTS.

VOLUME I.

CHAP. I.

Conference at Pillnitz: and conduct of Great Britain in respect to the Coalition against France in 1791 p. 1

CHAP. II.

Insurrection of the negroes in the island of St. Domingo. Friendly conduct of Great Britain towards France on this occasion. And the ingratitude of the French national assembly to the British government p. 9

CHAP. III.

Other less important events relative to Great Britain and France in the year 1791 - - p. 19

CHAP. IV.

Meeting of the British parliament on the 31ſt of January 1792. His majeſty's ſpeech. Reduction of the Britiſh forces, both by ſea and by land. Ceſſation of the treaty of ſubſidy with Heſſe Caſſel. Abolition of taxes to the annual amount of two hundred thouſand pounds. Falſehood of the aſſertion, that Great Britain acceded, in March 1792, to what is called the treaty of Pavia. Meaſures taken at this time in France for an augmentation of its forces, both by ſea and by land - - - - - . p. 24

CHAP. V.

Declaration of war againſt the king of Hungary and Bohemia. Notification of it to the court of Great Britain by the French miniſter Chauvelin. Determination of the Britiſh cabinet to perſevere in the ſyſtem of neutrality; and Chauvelin's letter on this ſubject. Letter of thanks from the king of France to the king of England. Chauvelin's note to Lord Grenville, in which it was requeſted, that all Britiſh ſubjects might be forbidden to ſerve under any foreign power at war with France. Punctual compliance with this requeſt, in a proclamation of the 25th of May. Remarks on the conduct of the Britiſh cabinet - - p. 34

CHAP. VI.

Proclamation of May 21, 1792, againſt ſeditions writings; and confutation of the objections which have been made to it - - - - - p. 41

CHAP. VII.

Prorogation of the Britiſh parliament on the 15th of June. Speech from the throne. Chauvelin's note of the 18th of June, requeſting the mediation of Great Britain. Anſwer of the Britiſh cabinet. Reflections on this ſubject - - - - - - p. 58

CHAP. VIII.

Senſation produced in France, by the ſailing of five ſhips of the line and a few frigates from Portſmouth, to perform naval evolutions in the Channel: Propoſal made in the national aſſembly of an immediate armament of thirty ſhips of the line. Chauvelin's letter to his own government, containing poſitive aſſurances, that the Britiſh cabinet had no views of hoſtility. Reſolution of the national aſſembly, that Chauvelin's letter was ſatisfactory, and that a naval armament was unneceſſary - - - - - - p. 84

CHAP. IX.

Recall of the Britiſh ambaſſador from Paris, after the king of France was dethroned. Examination of the queſtion, whether this recall was a breach of neutrality toward France - - - - - p. 89

CHAP. X.

French conqueſts in Germany, the Netherlands, and Savoy. A French fleet in the Mediterranean haraſſes the coaſts of ſeveral Italian ſtates. Other naval armaments in France. Opening of the Schelde. Decree of the 19th of November, by which aſſiſtance was promiſed to all nations that were willing to take up arms againſt their governments. Deputies from certain Britiſh ſocieties appear at the bar of the national convention, and ſignify their intention of eſtabliſhing a national convention in Great Britain. Encouragement thereto on the part of the French convention. Meaſures taken in conſequence, and commotions in Great Britain. - - p. 108

CHAP. XI.

Official communications between the governments of Great Britain and Holland, on the progreſs of the French arms in the Auſtrian Netherlands. Uneaſineſs produced by the reſolution to open the Schelde. Further alarm in Great Britain occaſioned by the decree of the 19th of November, and the concomitant meaſures taken by the national convention in conjunction with certain Britiſh ſocieties. Proclamation of the 1ſt of December, for calling out the militia; and another of the ſame date for the meeting of parliament. Spirited declaration of the bankers, merchants, and other inhabitants of the city of London, in favour of the conſtitution. Meeting of parliament, and ſpeech from the throne. Means adopted for the external as well as internal defence of Great Britain. Reflections on this ſubject - p. 146

CHAP. XII.

Decree of the 15th of December 1792, and the interpretation of it by the executive council. New exhortation to all nations who were inclined to inſurrection. Menace in the national convention of an appeal from the government to the people of Great Britain, with Briſſot's interpretation of it. Barailon's

proposal, to except Great Britain from the decree of the 19th of November, rejected by the national convention. Circular letter of the marine minister, Monge, to the inhabitants of the French sea-ports, to rouse them to a war with Great Britain, and to attempt the conquest of it. Attack on a British ship of war before the harbour of Brest. Mission of Mr. Genet to the United States of America, with proposals of an alliance with France against Great Britain. Order issued by the French executive council to general Miranda, on the 10th of January 1793, to invade Dutch Flanders and the province of Zealand, at farthest within twelve days. Armament of thirty ships of the line and twenty frigates, in addition to the twenty-two ships of the line and the thirty-two frigates already in commission, in order to act against Great Britain - - - - p. 197

VOLUME II.

CHAP. XIII.

Diplomatic communications between Great Britain and France in December 1792 and January 1793, relative to the danger with which the former was threatened by the latter, and to the meaſures of defence which had been taken in conſequence. Willingneſs of the Britiſh miniſtry to negociate with the agents of the French government. Mr. Pitt's conference with Mr. Maret, and its want of effect occaſioned by the circumſtance that Mr. Maret had received no inſtructions whatſoever from the French government. Mr. Pitt's declaration to Mr. Maret, "that it would give him great pleaſure to treat with him as a confidential perſon from the French executive council." Refuſal of the executive council to let Mr. Maret negotiate, or even converſe on political ſubjects with the Britiſh miniſtry. Order ſent to him by the executive council to depart immediately from London, and to return to Paris. Negotiation carried on by Lord Grenville and Mr. Chauvelin. Reſult of this negotiation, and proof, that it was not in the power of the Britiſh government to prevent a rupture with France p. 1

CHAP. XIV.

Proof that the French rulers had fully resolved on a war with Great Britain some time before the middle of January 1793. Investigation of the motives which induced them to undertake it - - p. 105

CHAP. XV.

Events of the last fourteen days before the declaration of war. M. Chauvelin's demand on the 17th of January to be acknowledged as ambassador of the French republic. Answer of the British government, that under the existing circumstances it thought proper not to comply with the demand. Order sent to M. Chauvelin by the French executive council to return to France. Similar, but later order, on the part of the British government, with the motives thereto. Copies of the papers relative to the late negotiation laid before the States General by Lord Auckland, the British ambassador at the Hague, who accompanied them with a memorial on the conduct of the French rulers. Message from his majesty to the two houses of Parliament. Apparent preparations for a new negotiation made by General Dumouriez. De Maulde's journey to the Hague to propose a conference between Lord Auckland and General Dumouriez, on the frontiers of Holland. Mr. Maret's departure from Paris on the 26th

of January for London, where he remained eight days, but for want of inſtructions from the French executive council again produced no effect. Departure of Dumouriez from Paris on the ſame day, to hold the propoſed conference with Lord Auckland, to which the Britiſh goverment had conſented, but which did not take place, becauſe the national convention refuſed to await the iſſue of it, and declared war againſt Great Britain and Holland on the 1ſt of February 1793 p. 139

CHAP. XVI.

State of parties in France at the beginning of the year 1793. Junction of Robeſpierre's party with that of Briſſot on the ſubject of a war with Great Britain. The decree for war voted without one diſſenting voice. Eighteen pretexts alledged in juſtification of it. Confutation of thoſe pretexts. General recapitulation, and concluſion - - - - - p. 201

Appendix - - - - - p. 233

THE HISTORY OF THE POLITICKS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE FROM THE TIME OF THE CONFERENCE AT PILLNITZ TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN.

CHAPTER I.

Conference at Pillnitz: and Conduct of Great Britain in respect to the Coalition against France in 1791.

On the 27. of August 1791 the Emperor and the King of Prussia signed a Declaration [1] at Pillnitz, by

1) The following is the authentic Declaration, contained in the Memoires sur la Revolution Française par le Marquis de Bouillé, Tom. II. p. 133. and Martens Recueil des principaux Traités. Tom. V. p. 35.

which they agreed to take certain measures in respect to France, provided other powers, whose assistance had been already solicited, consented to support them. The powers, which had been invited to take part with the Emperor and the *King* of Prussia, were Spain,

"Leurs Majestés l'Empereur et le Roi de Prusse, ayant "entendu les desirs et les representations de Monsieur Frere "du Roi de France et de S. A. le Comte d'Artois, declarent "conjointement qu'elles regardent la situation ou se trouve "actuellement le Roi de France comme un objet d'un inté-"rêt commun à tous les souverains de l'Europe. Ils esperent "que cet intérêt ne peut manquer d'être réconnu par les "puissances, *dont les secours sont réclamés*, et qu'en conse-"quence elles ne refuseront pas d'employer conjointement "avec leurs dites Majestés les moyens les plus efficaces rela-"tivement à leurs forces, pour mettre le Roi de France en "etat d'affermir, dans la plus parfaite liberté, les bases d'un "gouvernement monarchique également convenable aux "droits des souverains, et au bien-être de la nation Française. "*Alors et dans ce cas*, leurs dites Majestés l'Empereur et le "Roi de Prusse sont résolus d'agir promptement, d'un mutuel "accord, avec les forces necessaires pour obtenir le but pro-"posé en commun. En attendant elles donneront à leur "troupes les ordres convenables pour qu'elles soient à portée "de se mettre en activité.

"Donné à Pillnitz le 27. Août 1791.

"Signé, Leopold.

Frederic Guillaume.

Ruſſia, England, and the principal ſtates of Italy: but their anſwers did not arrive till after the Conference at Pillnitz was ended, and the Emperor was returned to Vienna. On the 12. of September therefore the Emperor ſent for the Marquis de Bouillé, and addreſſed him in the following terms. "It was not in my "power to converſe with you ſooner on the ſubject, for "which I had requeſted your attendance, becauſe I had "not received the anſwers of the Courts of Ruſſia, "Spain, England, and the principal ſovereigns of Italy. "At preſent they are arrived, and correſpond to my "wiſhes and exſpectations: for I am aſſured of the "cooperation of all theſe powers, *with exception to Eng-* "*land, which is reſolved to preſerve the moſt ſtrict neu-* "*trality.* [2]„

Here we have a teſtimony, which places the conduct of the Britiſh Cabinet in the cleareſt point of view. The mere circumſtance, that its anſwer was not

It appears from this authentic document, that the report of a *partition* treaty at Pillnitz has no hiſtorical foundation. Even the ſix ſecret articles, of which however the authenticity is very uncertain, contain nothing of a partition, either of France, or of any other country. See Martens, T. V. p. 36.

2. The Emperor's own words were: „Je ſuis aſſuré de „la cooperation de toutes ces puiſſances, *à l'exception de* „*l'Angleterre, qui eſt determinée à obſerver la plus ſtricte neu-* „*tralité.*" Memoires de Bouillé, Tom. II. p. 139.

received by Leopold before the beginning of September, sufficiently proves, that the British Cabinet took no part in the Conference at Pillnitz [3]: and as the reply to the Emperor's proposal was decidedly in the negative, we have absolute proof that Great Britain had no concern in the coalition then forming against France. No one can object in this instance, that the real views of a cabinet are often at variance with its

3. Another proof, and one too of the highest authority, is Lord Grenville's Dispatch to Lord Malmesbury, dated 20 June 1797, and printed among the Papers relative to the Negotiation at Lisle. In this dispatch Lord Grenville said: "Your Lordship should take this opportunity to explain in "the most distinct and unequivocal terms, that if any secret "treaty was in fact concluded at the interview at Pillnitz, "between the late Emperor and the King of Prussia, which "is, to say the least, very doubtful in point of fact, this at "least is certain that his Majesty was no party to such treaty; "and not only was not then included in it, but has never "since adhered to it, nor even been apprised of its contents. "The public *Declaration*, which was made at that interview, "shews on the face of it, that his Majesty was no party to "it; and it is indeed notorious, that it applied to circum-"stances, which were done away long before the war broke "out between Austria and France, and that the subsequent "negotiations for the maintenance of peace between those "two powers, turned on points wholly distinct from those "supposed to have been referred to in the pretended *Treaty* "of Pillnitz."

protestations, since the answer was given to a question proposed, not by the Court of France, but by the Court of Austria. It is true, that if the British government had been resolved on a war with France, it would have been consistent with its own interest, to conceal its intentions from its future adversary: in like manner, as the French government, at the beginning of the American war, continued to give the British ambassador the most friendly assurances, even after war was resolved on at Versailles. But the British government could have no interest in deceiving the Emperor: on the contrary, it would have been prejudicial to its own interest, to assure the leader of the coalesced powers, that its positive determination was to preserve a strict neutrality, had it really intended to join the coalition. However should any one still doubt, whether the dispositions of the British Cabinet were friendly toward France or not, the answer given to the Emperor proves at least thus much, that Great Britain *at that period* took no part in a coalition against France.

Another very strong proof of this position is contained in a Letter written by the King of Sweden, dated 2. of September 1791, to the Marquis de Bouillé [4].

4. This Letter is printed in the Memoires de Bouillé. Tom. II. p. 142 — 145.

It appears from this Letter that the King of Sweden at that time intended to embark troops, which were to be landed on the coast of Flanders: but he was so far from expecting assistance, that he apprehended even opposition on the part of England, and said, *it would be a grand point gained, if England remained neutral.* [5] Hence it is evident that England no more made a common cause with the King of Sweden, than with the Emperor. In fact, the British government not only refused to join the coalition against France, [6] but

5. His own words were: Ce serait un grand point que la neutralité d'Angleterre, dont vous me parlez. Ib. p. 144.

6. If further proof were necessary, we might quote the authority of the French themselves. The Minister of the war department in a report delivered to the National Assembly on the 11. of October 1791, which in the Moniteur of the 13. of October occupies four whole columns, described very circumstantially the danger, which at that time threatened France from various powers of Europe, and mentioned them by name, but did not say a syllable of England. And Brissot in his Speech of the 20. October 1791 was so far from representing the English ministers as *encouraging* the princes of Europe to a confederacy against France, as some late writers have done without the least foundation, that on the contrary he spoke of them as mediators, and said, l'Angleterre etait occupée à *calmer* les esprits de Ratisbonne. Moniteur 22. Oct. 1791. But Brissot, it is said, was a friend of the English ministry! Now it must be observed

acted toward that country with the greateſt friendſhip, as will appear from the following chapter.

that this abſurd report was firſt propagated in the Spring of the year 1793, at the time that the power of the Girondiſts was on the decline, when Cambon, a principal member of the oppoſite party, in order to accelerate the fall of Briſſot, ſuggeſted that he was in ſecret alliance with the Engliſh miniſtry. The thought was ſo valuable to the Anarchiſts, who were then coming into power, that it was ſeized with great avidity; and as this party, at the head of which was Robespierre, maintained their authority a conſiderable time, it was brought by degrees into general circulation, without any one's knowing, or even aſking, whence it came. Briſſot (A ſes Commettans, p. 98. Paris 1793) ſays: "Cambon, "craint il la lumiere? Le mien (c'eſt à dire, bilan) eſt prêt; "il eſt dans un mot — *Rien;* et c'eſt la ſeule réponſe que je "fais à l'epithète qu'il m'a donnée, Allié de Pitt.,, In fact it would have been a very extraordinary alliance, ſince Pitt's adverſaries have claimed Briſſot as *their* friend, and a noble Peer at the head of the Oppoſition called him in his ſpeech of 1. Feb. 1793 (to uſe the words of the Moniteur 10. Feb. 1793) "un homme auſſi vertueux, qu'éclairé, *de l'amitié duquel il s'honore.,,* Briſſot's virulent abuſe of the Engliſh miniſtry a ſhort time before the declaration of war, as well as on the day, on which it was declared, is likewiſe not very reconcileable with his ſuppoſed friendſhip for them. But that was mere diſſimulation, it is ſaid. Now if that was mere diſſimulation, the Director Barras is likewiſe attached to the Engliſh miniſtry, and all his invectives are no-

thing more than a maſk, to cover his real friendſhip. In fact if another 18. of Fructidor ſhould take place, and the ſame fate ſhould befall Barras, which he prepared for his colleagues, Barthelemy and Carnot, it would be nothing extraordinary, to hear Barras decried as an agent of the Britiſh miniſter: for it has been the fate of the French rulers from the beginning of the revolution, to be adored, while in power, and to be calumniated, when fallen. — Laſtly in the catalogue of grievances, with which the national convention on the 1. of February 1793 accompanied the declaration of war againſt Great Britain, no charge whatſoever was laid to the Britiſh government, prior to the 10. of Auguſt 1792. See Moniteur 3. Feb. 1793. We may be aſſured therefore that the national convention itſelf was conſcious of the Britiſh government's having no concern in a coalition againſt France in 1791.

CHAPTER II.

Insurrection of the negroes in the Island of St. Domingo. Friendly conduct of Great Britain toward France on this occasion: and ingratitude of the French national assembly to the British government.

Toward the close of the summer of 1791, an insurrection broke out among the negroes of St. Domingo, which was so dreadful in its effects that the French inhabitants of the Island were reduced to a state of despair. The town of Cape Français was surrounded by a formidable army of the insurgents: and the inhabitants had neither a sufficient quantity of arms and ammunition to enable them to defend themselves, nor provisions sufficient to support a long blockade. Without speedy relief therefore, the French colony of St. Domingo must have been for ever lost to France: but from France itself, on account of its distance, speedy relief was not to be obtained. In this distressed situation, the governor of St. Domingo sent deputies to Lord Effingham, the governor of Jamaica, to request both provisions and ammunition: and Lord Effingham, with the consent of Admiral Affleck, sent immediately

two frigates, the Daphne and the Blonde, provided with all neceſſaries to Cape Français, and a third, the Centurion, to Port au Prince. The Daphne and the Blonde arrived at the Cape on the 26. of September. On board the former was M. Bryan Edwards, who in the preface to his Hiſtorical Survey of St. Domingo has circumſtantially deſcribed the manner, in which the aſſiſtance afforded to the diſtreſſed coloniſts was received. "The inhabitants of the town,, ſays Mr. Edwards, [1] "being aſſembled on the beach directed all "their attention towards us, and we landed amidſt a "crowd of Spectators, who with uplifted hands and "ſtreaming eyes gave welcome to their deliverers, for "ſuch they conſidered us, and acclamations of „vivent "les Anglais" reſounded from every quarter. The "Governor of St. Domingo was at that time the unfor-"tunate General Blanchelande, who has ſince periſhed "on the ſcaffold. He did us the honour to receive us "on the quay. A committee of the colonial aſſembly "accompanied by the Governor's only ſon, an amiable "and accompliſhed youth, had before attended us on "board the Blonde, and we were immediately con-"ducted to the place of their meeting. The ſcene was "ſtriking and ſolemn. The hall was ſplendidly illumi-"nated, and all the members appeared in mourning. "Chairs were placed for us within the bar, and the

1. P. 5.

"Governor having taken his ſeat at the right hand of "the Preſident, the latter addreſſed us in an eloquent "and affecting oration, of which the following is as "literal a tranſlation, as the idiom of the two langua-"ges will admit.„

"We were not miſtaken, Gentlemen, when we "placed our confidence in your generoſity; but we "could hardly entertain the hope, that, beſide ſending "us ſuccours, you would come in perſon to give us "conſolation. — Generous iſlanders! humanity has "operated powerfully on your hearts; you have yielded "to the firſt emotion of your generoſity, in the hopes "of ſnatching us from death, for it is already too late "to ſave us from miſery. What a contraſt between *your* "conduct and that of other nations![2] We will avail

2. What a contraſt likewiſe between the conduct of the Engliſh, and that of their own countrymen! While the northern diſtrict of St. Domingo was in the utmoſt want of proviſions, a French ſhip arrived laden with meal from Bordeaux, but the captain refuſed to diſpoſe of his cargo, becauſe the coloniſts were unable to pay him ready money. On this ſubject a complaint was afterwards made in the national aſſembly, in which the following letter from St. Domingo was read on the 11. of January 1792. "Les paroiſſes du Nord "manquaient de ſubſiſtences. Mr. Fournier, commandant le "Triton de Bordeaux, refuſait de fournir de la farine aux "habitans de Bongres, parceque ceux-ci epuiſés en ce mo-"ment ne pouvaient lui payer comptant. En vain lui avaient-

"ourſelves of your benevolence; but the days, you "preſerve to us, will not be ſufficient to manifeſt our "gratitude: our children ſhall keep it in remembrance. "Regenerated France, unapprized that ſuch calamities "might befall us has taken no meaſures to protect us "againſt their effects. With what admiration will ſhe "learn, *that without your aſſiſtance we ſhould no longer "exiſt as a dependency to any nation!*"

This addreſs of the Preſident of the Colonial Aſſembly is an unanſwerable proof, that the French were at that time indebted to the friendſhip of the Engliſh for the preſervation of their valuable colony of St. Domingo. They were under obligations likewiſe to the Britiſh *government:* for the Governor of Jamaica would not have ventured to ſupply the French coloniſts with arms and ammunition, unleſs he had been aſſured, that the diſpoſitions of his cabinet had been friendly toward France. And to remove all doubts on this ſubject, the Britiſh ambaſſador at Paris was ordered to notify to the Court of France, that his Majeſty approved of Lord Effinghams conduct. [3]

"ils rémontré, que ſon refus de fournir des farines allait les "expoſer aux plus affreux beſoins.," Moniteur, 12. Jan. 1792.

3. The following is the official note of the Britiſh Miniſter at Paris to the French Miniſter for foreign affairs. "Je "crois dévoir vous envoyer une lettre de Milord Effingham, "Gouverneur de la Jamaique, en date du 7. Septembre. Je

On the 5. of November the Note of the Britiſh Ambaſſador was taken into conſideration by the National Aſſembly [4]. The perſon however, who ſpoke firſt, propoſed neither a vote of thanks to the Britiſh government, nor even to Lord Effingham: but directed his whole attention to the ſtate of the French colony, till Mr. Dubayet reminded him of the obligations, which they owed to the generous governor of Jamaica. [5] Another member of the Aſſembly, but a perſon of ſo little importance, that his name was unknown even to the editor of the Moniteur [6], then propoſed a vote of thanks to the Britiſh government: but the motion was ſeconded by no one in the whole aſſembly. Upon this, Mr. Goujon moved, that the thanks of the Aſſembly ſhould be voted, neither to the Britiſh Government, nor to the Governor of Jamaica,

"dois vous annoncer, que le roi mon maitre a bien voulu "*approuver la conduite*, qu'a tenu le gouverneur en envoyant "tous les ſecours, dont il pouvait ſe paſſer, pour ſoutenir le "gouvernement de St. Domingue.,, Moniteur 6. Nov. 1791.

4. The whole debate is contained in the Moniteur 6. Nov. 1791.

5. "Vous devez jetter vos regards ſur la conduite de M. Effingham, gouverneur de la Jamaique, digne d'une grande nation, qui rivaliſe avec nous pour la liberté. Je demande qu'il lui ſoit voté des remercimens.,,

6. This appears from the circumſtance, that after Mr. a mere line is placed, inſtead of a name.

but to the Britiſh *nation*: [7] and this motion paſſed with only the following amendment, that Lord Effingham, as a member of the Britiſh nation, was named in particular. [8]

This ſtrange behaviour of the National Aſſembly was by no means calculated to promote that friendſhip with the Britiſh government, of which they had juſt received ſo ſtriking a proof. It was not only abſurd to thank a whole nation for an act, in which merely the government, the governor of Jamaica, and a few individuals of that iſland had taken part, but it was ungrateful and affronting to reject the thanks, which were propoſed, and were really due to the government of Great Britain. The object however, which the National Aſſembly had in view admits of no doubt: and we may ſafely conclude, that the ſyſtem, which the French rulers have ſince followed with ſo much ſucceſs, was at that time already adopted. [9]

7. Je demande qu'il ſoit voté des remercimens, non pas au gouverneur, non pas au gouvernement Anglais, mais à la *nation* Anglaiſe.

8. Mr. le Préſident. La motion eſt faite, à voter des remercimens à la nation Anglaiſe, et en particulier à Mr. Effingham, gouverneur de la Jamaïque.

La propoſition énoncée par M. le Préſident eſt adoptée.

9. This ſyſtem conſiſts in ſeparating the governed from their governors, in exciting the one againſt the other, that both of them may at laſt fall a prey to French avarice and

The conduct of the National Aſſembly was likewiſe in another reſpect highly ungrateful: for if the Britiſh miniſtry had thought proper to act on the ſame political principles, on which the French government acted at the commencement of the American war, or to retaliate its unjuſt aggreſſion, they might, without the leaſt difficulty, have gained poſſeſſion of the capital of

ambition. Briſſot ſaid: "Que penſaient les hommes éclairés, "républicains avant le 10. Août, les hommes qui voulaient "la liberté non ſeulement pour leur pays, mais pour toute "l'Europe? Ils croyaient qu'on pouvait l'établir par-tout, *en "ſoulevant les adminiſtrés contre les adminiſtrans*, en faiſant "voir aux peuples la facilité et les avantages de ces ſoulevemens.„ Briſſot à ſes commettans (Paris, May 1793) p. 81. And that this ſyſtem was already adopted at the end of the year 1791, appears from Iſnard's ſpeech in the National Aſſembly on the 5. Jan. 1792. In this ſpeech ſaid Iſnard: "Voici l'inſtant qui peut-être doit decider à jamais des de"ſpotes et des nations: c'eſt vous que le ciel réſervait à ces "grands événemens: élevez vous au niveau de vos deſtinées.„ And a few lines after: "Eſt-il bien vrai qu'un langage na"tional ne ferait entendu dans aucune contrée? Ah ſans "doute les Anglais ſeraient un peuple digne de l'entendre.„ Moniteur 6. Janv. 1792. This laſt paſſage ſhews likewiſe that the leaders of the National Aſſembly even at that time directed their attention to the people of England, who, in conſequence of their political liberty, were conſidered as fitter ſubjets for French intrigue than the inhabitants of any other country.

St. Domingo. The French marine was then in such a situation, that it could not have made the least resistance. Ever since the year 1789 the French sailors had been in a continual state of insurrection [10]: almost all the naval officers were dissatisfied [11], the greatest part of them had actually quitted the service, and many had already emigrated. Even those who were appointed in their stead, returned, almost to a man, their commissions, as soon as they received them [12]; and

10. All the documents relative to this subject are contained in the Memoires secrets, pour servir à l'histoire de la derniere année du regne de Louis XVI. Par A. F. Bertrand de Molleville, Ministre d'Etat à cette epoque (Londres 1797, Tom. III. 8.) Tom. II. p. 315 — 335.

11. Bertrand de Molleville (Tom. I. p. 291) says: "Un "esprit d'insubordination et de révolte s'était manifesté de "lui même dans les principaux ports de mer, et à bord de "plusieurs vaisseaux de guerre depuis l'année 1789. Plusieurs "officiers avaient été outragés et insultés par les matelots: "aussi tous les officiers en géneral étoient dégoûtés du service, "et je crus fermement que le Duc d'Orléans et le Comte "d'Estaing seraient les seuls d'un rang distingué qui consentiroient à servir, tant que la marine seroit soumise aux nouveaux réglemens.,,

12. "La désobéissance et la révolte étaient non seulement "tolérées, mais encouragées et regardées comme les marques "distinctives du patriotisme: aussi, *presque tous les officiers*

and Bertrand de Molleville, at that time Minifter of the marine, has himfelf acknowledged, that he fhould have found it difficult at the end of 1791 to have found an officer, who would have accepted the command of a fhip of war [13].

But even if the French marine had been in the beft poffible condition, there would have been no neceffity for ufing force, in order to accomplifh the end: for the inhabitants of St. Domingo were fo exafperated againft the National Affembly, to whofe proceedings they imputed their difafters [14], that all the

"*m'envoyèrent leurs démiffions dès qu'ils eurent reçu la lettre,* "*par laquelle je leur annonçais leur promotion*.,, Ib. T. I. p. 278.

13. Tom I. p. 263 he relates the following converfation, which took place at that period between himfelf and Mr. de Narbonne, the war Minifter. "Le jour où je parlai au con-"feil de ce refus des officiers, M. de Narbonne m'entreprit "en ces termes.,,

"Quoi! *tous les officiers refufent?* c'eft donc à dire, que "fi nous avions quelqu' inquietude relativement aux difpofi-"tions de l'Angleterre, et que je vous demandaffe une fré-"gatte pour croifer fur nos côtes, vous ne pourriez la fournir."

"Ce ne font pas les frégattes, qui nous manquent, re-"pondis-je: mais *dans ce moment je ferais fort embarraffé pour* "*trouver un officier, qui voulut fe charger d'en commander une*.,,

14. Edwards's Hiftorical Survey of St. Domingo; Pref. p. 10. They accufed particularly thofe members of the Affembly, who called themfelves Amis des Noirs, and

classes of the whites were disposed to renounce their allegiance to the mother country. "The black cockade, "says M. Edwards [15], was universally substituted in "place of the tri-coloured one, and very earnest wishes "were avowed in all companies, without scruple or "restraint, that the British administration would send "an armament to conquer the island, or rather to re-"ceive its voluntary surrender from the inhabitants.„ Very earnest application was likewise made to the British ministry, that an armament might be sent to take possession of the country: but no attention was paid to the solicitations of the colonists, till the French government had thought proper to declare war against Great Britain.[16] And this generous conduct has been repaid, on the part of France, with the blackest ingratitude.

whose conduct, as well as the effects, which it produced, M. Edwards has described in Ch. VII. See also Bertrand de Molleville Memoires secrets, Tom. II. p. 241 — 245. where an account is given of some papers, found in the hands of the mulatto Raimond, which contained the instructions communicated to the Negroes of St. Domingo by the Amis des noirs during the years 1790 and 1791, in order to excite them to rebellion.

15. Ib. ib.

16. Ib. p. 140.

CHAPTER III.

Other less important events, relative to Great Britain and France, in the year 1791.

On the 28. of September 1791 the King of France issued a proclamation, in which he formally notified his acceptance of the new constitution: and he wrote likewise circular letters to the different courts of Europe, to the same purpose. The court of Great Britain was one of the first, which sent an answer, and this answer was delivered in terms of great respect. [1] It may be said indeed that answers of this kind are mere matters of form: yet, when we consider, that several of the European courts answered much later, others not at all, that the King of Spain gave for answer, he regarded not the acceptance as an act of free will, and that the King of Sweden returned the letter delivered to him by the French minister at Stockholm, without even opening it, [2] the new legislative power of France had certainly reason to be satisfied with the early and friendly answer of the court of Great Britain.

1. It is contained in the Moniteur 5. Nov. 1791, and is dated Oct. 6. 1791.

2. Ib.

But another event took place before the close of the year, which could by no means afford the court of Great Britain reciprocal satisfaction. By the twenty fourth article of the treaty of commerce [3] it had been stipulated, that if one of the two contracting powers should be engaged in war with a third, all vessels belonging to subjects of the other power should be provided with sea-letters and certificates, that the masters of them, in case they should be suspected of carrying ammunition or any warlike stores to the enemies of the former power, which was strictly prohibited by the twenty second article, might be able to clear themselves. It had been further stipulated by the twenty sixth article, that if a ship of war belonging to the former power met a merchant-ship Belonging to any subject of the latter, the captain of the ship of war should have the liberty of sending a person on board the merchant-ship to examine the sea-letter and certificate. Agreably to these stipulations, Sir Richard Strachan, at that time Captain of the Phoenix, meeting with some French merchantmen on the coast of Malabar in November 1791, determined to examine their sea-letters and certificates: but

3. The treaty of commerce between Great Britain and France is printed among the State Papers, in the Annual Register for 1786: and also in Martens Recueil des principaux traités, Tom. II. p. 680 — 707.

as they were under convoy of a French frigate, he firſt ſent off an officer to ſignify his intentions to the captain, and to requeſt him to make the proper ſignal to the merchantmen under his convoy. Now as England was then engaged in a war with Tippoo Saib, who, as well as his predeceſſor, had always ſtood in cloſe alliance with France, and a ſuſpicion therefore muſt neceſſarily ariſe that theſe merchantmen were carrying warlike ſtores to the enemies of Great Britain, eſpecially ſince they were under convoy of a frigate, which, as France was then engaged in no war, appeared unneceſſary for veſſels, which had nothing contraband on board, the captain of the French frigate was in duty bound, to attend to the repreſentations of Sir Richard Strachan, and to make a ſignal to the veſſels under his convoy, to bring to, and clear themſelves. But inſtead of this he made a ſignal to the merchantmen to crowd ſail, and get off:, and, to prevent Sir Richard Strachan from following them, he attacked the Phoenix, as if Great Britain and France were then at war, nor did he even wait till the Engliſh lieutenant was returned on board, to make report to his captain. It is true, that the French frigate, after a ſhort engagement was obliged to ſtrike, [4] and that

4. Commodore, now Admiral, Cornwallis, who then commanded the Engliſh fleet at Tellichery gave orders however for her immediate releaſe.

her captain was ſo ſeverely wounded, that he paid for his temerity with the loſs of his life: his conduct however was not only a violation of the treaty of commerce, but an act of open hoſtility.

As ſoon as intelligence of this event arrived in England, government of courſe complained of it to the court of France: but the complaint was delivered in terms of great moderation, and it was requeſted only, that orders might be given to prevent ſimilar accidents in future, which might tend to deſtroy that harmony, which the Britiſh government ſincerely wiſhed to preſerve. But when the note of the Britiſh ambaſſador [5] was read in the National Aſſembly, the

5. It is contained in the Moniteur 12. April 1792, and is as follows,

"Milord Gower a l'honneur de communiquer à M. Du-"mourier la traduction des pieces dans leſquelles ſe trou-"vent les details du combat, qui a eu lieu entre le Phoenix, "et la fregatte Françaiſe la Reſolue. La premiere eſt une "lettre écrite par M. Strachan au Commodore Cornwallis: "l'autre eſt un recit de M. Parker lieutenant envoyé par le "Capitaine anglais à bord de la Fregatte Françaiſe. Il eſt "aiſé de ſe convaincre, que la conduite du capitaine anglais "eſt conforme aux traités, et que cette affaire ne doit pas "porter atteinte à la bonne harmonie qui ſubſiſte entre les "deux nations. Il parait que ſon objet était de s'aſſurer, ſi "les batimens Français ne contenaient aucunes des proviſions

members of it were ſo far from offering any ſatisfaction for the violation of the treaty of commerce and the act of open hoſtility, committed on the part of France, that they did not condeſcend to make even an apology for the paſt, or to promiſe ſecurity for the future. [6] On the contrary, they ſought only evaſions, to juſtify the conduct of the French Captain. At laſt, the matter was referred to a committee, and there it ended.

The preceding tranſaction, though in itſelf of no great importance, ſhews at leaſt the ſpirit, which animated the Britiſh government on the one hand, and the French National Aſſembly on the other. It ſhews

"militaires, qu'on eſt convenu par le traité de regarder "comme contrebande, et qu'il eſt reciproquement defendu "de fournir aux ennemis de l'une ou l'autre des parties con-"tractantes. C'eſt après cette communication amicale, que "le capitaine Français fit un ſignal ſur ſon bord pour que les "batimens Français fiſſent voile, au lieu d'amener. Il fit feu, "ſans attendre aucune explication ultérieure. La conduite "de ce dernier eſt repréhenſible, ſur-tout en ce qu'il a fait "feu, avant que le lieutenant du vaiſſeau Anglais fût de re-"tour à ſon bord. Sa Majeſté Britannique ne doute pas que "le Roi ne donne des ordres, pour prévenir déſormais des "evenemens ſemblables, qui pourraient troubler la paix, qu'il "aura toujours à coeur de maintenir.,,

6. See the Debates in the Moniteur 12. April 1792.

that the former was desirous to maintain peace, and that the latter was totally indifferent about it. [7]

CHAPTER IV.

Meeting of the British Parliament on the 31 of January 1792. His Majesty's Speech. Reduction of the British forces both by sea, and by land. Cessation of the treaty of subsidy with Hesse Cassel. Abolition of taxes to the annual amount of two hundred thousand pounds. Falshood of the assertion, that Great Britain acceded in March 1792 to what is called the treaty of Pavia. Measures taken at this time in France, for an augmentation of its forces by sea as well as by land.

On the 31. of January 1792 the session of the British Parliament was opened by a speech from the throne [1],

7. It shews the dispositions of the two governments even so late as April 1792: for though the engagement between the frigates took place in Nov. 1791, on which account I have related the whole transaction in this chapter, yet the news of the engagement arrived not in London before the beginning of April 1792.

1. See Rivington's Annual Register 1792, P. II. State Papers, p. 187: or New Annual Register, Public papers, p. 50.

in which his Majeſty, having mentioned the treaty of peace between the Emperor and the Porte, and the prelimaries already ſigned between the latter power and Ruſſia, concluded in the following terms, "The "friendly aſſurances, which I receive from foreign "powers, and the general ſtate of affairs in Europe, "appear to promiſe to my ſubjects the continuance of "their preſent tranquillity. Under theſe circumſtances "I am induced to think, *that ſome immediate reduction* "*may be ſafely made in our naval and military eſtabliſh-* "*ments:* and my regard for the intereſts of my ſubjects "renders me at all times deſirous of availing myſelf of "any favourable opportunity of *diminiſhing the public* "*expences.*"

On the 9. of February, when this ſubject was taken into conſideration by the Houſe of Commons, the number of ſailors and marines to be employed for the year 1792 was reduced to ſixteen thouſand: [2] and on the 16. of February, even the army of Great Britain, though at that time ſo inconſiderable in point of number, that no foreign power could have taken

1. Ib. p. 183. Ib. p. 145.

3. On the 16. of Febr. guards and garriſons were eſtimated, from Dec. 25. 1791 to June 24, 1792, at 17,013 men: but from June 25. to Dec. 24. 1792, at only 15,701. Ib. Ib.

umbrage at it, likewise underwent a reduction.[3] Further on the 17. of February Mr. Pitt informed the House that the Hessian subsidy being now expired, "his Majesty's ministers were not of opinion, that the circumstances of the country required its renewal.[4]" By these and similar reductions the annual expenditure of Great Britain received a diminution of four hundred thousand pounds: and it was resolved, that taxes should be abolished to the amount of one half of this sum, and that the other half should be applied to the diminution of the national debt[5].

The preceding measures sufficiently evince the peaceful disposition of the British cabinet, and its determination to take no part in a war against France. And as there seemed no reason to believe, at the beginning of the year 1792, that France itself would so soon attempt to disturb the repose of Great Britain, ministers flattered themselves with the pleasing expectation, that the plans, by which they endeavoured to promote the happiness of their country, would be continued without interruption. "Though I am not so vain," said Mr. Pitt on the 21. of February, "as to

4. New Annual Register 1792, British and foreign history, p. 38.

5. Ib. p. 40.

"suppose, that *all* my present speculations should "succeed agreably to my wishes, or that no unforeseen "event should prevent the execution of any one of "them: yet it is not unreasonable to expect, that the "peace, which we at present enjoy, should continue "at least *fifteen years*, since at no period of the British "history, whether we consider the internal situation of "the kingdom, or its relation to foreign powers, has "the prospect of war been further removed, than at "present.„ But unfortunately for Great Britain, and unfortunately for all Europe, these expectations were annihilated, in less than a year, by events, which no human sagacity could at that time predict.

The report, that England acceded in March 1792 to what was called the treaty of Pavia, [6] is contradicted by the facts, which have been already related in this chapter. It is even doubtful, whether the treaty itself, which is said to have been concluded in July 1791, be genuine or not [7]: but even if we suppose it to be genuine, England was no party to it, for

6. This treaty may be seen in Martens Recueil des principaux traités, Tom. V. p. 5.

7. Martens in the place just quoted says, that he is "fort eloigné d'annoncer comme digne de foi une piece, que le contenu, les circonstances qui ont précedé, la signature même, semblent déclarer apocryphe.„

there is not only no signature on the part of England,[8] but England is not once mentioned in it, either directly or indirectly. Consequently, the only question to be examined is, whether the report be true, that England acceded to it in the month of March following: and that this report, in support of which not a single fact has ever been adduced, is devoid of foundation, appears from the general conduct of the British government at this very period, which is wholly irreconcileable with the prospect of a war with France. But to remove all doubts on this subject, it will be necessary to inquire into the origin of the report, which took its rise not at the time of the pretended accession, but in the following month of November. In the Moniteur of the 18. Nov. 1792, the treaty of Pavia was printed: and after the signatures, which close every treaty, was added the following note by the editor, "England *passively* acceded to it in March 1792[9]." This anonymous note is the source, from which the report in question took its rise. In the first place therefore, we must ask: what did the unknown author intend to express by this *passive* acces-

8. The only names signed to this treaty are, Leopold, Prince of Nassau, Count Florida Blanca, Bischofswerder.

9. "Nota. L'Angleterre y a *passivement* accedé en Mars 1792."

ſion? Does the epithet apply to the act of acceſſion, as the conſtruction ſeems to indicate, or to the meaſures, which England was to adopt in conſequence of the acceſſion? Either to the one, or to the other, it muſt neceſſarily apply, if the note be not abſolutely devoid of meaning. But no government can accede to a treaty, without ſignifying its acceſſion by ſome *poſitive* act, ſuch as the ſignature of an ambaſſador. A *paſſive* acceſſion, therefore, if regard be had to the acceſſion itſelf is a contradiction. Nor will the explanation be more ſatisfactory, if reference be made to the meaſures, which England was to adopt in conſequence of the acceſſion: for the acceſſion to a treaty on the one hand, and a perfectly paſſive conduct on the other, are two things, which, though not in direct contradiction, are yet of ſuch a nature, that the one deſtroys the other. The note therefore in the Moniteur, in whatever way we interpret it, contains its own confutation. This was clearly perceived by thoſe commentators and quoters of the note, who were inimical to the Britiſh government: and for that reaſon they have omitted the inconvenient word "paſſively,", which the author of the note had cautiouſly inſerted, becauſe ſix months had then already elapſed after the pretended acceſſion, and yet no viſible effect had been produced in the conduct of the Britiſh adminiſtration.

It appears then, on a near examination, that the report in queſtion is founded, firſt on an anonymous and contradictory note in the Moniteur of the 18. Nov. 1792, and ſecondly on arbitrary alterations, which have been made in ſubſequent copies of it. How then is it poſſible, that any man, who has a regard for truth, can ſubſcribe to a report, which reſts on *ſuch* a foundation? Indeed I believe that every man, who has ſeriouſly inquired into it, muſt perceive its falſity. The author of the Britiſh and foreign hiſtory in the New Annual Regiſter for 1793, whom no one will accuſe of partiality in favour of miniſters, is himſelf of opinion, "that the inſinuation is merely the effect of party malevolence. [10]" Nor did Briſſot believe in this idle ſtory: for in his ſpeech of the 12. of Ianuary 1793, which was delivered nearly two months after the treaty of Pavia and the above-mentioned note appeared in the Moniteur, he acknowledged [11], that England had obſerved the moſt ſtrict neutrality in reſpect to France, till after the 10. of Auguſt [12] 1792.

10. See p. 7.

11. His own words are, „Le cabinet de Saint James a pluſieurs fois proteſté d'obſerver ſcrupuleuſement la neutralité envers la France, *et en effet elle a été jusqu' à l'immortelle journée du* 10. *Août.*" Moniteur 15. Jan. 1793.

12. Whether the neutrality was violated after this period, is a queſtion, which will be examined in the ſequel.

And on the 13. of January 1793 the national convention itself admitted [13], that the obſervation of this ſtrict neutrality toward France, on the part of England, had been continued even to the beginning of the year 1793. But the national convention would certainly not have made this confeſſion, unleſs at leaſt a majority of its members had been perſuaded, that the report of England's acceſſion to the treaty of Pavia was ungrounded. The very ſame confeſſion contains likewiſe a direct acknowledgement on the part of the French government, that England had no concern in any coalition againſt France either in 1791 or 1792.

We have ſeen that the Britiſh cabinet in the ſpring of the year 1792, by a reduction of the army and navy, by the abolition of the treaty of ſubſidy with Heſſe Caſſel, by the repeal of taxes to the amount of two hundred thouſand pounds, and by a decided reſolution to engage in no coalition againſt France, evinced a manifeſt diſpoſition to peace with

13. The introduction to the decree of the 13. Jan. 1793 is as follows. "La convention nationale informée par le "miniſtre des affaires étrangeres des préparatifs extraordi-"naires de l'Angleterre, conſiderant le changement de con-"duite de ce pays relativement au caractere de neutralité, "*qu'il avait conſervée jusqu'ici, touchant les affaires de la* "*France, etc.*„ Moniteur 16. Jan. 1793.

that country. Yet at this very period France itself not only took very active measures for an augmentation of its army, but likewise, what is not generally known, and what could have reference only to England, made preparations for an augmentation of its marine. On the 18. of March 1792, which was full six weeks after the British Parliament had reduced the sailors and marines to be employed that year to *sixteen thousand*, Theodore Lameth, in the name of the committee for naval affairs, delivered a report to the national assembly, in which he said, "that about *eighty thousand* "sailors would be necessary, in order to man the vessels "now at the disposition of the state, and which the "honour of the nation, as well as the interest of its "commerce, *does not permit us to reduce* [14]." The committee further requested the national assembly to take the speediest measures for the organisation of the navy [15]: and the proposal was made with an enthusiasm,

14. „L'armement entier des batimens, dont l'etat peut disposer aujourd'hui, et que l'honneur de la nation, ainsi que l'interêt de son commerce *ne permet pas de rédnire*, exigeroit environ 80.000 matelots. Moniteur 31. Mars 1792.

15. "C'est au nom de ces troupes, dont le courage soutint "toujours l'état du pavillon Français etc, que notre comité "vous supplie, *de ne pas différer* l'organisation de l'artillerie, "et des troupes de la marine.„ Ib.

ſiaſm, which indicated a diſpoſition to engage in a war by ſea [16], as well as by land.

It is true, that theſe were only preparatory ſteps to an augmentation of the French marine: but as they were taken at a time, when England had juſt made ſo conſiderable a diminution in its own naval force, the conduct of the national aſſembly unavoidably excited the ſuſpicion of an hoſtile diſpoſition toward England. The Engliſh government however ſtill adhered to its principles of neutrality: and as the whole attention of France was ſoon after directed to a war on the continent, the intended augmentation of the French marine was of courſe deferred to a more convenient opportunity.

16. Notre artillerie *prête à gronder ſur tous les mers*, etc. Ib.

CHAPTER V.

Declaration of war against the King of Hungary and Bohemia. Notification of it to the court of Great Britain by the French minister Chauvelin. Determination of the British cabinet to persevere in the system of neutrality: and Chauvelin's Letter on this subject. Letter of thanks from the King of France to the King of England. Chauvelin's Note to Lord Grenville, in which it was requested, that all British subjects might be forbidden to serve under any foreign power at war with France. Punctual compliance with this request in a proclamation of the 25. of May. Remarks on the conduct of the British cabinet.

On the 20. of April 1792 the National Assembly decreed almost unanimously [1], and amidst the plaudits of a numerous crowd of spectators, war against the King of Hungary and Bohemia. The French minister in London made a formal notification of it to the court of Great Britain: and the conduct which our government

1. Only seven members voted against the war. See the Moniteur 22. April 1792.

obſerved on this occaſion, affords a new proof of its reſolution to preſerve the moſt ſtrict neutrality. Chauvelin's letter to his own court, dated 28. of April, is decifive on this ſubject [2].

Immediately on the receipt of Chauvelin's letter, the King of France wrote a letter of thanks to the King of England [3], dated 1. of May, in which he ſaid, "I embrace this opportunity to expreſs to your "Majeſty, how ſenſible I am of all the public marks "of affection you have given me. *I thank you for not "having become a party to the concert formed by certain "powers againſt France.*„

2. "Londres le 28. Avril 1792.

"J'ai communiqué au Lord Grenville toutes les pieces, "que vous m'aviez addreſſées relativement à la declaration "de guerre. L'effet de cette nouvelle a été de produire une "baiſſe aſſez conſiderable dans les fonds publics. M. Pitt a "fait dementir dans tous les papiers les bruits qui couraient, "que des ordres avaient été donnés pour la preſſe. Il a ré- "pondu formellement à une députation de commerce, *que le "gouvernement ne ſe mêlerait pas des affaires de la France.* "L'interêt qu'il met à ſoutenir les fonds publics eſt une nou- "velle garantie de ſa neutralité. La guerre n'eſt pas du gout "de la nation; on ne fait aucuns preparatifs, ni dans les "ports, ni dans les arſenaux. *Il eſt certain, que le ſyſteme de "neutralité, débattu au conſeil, y a été adopté.*„ Moniteur 8. May 1792.

3. See New Annual Regiſter 1792. Public papers, p. 96: or Rivington's Annual Regiſter 1792. State papers p. 256.

On the 15. of May the French ambassador communicated a note to Lord Grenville [4], in which, after a long and detailed representation of the motives, which had induced the national assembly, to declare war against the King of Hungary and Bohemia, and after the most solemn protestation, first, that France renounced every idea of aggrandizement, and secondly, that France would never interfere in the internal concerns of other nations [5], the following demand was made of the court of Great Britain. "That conformably

4. In the New Annual Register, 1792. Public papers p. 99, this note is dated 15. of May; but, probably owing to an error of the press, it is called in the superscription p. 97, a note presented 12. of May. That 15. May is the true date, is certain: for not only Lord Grenville in his answer to this note, but likewise Mr. Chauvelin himself in his two following notes of the 24. of May and the 18. of June, quotes it as a note dated 15. of May. This determination is not superfluous, because several writers, in consequence of the above mentioned typographical error, have ascribed to the note in question a false date.

5. Whether the French rulers have kept their word, in regard to this solemn protestation, which they had already made in their Manifesto to all states and nations on the 29. of December 1791, is a question, which no one *at present* will venture to answer in the affirmative. An appeal to it therefore can prove nothing more, than the *hypocrisy* of those, who made it.

"to the treaty of navigation and commerce of the 26. "of September 1786, his Britannic Majeſty ſhall pro- "hibit all the ſubjects of Great Britain and Ireland, "(and publiſh the order in the uſual way throughout "the two kingdoms and the iſlands and countries de- "pendent thereon) from committing any hoſtilities "againſt French ſhips at ſea: and that they ſhall not "take out any patent, commiſſion, or letters of repriſal, "from the different princes, or ſtates, who are or ſhall "be at war with France, or make uſe in any way of "ſuch patents or commiſſions.„

With this demand the court of Great Britain punctually complied: for in ten days after the receipt of Mr. Chauvelin's Note, a proclamation [6], dated 25. of May [7], was publiſhed agreably to his own pre-

6. See Rivington's Annual Regiſter 1792. State papers, p. 195: or New Annual Regiſter 1792. Public papers, p. 99.

7. On the preceding day Lord Grenville ſent a Note to Mr. Chauvelin, in which, after expreſſing his concern for the hoſtilities, which had broken out between France and Auſtria, he aſſured the French ambaſſador, that the court of Great Britain was ready "to fulfil in the moſt exact man- "ner the ſtipulations of the treaty of navigation and com- "merce, of which his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty required the "execution.„ See Rivington's Annual Regiſter 1792, State papers, p. 259.

ſcription, containing the following order relative to the ſubject in queſtion. "Whereas the moſt Chriſtian "King hath cauſed application to be made to his Ma-"jeſty, that his Majeſty would conformably to the "article of the treaty of navigation and commerce con-"cluded at Verſailles 26. of September 1786, renew "and publiſh in all his dominions and countries the "ſtrict and expreſs prohibitions contained in the ſaid "article; his Majeſty doth hereby ſtrictly forbid all "his ſubjects to receive any commiſſion, for arming "and acting at ſea as privateers, or letters of repriſals, "from any enemy of the moſt chriſtian king, or, by "virtue or under colour of ſuch commiſſions or repriſals, "to diſturb, infeſt, or any ways damage his ſubjects; "or to arm ſhips as privateers, or to go out to ſea "therewith, under the ſevereſt puniſhments that can "be inflicted on the tranſgreſſors, beſides being liable "to make full reſtitution and ſatisfaction to thoſe, to "whom they have done any damage.„

The French government had certainly reaſon to be ſatisfied with this friendly conduct of the Britiſh court: and in fact it was ſo, as appears from the following paragraph in Mr. Chauvelin's Note to Lord Grenville of the 18. of Iune [8]. "The underſigned

8. The original is printed in the Moniteur 20. July 1792: and an Engliſh tranſlation in Rivington's Annual Re-

"minister plenipotentiary of his majesty the king of "the French has transmitted to his majesty the official "note, which Lord Grenville addressed to him on the "24. of May last, on the part of his Britannic Majesty, "in answer to that, which he had the honour to deli- "ver to him on the 15. of the same month, together "with the royal proclamation published in consequence "of it. He is directed to assure his Britannic Majesty "of the due sense, which the king entertains of *the "friendly dispositions, and of the sentiments of humanity, "of justice, and of peace, which are so clearly manifested "in that answer* [9]." Since then the French government itself expressed so much satisfaction at the conduct of the British court relative to Mr. Chauvelin's note of the 15. of May, one should suppose, that no one would venture to make this very conduct a subject of animadversion and complaint. But as the three following charges have been preferred by British writers, first that Mr. Chauvelin was suffered to wait too long for his answer, secondly that in Lord Gren-

gister, 1792, State papers, p. 263. In the New Annual Register it is omitted.

9. The words of the French original are, "Il a reçu "l'ordre de présenter à sa majesté britannique le temoignage "de la sensibilité du roi aux *dispositions amicales, et aux sen- "timens d'humanité, de justice, et de paix, si bien manifestés "dans cette réponse.*"

ville's anſwer no notice was taken of the motives, which had induced the national aſſembly to declare war againſt the King of Hungary, and thirdly that in the interval was iſſued a proclamation againſt ſeditious writings in Great Britain, it is neceſſary to make a particular reply to each. With reſpect to the firſt charge, every impartial man muſt admit, that an interval of nine days, for it was really no more [10], was by no means an exorbitant length of time for the deliberations on the demand of the French government, and the preparation of a proclamation, which was to ſerve as a rule for all Britiſh ſubjects during the war, eſpecially as the Britiſh government was at that time engaged with domeſtic concerns of the higheſt importance. The ſecond charge is ſtill more extraordinary: for if Lord Grenville in his anſwer to Mr. Chauvelin's note had taken notice of the motives, which had induced the national aſſembly to declare war againſt the king of Hungary, he would have acted in direct oppoſition to the principle, which the French themſelves continually repeated, that no nation has a right to intermeddle in the affairs of another. And in regard to the proclamation againſt ſeditious writings, which

10. Lord Grenville's anſwer was dated 24. of May, and Mr. Chauvelin's Note, as I have already proved, was dated 15. of May.

was iſſued on the 21. of May, it ſtood in no connexion with the diplomatic relations between Great Britain and France: it related ſolely to matters of national police, and theſe were of too much conſequence to be deferred, in order that Mr. Chauvelin might receive his anſwer a few days ſooner. In fact the proclamation of the 21. of May has ſo little reference to the preſent hiſtory, that it might be ſafely paſſed over in ſilence: but as ſeveral writers have contended, that it evinced a hoſtile diſpoſition toward France, we will examine it at full length in the following chapter.

CHAPTER VI.

Proclamation of the 21. of May 1792 againſt ſeditious writings: and Confutation of the objections, which have been made to it.

During a conſiderable time before the appearance of this proclamation various political publications, which by no means contributed to promote the welfare of the Britiſh conſtitution, had been circulated with great aſſiduity throughout Great Britain. And theſe publications were not works of cool and philoſophical inquiry, they were not calculated to exerciſe the judgement of the learned, but to inflame the paſſions of the illite-

rate. They were designed chiefly for the lower classes, to whose understandings they were particularly adapted: and that the poorest individual might be enabled to procure them, not only the cheapest possible editions were published, but even those cheap editions were sold at a price, which could hardly repay the expences of printing. In these publications the lower classes were taught, that the British constitution, the pride of Britons and the envy of foreigners, a constitution, which Montesquieu and De Lolme had made the theme of their admiration, was a system of slavery [1].

1. This was particularly Mr. Paine's doctrine, who asserted in the most general terms that "*all* kings were tyrants, and their subjects *slaves*.„ See New Annual Register 1792, British and foreign history p. 72. whence it likewise appears, that Paine's writings had been circulated even in public schools. That Paine's second part of the Rights of Man was a libel on the constitution, was admitted in the House of Commons on the 30. of April 1792 by an eminent leader of opposition: and a celebrated writer of the same party has likewise granted, that several publications, at that time in general circulation, „were according to the just theory of the law unquestionably libels.„ The same writer adds, "these *irregularities* and *excesses* were for a considerable length of time wholly overlooked by government:„ and it may be further added, that, if these avowed excesses had been any longer treated with indulgence, the revolution, which soon after deprived the king of France of his throne, would in all probability have extended itself to Great Britain.

They were taught to believe, that evils, which not even the wiseſt adminiſtration can remove, were merely the reſult of political inſtitutions, which diſtributed wealth and power in unequal portions, as if the ſame advantages were to be derived from indolence and ignorance, as from induſtry and talents. Even imaginary evils were repreſented as real ones, and cauſes, which had formerly produced content, were converted into motives of complaint. Before this period the lower, as well as the higher orders of ſociety, had been inſtructed in the uſeful leſſon, that, as they were privileged on the one hand to exerciſe the rights of free-born Britons, they were bound on the other hand to fulfil the duties of good citizens. But by the new doctrine the lower claſſes eſpecially were informed, that the *Rights* of man muſt now occupy their whole attention, and that theſe rights, if properly exerciſed, would lead to wealth, to power, and to honour. This doctrine unavoidably produced a very ſenſible effect: for where ſhall we find a man, who poſſeſſes not vanity and ambition, who would not rather be rich than be poor, who would not rather govern, than be governed? The ignorant and the unwary regard only *immediate* conſequences, and have not ſufficient penetration to diſcover *ultimate* effects. They perceive not, that a ſyſtem in which all men chuſe to govern, can no where be of long duration, that, though well calcu-

lated to deftroy an exifting conftitution, it muft ceafe the moment a new one is erected, what ever fhape the new conftitution affumes, or however fplendid the title, with which it is adorned. They perceive not that a fyftem, which leads immediately to anarchy, muft ultimately lead to defpotifm, and that the feverity of the latter is always proportioned to the exceffes of the former [2]: nor are they aware, that they are mere inftruments in the hands of a few ambitious demagogues, who amufe mankind with the magic words of liberty and equality, not with a view of promoting the happinefs of their fellow citizens, or of introducing a real fyftem of equality, which can no where exift, but folely to exchange the old fyftem of inequality for one, which is better adapted to gratify their private vanity and ambition. Further, the effects of the new doctrine were fo much the more extenfive, as the writings, in which it was contained, were not merely circulated in the common courfe of trade, but were induftrioufly diftributed by numerous focieties, who had correfpondents in every part of the kingdom. Laftly, one at leaft of thefe focieties, the fociety for conftitutional information, a fhort time before the proclamation of the 21 of May, opened by its own avowal a correfpondence with the jacobin club in Paris

2. The tyranny of Robespierre affords a ftriking proof.

whose grand object was the destruction of monarchical government of every description, in which it likewise succeeded in its own country within ten weeks after the period in question [3]. Under these circumstances

3. So early as the 4. of May 1792, the society for constitutional information resolved that a committee should be appointed to consider of a correspondence with the jacobin club in Paris, as appears from an advertisement inserted by order of the society in the Morning Chronicle 8. May. And about the middle of this month, an address was actually voted and sent to the jacobin club, containing the following passages. "Brothers, and fellow-citizens of the world, the "cordial and affectionate reception, with which you have "honoured our worthy countrymen Mr. Thomas Cooper and "Mr. James Watt, members of the society at Manchester, "and united with our society, has been communicated to us "by the correspondence of those gentlemen,, (From this passage we learn, that even before the month of May 1792 deputies had been sent to the jacobin club). — "It is not "among the least of the revolutions, which time is unfolding "to an astonished world, that two nations nursed by some "wretched craft in reciprocal hatred, should so suddenly "break their common odious chain, and rush into amity. "The principle, that can produce such an effect is the off-"spring of no earthly *court:* and whilst it exhibits to us the "expensive iniquity of *former* politics, it enables us with "bold felicity to say, *We have done with them.* In contem-"plating the political condition of nations, we cannot con-"ceive a more diabolical system of government, than that

the British cabinet deemed it necessary to issue the following proclamation.

"which has hitherto *generally* been practised over the world." Though this language is cautiously obscure, its meaning is very easy to be discovered. — That the address was sent to the jacobin club at Paris at least a week before the proclamation of the 21. of May was issued, appears from the resolution entered into by the society on the 18. of May, (which in the Morning Chronicle of the 25. of May immediately precedes the address itself), namely, "The following "address to the friends of the constitution at Paris, com-"monly called Jacobins, and which was by the direction "of this society sent to them *last week*, was ordered for "publication." The information therefore, which government received of this address was probably one of the principal motives to the proclamation of the 21 of May: and every man, who thinks the British constitution worth preserving, must admit, that it was high time, to put a stop to proceedings, which tended to the destruction of it. The society of the Friends of the People, at a meeting held on the 12. of May, in consequence of a letter from the chairman of the society for constitutional information, and four days after the advertisement relative to the then intended address to the jacobin club had appeared in the Morning Chronicle, resolved that an answer should be returned, which concluded in the following words. "We decline all "intercourse with a society, whose views and objects, as "far as we can collect them from the various resolutions and "proceedings, which have been published, we cannot help

"Whereas divers wicked and seditious writings "have been printed, published, and industriously "dispersed, tending to excite tumult and disorder, by "endeavouring to raise groundless jealousies and discon-"tents in the minds of our faithful and loving subjects, "respecting the laws and happy constitution of govern-"ment, civil and religious, established in this king-"dom, and endeavouring to vilify and bring into con-"tempt the wise and wholesome provisions made at the "time of the glorious revolution, and since strengthened "and confirmed by subsequent laws, for the preserva-"tion and security of the rights and liberties of our "faithful and loving subjects; and whereas divers wri-"tings have also been printed, published, and indu-"striously dispersed, recommending the said wicked "and seditious publications to the attention of our "faithful and loving subjects: and whereas we have "also reason to believe that correspondencies have been

"regarding as *irreconcileable with those real interests*, on "which you profess to inform and enlighten the people.,, See the Morning Chronicle 14. May 1792. Since then the society of the friends of the people have declared that the proceedings of the society for constitutional information were irreconcileable with the real interests of the people of Great Britain, no one of its members can represent the proclamation of the 21. of May as unnecessary, without arraigning the proceedings of his own society.

"entered into with sundry persons in foreign parts, "with a view to forward the criminal and wicked pur-"poses above-mentioned: and whereas the wealth, "happiness and prosperity of this kingdom do, under "divine providence, chiefly depend upon a due sub-"mission to the laws, a just confidence in the integrity "and wisdom of parliament, and a continuance of that "zealous attachment to the government and constitu-"tion of the kingdom, which has ever prevailed in the "minds of the people thereof: and whereas there is "nothing, which we so earnestly desire, as to secure "the public peace and prosperity, and to preserve to "all our loving subjects the full enjoyment of their "rights and liberties, both religious and civil: We "therefore being resolved, as far as in us lies, to re-"press the wicked and seditious practises aforesaid, and "to deter all persons from following so pernicious an "example, have thought fit by the advice of our privy "council, to issue this our royal proclamation, solemnly "warning all our loving subjects, as they tender their "own happiness, and that of their posterity to guard "against all such attempts, which aim at the subversion "of all regular government within this kingdom, and "which are inconsistent with the peace and order of "society; and earnestly exhorting them at all times, "and to the utmost of their power to avoid and discou-

"rage

"rage all proceedings tending to produce riots and tu-
"mults. And we do ſtrictly charge and command all
"our magiſtrates in and throughout our kingdom of
"Great Britain, that they do make diligent inquiry,
"in order to diſcover the authors and printers of ſuch
"wicked and ſeditious writings, as aforeſaid, and all
"others, who ſhall diſperſe the ſame: and we do fur-
"ther charge and command all our ſheriffs, juſtices of
"the peace, chief magiſtrates in our cities, boroughs
"and corporations, and all other our officers and magi-
"ſtrates throughout our kingdom of Great Britain, that
"they do, in their ſeveral and reſpective ſtations, take
"the moſt immediate and effectual care to ſuppreſs and
"prevent all riots, tumults, and other diſorders, which
"may be attempted to be raiſed or made by any perſon
"or perſons, which, on whatever pretext they may be
"grounded, are not only contrary to the law, but dan-
"gerous to the moſt important intereſts of this king-
"dom. And we do further require and command all
"and every our magiſtrates aforeſaid, that they do
"from time to time, tranſmit to one of our principal
"ſecretaries of ſtate, due and full information of ſuch
"perſons, as ſhall be found offending as aforeſaid, or
"in any degree aiding or abetting therein: it being our
"determination, for the preſervation of the peace and
"happineſs of our faithful and loving ſubjects, to carry

"the laws vigourously into execution against such offen-"ders as aforesaid [4]."

It is evident, that this proclamation had no relation to the government of France: it was a mere act of national police, which no more concerned the French government, than the measures taken in France relative to the emigrants concerned the English government. France therefore had no right to complain of it, as an eminent opposition writer has himself acknowledged. But if France had no right to complain of it, what right can any man possess, to represent it as inimical to France? The period however, it is said, at which the proclamation was issued, was very critical. This is perfectly true: but the period was critical for *England*. Why therefore might not government take measures to prevent an impending evil, as well at this, as at any other time? It is further objected, that there is an expression in the proclamation, which *may* be applied to certain Frenchmen, namely, "that correspondencies have been entered into with sundry persons in foreign parts." Now the term "sundry persons in foreign parts," is so general, that no one would apply it to himself, who was not conscious of having

4. Rivington's Annual Register 1792, State Papers, p. 192: or New Annual Register, 1792, Public Papers, p. 52.

corresponded with a political ſociety in England [5]. Nor does the queſtion relate to a *government*, but ſimply to *individuals:* no government therefore, and conſequently not even that of France, could be affected by it, however clear the reference might have been to certain inhabitants of that country. Even if a particular expreſſion had been uſed inſtead of a general one, if inſtead of "ſundry perſons in foreign parts" had been ſaid "ſundry Frenchmen", no objection could have been made to it, ſince the ſociety for conſtitutional information, by its own avow al commenced a correſpondence with the jacobin club in Paris before the appearance of the preſent proclamation, not to mention the numerous, but leſs dangerous, addreſſes, which had been tranſmitted to various ſocieties in France during more than two years paſt [6]. In fact it was the *Britiſh* government, and the Britiſh government alone,

5. Condorcet, in his report to the national aſſembly on the 16. of February 1792, relative to a conſpiracy againſt the new conſtitution of France, ſpoke in much ſtronger terms of a connexion between the leaders of it and perſons in other countries. Why did not the Britiſh government apply to itſelf the general expreſſions uſed by Condorcet? The anſwer is obvious. Becauſe it was conſcious of having no concern in a conſpiracy againſt the French conſtitution.

6. See Rivington's Annual Regiſter 1792. P. II. p. 128 — 144.

which had a right to complain on this ſubject: it had a right to demand of the French government, if not ſatisfaction, at leaſt an explanation, and an aſſurance of its diſapprobation of the conduct of certain individuals in that country in regard to Great Britain, eſpecially as the principle, that no one had a right, to intermeddle in the internal affairs of another nation, was no where ſo ſtrongly enforced as in France itſelf. It is true, that the Britiſh government made no formal demand of any ſuch explanation: but Mr. Chauvelin himſelf was ſo convinced of the neceſſity of making one, that on the 24. of May he ſent a note to Lord Grenville [7], in which he declared, "If certain indivi-"duals of this country have eſtabliſhed a correſpondence "abroad, tending to excite troubles therein, and if, as "the proclamation ſeems to inſinuate, certain French-"men have come into their views, this is a proceeding "wholly foreign to the French nation, to the legiſlative "body, to the king, and his miniſters; it is a proceed-"ing, of which they are entirely ignorant, which mi-"litates againſt every principle of juſtice, and which "whenever it became known would be univerſally "condemned in France.„ Further, Mr. Chauvelin was ſo deſirous of reſcuing his court from all ſuſpicion of favouring ſedition in Great Britain, a ſuſpicion which

7. Rivington's Annual Regiſter 1792. State Papers, p. 260.

the British Cabinet did not entertain, for no allusion was made in the proclamation to any government, but merely to certain individuals, that he even requested, his note might be laid before the two houses of Parliament, previous to the debates on the proclamation, which however could not be granted, because it was contrary to the forms of the British constitution, as Lord Grenville informed him in a note written on the following day [8], to which Mr. Chauvelin immediately replied [9], "In making this request, my Lord, I inten-"ded to obviate the false interpretations, which might "be occasioned in the two houses by the article of the "proclamation, which is the subject of it: I flattered "myself by these means to contribute toward the main-"tenance of that harmony and of that cordiality bet-"ween the two states, of which I with joy remarked "the expression in the assurance, which you gave me, "that it is no less desired by his Britannic majesty, than "by the king of the French.„

Since then the proclamation of the 21. of May by no means disturbed the harmony, which subsisted between the courts of Great Britain and France, it seems unnecessary, in a history of their political conduct, to

8. Ib. p. 261.

9. Ib. p. 262.

ſay any thing further on the ſubject. But an eminent writer has endeavoured to excite a ſuſpicion, that, beſide the avowed object of ſuppreſſing ſedition, the proclamation had a *ſecret* tendency, and that "at this time the ſeeds of war were ſown, which we have ever ſince been unfortunately reaping.„ I requeſt therefore every impartial man, to re-conſider the conduct of the Britiſh government toward France, as deſcribed in the preceding chapters of this work: I requeſt him to recollect the abſolute refuſal to join the coalition, to remember the ſtrict regard paid to the principles of neutrality, in the rejection of the advantageous offer made by the coloniſts of St. Domingo, to take a review of the general conduct of adminiſtration from the opening of parliament on the 31. of Ianuary 1792 to its prorogation on the 15. of Iune, and then ſeriouſly aſk himſelf, whether it could be the deſign of the Britiſh government in May 1792 to engage in a war with France. At that time Mr. Pitt's favourite object was a diminution of the national debt, the abolition of taxes, the promotion of commerce, and of general welfare throughout the kingdom, the attainment of which would neceſſarily be impeded by the expences of a foreign war. Is it poſſible that a miniſter could at one inſtant ſpeak with enthuſiaſm of the advantages, which he propoſed to obtain for his country, and yet reſolve at the next inſtant to ſacrifice all theſe advan-

tages without any reaſon? Whoever can admit this ſuppoſition, muſt poſſeſs a faith, which bids defiance to all the rules of probability. Why then is it conjectured, that it was Pitt's deſign in May 1792 to involve England in a war with France? Becauſe a royal proclamation was iſſued on the 21. of this month againſt ſeditious writings! It is inferred therefore that, becauſe a government takes meaſures to preſerve *peace at home*, it has formed a reſolution to engage in *a war abroad!* But if the inference be really valid, it operates much more forcibly againſt the other party, and proves that the national aſſembly had long before the period in queſtion reſolved on a war with England: for every decree, which had been made againſt the French royaliſts, affords juſt as good a proof of an hoſtile diſpoſition toward England, as a proclamation againſt Engliſh democrats of an hoſtile diſpoſition toward France. That the Britiſh cabinet however was far from entertaining any ſentiments of hoſtility toward France, when this proclamation was iſſued, is a fact, which has been admitted not only by the old but even by the *new* government of that country. Mr. Chauvelin in his Note of the 18. of June, which was written nearly a month after the appearance of the proclamation, declared, that he had received orders from his court, to thank his Britannic Majeſty *for his friendly diſpoſitions, his ſentiments of humanity, of juſtice and*

of peace[10]: and when Lord Gower quitted Paris, after the king was dethroned, he received a Note from Le Brun, in the name of the executive council, containing the following declaration, "The French nation has reaſon to hope, that the Britiſh cabinet will not depart, at this critical moment, from *that juſtice, that moderation and that impartiality, which it has hitherto diſplayed*[11]." Mr. Chauvelin himſelf likewiſe in a letter ſent to his own government on the 17. of July[12] bore ample teſtimony to the friendly diſpoſitions of the Britiſh court. When the advocates of the French therefore contend that government endeavoured in May 1792 to promote a war with France, they aſſert what their clients themſelves deny. In fact, there is no connexion whatſoever between the premiſes and the concluſion, unleſs certain intermediate ideas be introduced, which will hardly occur to any man, who is a real lover of his country. That they, who wiſh to overturn the Britiſh conſtitution, have conſidered the cauſe of the French as their own, and have regar-

10. See the preceding chapter, Note 9.

11. "La nation Françaiſe a lieu d'eſperer que le cabinet Brittannique ne ſe départira point, en ce moment deciſif, *de la juſtice, de la moderation, et de l'impartialité, qu'il a montrée jusqu'a préſent.*" Moniteur 26. Aug. 1792.

12. This letter, which is printed in the Moniteur 29. July 1792, will be quoted at length in the eighth chapter.

ded therefore the proclamation of the 21. of May, which was certainly inimical to *them*, as inimical likewiſe to France, is very poſſible. But then they muſt not give too great a latitude to their concluſion: by the word "France,, they muſt not underſtand the French government, and ſtill leſs the French nation at large: for the Iacobins, though their influence was very great, had not brought matters ſo far in May 1792, that they could be conſidered at that time, as conſtituting either the French government, or the repreſentation of the whole body of the people. The utmoſt therefore that can be inferred, by help of this aſſociation of ideas, is, that the proclamation was inimical to a certain ſociety in Paris. Now this ſociety had either entered into the views of thoſe perſons, againſt whom the proclamation was levelled, or it had not. In the latter caſe, the general expreſſion "ſundry perſons in foreign parts,, could no more affect the Iacobins, than any other ſociety in Europe. In the former caſe, they had ſtill leſs cauſe for complaint, ſince he, who makes the firſt attack, can have no reaſon to take it ill, if his adverſary defends himſelf. And in this latter caſe, which admits of no doubt [13], thoſe writers, who endeavour to throw the blame of the preſent war on the Britiſh government, will defeat

13. See Note 3.

their own purpose, if they consider the term "Jacobin club,, as synonymous with France at large: but if this synonymity be rejected, all *appearance* of foundation for the inference, that the proclamation was inimical to France, is removed.

CHAPTER VII.

Prorogation of the British Parliament on the 15. of June. Speech from the throne. Chauvelin's Note of the 18. of June, requesting the mediation of Great Britain. Answer of the British cabinet. Reflexions on this Subject.

On the 15. of June the British Parliament, after a session replete with measures, which indicated the expectation of continued peace, was prorogued with a speech from the throne [1], in which his Majesty, after expressing his satisfaction at the steps, which had been taken for the diminution of the public burdens, and the reduction of the national debt, proceeded as follows. "I have seen with great concern the commen-"cement of hostilities in different parts of Europe. In

1. Annual Register 1792. State Papers, p. 196: or New Annual Register. Public Papers, p. 58.

"the present ſituation of affairs it will be my principal "care to maintain that harmony and good underſtand-"ing, which ſubſiſts between me and the ſeveral belli-"gerent powers, and to preſerve to my people the un-"interrupted bleſſings of peace. And the aſſurances, "which I receive from all quarters, of a friendly diſpo-"ſition toward this country, afford me the pleaſing "hope of ſucceeding in theſe endeavours.„

Within three days however after the prorogation of Parliament, a propoſal was made on the part of France, which, had it been accepted, would have effectually diſturbed the repoſe then enjoyed by Great Britain. On the 18. of Iune namely Mr. Chauvelin communicated a Note to Lord Grenville [2], in which the mediation of the Britiſh Cabinet was requeſted, between France and the allied powers of Auſtria and Pruſſia. In this Note, after an introduction, expreſſive of the friendly conduct of Great Britain on the one hand [3], and the danger which threatened France from the two great continental powers on the other, the

2. The French original is printed in the Moniteur 20. July 1792, under the title, Copie de la Note addreſſée à Milord Grenville par M. Chauvelin du 18. Juin 1792. An Engliſh tranſlation of it is in the Annual Regiſter 1792. State Papers, p. 263.

3. See above, Chapt. V. Note 9.

interposition of the former was requested on the following grounds, and in the following words. "The "consequences of such a conspiracy formed by the concurrence of powers, who have been so long rivals, will "be easily felt by his Britannic Majesty: the balance "of Europe, the independence of the different powers, "the general peace, every consideration, which at all "times has fixed the attention of the English government, is at once exposed and threatened. The king "of the French presents these serious and important "considerations to the solicitude and the friendship of "his Britannic Majesty. Strongly penetrated with the "marks of interest and of affection, which he has "received from him, he invites him to seek in his "wisdom, in his situation, and in his influence, means "compatible with the independence of the French "nation, to stop, while it is still time, the confe-"deracy, etc.,,

To this proposal, which involved the interests and the tranquillity of Great Britain, was returned on the 8. of July, after mature deliberation, the following answer [4]. "His Majesty has thought, that in the "existing circumstances of the war now begun, the in-

4. The French original is printed in the Moniteur 20. July 1792, and an English translation in the Annual Register immediately after M. Chauvelin's Note.

"tervention of his councils, or of his good offices, "cannot be of uſe, *unleſs they ſhould be deſired by all* "*the parties intereſted.*"

The refuſal of the Britiſh cabinet to interpoſe between France and the other belligerent powers, unleſs thoſe powers likewiſe deſired its mediation, was certainly the moſt prudent conduct, which could have been adopted. Yet this prudent conduct has been the ſubject of ſevere reprehenſion; and miniſters have been cenſured, for not ſtanding forward as the champions of France. Had France then ſo ſtrong a claim on the gratitude of Great Britain, as to be entitled to expect, that we ſhould involve ourſelves in a war merely on her account? For every one knows, that a mediation, unſupported by an armament, muſt be wholly ineffectual, and Mr. Chauvelin himſelf had very clearly ſuggeſted, that the requeſted mediation was to conſiſt, not in bare ſolicitations, but in effectual and deciſive meaſures. Let us aſk then: For whom was England to take theſe effectual and deciſive meaſures? For whom was England to engage in a continental war? For whom was England to ſacrifice thoſe advantages, which were then the favourite objects of government, and which could not be preſerved without a continuance of peace? For a nation, which has never ceaſed to be our mortal enemy: for a nation, which has

embraced every opportunity of humbling its neighbour, which never saw the British government in distress, without taking ungenerous advantage of it, and at the beginning of the very last war, which was concluded hardly ten years before the period in question, had proved itself as treacherous as hostile! Strange therefore was the request of France; and still more strange the censure of British subjects, because it was refused. This censure ill becomes those, who accuse ministers of being the authors of the war, which broke out in the following year, unless the case of commencing hostilities *in favour* of France is to be excepted from the general animadversion. The requested mediation has been termed indeed an act of peace, and the non-acceptance of it has been represented, as indicating a disposition to hostilities. But since this pretended act of peace would have previously involved us in a war, before any effect could have been produced, we may rather conclude, that the same principle of neutrality, and the same desire to avoid hostilities in general, which had induced the British cabinet, to refuse to join the adversaries of France, occasioned likewise the resolution to take no part against them. And as to the supposed hostile disposition toward France, at the time when the answer of the British cabinet was given, it is completely contradicted by the avowal of the French themselves, by Mr. Chauvelin's Letter to

his own government of the 17. of Iuly, and by Le Brun's Note to Lord Gower on his departure from Paris in the month of Auguſt [5].

Suppoſe however that the Britiſh government had accepted the proffered mediation, and, what muſt neceſſarily have taken place, unleſs the mediation was to conſiſt in mere words, had reſolved to join France, if the other parties refuſed to accept it, the reſolution though highly detrimental to ourſelves, would have rendered very little ſervice to thoſe, who required it. The danger, which at that time threatened France, proceeded not from any maritime power, but from the two great continental powers, Auſtria and Pruſſia, in compariſon of whoſe armies, that of Great Britan in the year 1792, at leaſt in point of number, was a mere nothing. A mediation therefore could have produced no effect, unleſs theſe two powers *voluntarily* conſented to it: and for this very reaſon the anſwer of the Britiſh cabinet was the moſt proper, which could be given. The caſe would have been totally different, if France had been engaged in a war at ſea, ſince Great Britain, with its formidable fleet, would then have poſſeſſed the means of obliging the adverſaries of France to accept its mediation. But even

5. See the latter part of the preceding chapter.

in this caſe, it would have been imprudent to have incurred the expenſes of a naval armament: for the experiment had been already made, when we attempted a mediation between Ruſſia and the Porte, and had met with ſufficient oppoſition to diſſuade miniſters from making a ſecond attempt of the ſame kind, within ſo ſhort a period after the firſt.

I have hitherto argued on the ſuppoſition that the French government really wiſhed for the re-eſtabliſhment of peace. That the king of France himſelf ſincerely wiſhed it, may be readily granted: but on the 8. of Iuly, when the anſwer of the Britiſh cabinet was given, the government of France had ceaſed to be veſted in the hands of the king. It is true that he was not *formally* depoſed till a month after the period in queſtion: but nearly three weeks had elapſed after the celebrated 20. of Iune, and from this day the whole power of France, executive as well as legiſlative, was lodged in the national aſſembly. Conſequently, it was the buſineſs of the Britiſh cabinet, in all matters relative to the political ſituation of the two countries, to regulate its conduct by the views and motives of this aſſembly. The queſtion therefore is: Did the national aſſembly, or at leaſt a majority of its members, at the time of the propoſed mediation, ſincerely wiſh the re-eſtabliſhment of peace? Or did they did not,

on

on the contrary, ardently wiſh for a continuance of the war? This queſtion ſhall be minutely examined.

It was hardly two months, before Mr. Chauvelin's Note of the 18. of June was preſented to the Britiſh government, that the national aſſembly had decreed the war againſt the King of Hungary, with an unanimity and an enthuſiaſm, which clearly proved, that in the opinion of almoſt all its members war was more advantageous to them than peace [6]. Even ſo early as the 29. of December 1791 Briſſot had declared in the national aſſembly, that "war was a real benefit "to the nation, and that the only evil, which they "had to dread, was the not having war [7]„: and a few

6. See the debates in the Moniteur 22. April 1792. In vain ſaid Mr. Becquet, one of the ſeven members, who alone out of the ſeven hundred and fifty voted againſt the war, "Renonçons à une entrepriſe qui n'a aucun objet réel; "bornons nous à nous défendre, ſi quelque puiſſance nous "attaque, *et probablement nous n'aurons pas de guerre*:„ for his ſpeech excited in the aſſembly a violent tumult.

7. "La guerre eſt actuellement un bienfait national, et la ſeule calamité qu'il y ait à redouter, c'eſt de n'avoir pas la guerre„ Moniteur 21. Dec, 1791. Even two months before, in a debate of the 20. of October 1791, Briſſot had ſaid: "Il ne faut pas ſeulement vous défendre, *il faut attaquer* vous même.„ See Lally Tolendal Defenſe des Emigrés Français. Tom. I. p. 189.

days after, Isnard explained to the assembly, in what *respect* a war was to be considered as a national benefit, namely as being the means of completing the revolution [8]. The completion of the revolution therefore, or, in other words, the deposition of the king and the establishment of a republic, was to be effected by a foreign war, which should divert the general attention from the cabals in the centre of the kingdom to the military operations on the borders. That this was the real object of the war, which was declared against Austria, the chiefs of the revolution avowed openly, as soon as their object was attained. For on the very day after the national convention had decreed the abolition of royalty in France [9], Brissot boasted in his celebrated journal, that "without the war the "revolution of the 10. of August would not have taken "place, that without the war France would not have

8. "Une guerre est prête à s'allumer, *guerre indispensable pour consommer la révolution*.,, Moniteur 6. Jan. 1792. On the 4. of January the same orator had already said: "Que tous les Français accourent au club des Jacobins; "voici le moment où nous allons publier la guerre.,, See Lally Tolendal Défense des Emigrés Français. T. I. p. 198.

9. This decree, which was the first act of the national convention, passed on the 21. of September 1792. See the Moniteur 22. Sept. 1792.

"become a republic [10]": and a few weeks afterwards he declared in the most positive and unequivocal terms, that "it was the abolition of royalty, which he had in view, when he provoked the declaration of war [11]." Louvet also, in his Address to Robespierre said, "We "wished for war, we genuine Iacobins, because peace "was certainly destructive to the republic [12]": and a few lines afterwards he added, "republicans, who "were worthy of the name, demanded the war, they "dared aspire to the lasting renown, to the immortal "honour, of abolishing royalty itself, of abolishing it "for ever, at first in France, and then throughout the "world [13]."

10. "Sans la guerre la révolution du 10. Août n'aurait "pas eu lieu: sans la guerre la France ne serait pas republi-"que." Journal du Patriote Français, 22. Sept. 1792.

11. "C'etait l'abolition de la royauté, que j'avais en "vue, en faisant déclarer la guerre." Brissot à tous les républicains de France sur les Jacobins (Paris Oct. 1792) p. 8.

12. "Nous voulions la guerre, nous purs jacobins, parcequ' à coup sûr la paix tuait la république." I. B. Louvet à Maximilien Robespierre et à ses royalistes (Dec. 1792) p. 18.

13. "Ils appellaient la guerre les républicains dignes de "l'être: ils osaient aspirer à la gloire solide, à l'immortel hon-"neur de *tuer la royauté méme, de la tuer à jamais, d'abord en* "*France, et puis dans l'univers*." Ib. Likewise Collot d'Herbois said: "Nous avons voulu la guerre, parceque la guerre

The object therefore of the national assembly in involving France in a war, lies open to public view: and in order to attain this favourite object, the principal members of it had such a thirst after hostilities, and so frequently expressed it in their public speeches and writings, that if any man should take the pains to collect the scattered expressions on this subject, from the Moniteur and other political publications, he might fill with them a complete volume. Cambon even declared, that "it was necessary to break with *all* the courts [14]": and Brissot himself acknowledges, that the resolution was formed "to set all Europe at defiance [15]." Lastly, as soon as the plan, which had been long in agitation, approached to its maturity, this same Brissot

devait tuer la royauté.", See Lally Tollendal Défence etc. T. I. p. 208. And Cambon, after the war had begun to take a favourable turn, made the following declaration in the name of the three united committees of war, finance and diplomacy, "Ils se sont demandé d'abord quel est *l'objet* de "la guerre que vous avez entreprise? C'est sans doute *l'anéantissement de tous les privilèges*.", Moniteur 18. Dec. 1792.

14. "Il faut rompre avec *tous* les cabinets.", These words of Cambon are quoted by Brissot in his work A ses Commettans (Paris 1793) p. 74.

15. "Voila les grandes idées, qu'il fallait concevoir, "qu'il fallait executer, puisque l'on *voulait braver toute* "*l'Europe*.", Ib. p. 73.

went ſo far as to aſſert: „We muſt ſet fire to the four "corners of Europe, for there lies our ſalvation [16].„

This ſalvation was firſt ſought in a war with Auſtria: and in order to effect it, the firſt ſtep taken by the national aſſembly was the removal of De Leſſart, Narbonne, Bertrand de Molleville, with the other French cabinet miniſters, who as well as the king himſelf were deſirous of preſerving peace, and the appointment of a new miniſtry, which conſiſted entirely of jacobins, and agreably to the wiſhes of the national aſſembly obliged the king, to propoſe a declaration of war [17]. It cannot be here objected that the members of the national aſſembly demanded a declaration of war *merely* becauſe they themſelves were apprehenſive of a ſimilar declaration on the part of Auſtria, and that they had *no other object* in view than to ſecure to themſelves the advantages ariſing from the firſt attack: for their own confeſſions prove the contrary. Nor is it

16. "Il faut incendier les quatre coins de l'Europe: notre ſalut eſt là. Theſe words are quoted from one of Briſſot's letters by Mallet du Pan in his Conſiderations ſur la nature de la revolution Françaiſe„ (Londres 1793) p. 37.

17. "Le miniſtere fut alors complettement compoſé de "jacobins, qui ſous la protection du coté gauche de l'aſſem-"blée demandaient à grands cris une declaration de guerre.„ Bertrand de Molleville Memoires ſecrets. T. II. p. 145.

by any means so probable, as is commonly supposed, that the Austrian cabinet would have declared war against France, even if the national assembly had not declared war against Austria. It is true that in the year 1791 a coalition had been formed against France: but in April 1792, when France declared war against Austria, the coalition, which even in 1791 had produced no effect, appeared to have been abandoned. The king of Sweden, one of the chief instigators to a war with France was already murdered [18]: and after his death the state of politicks in Sweden took a totally new turn. The Emperor Leopold was likewise dead [19]: and his successor Francis II. gave no indications of a warlike disposition [20]. The character of Leopold was likewise pacific: and there is reason to believe that it was not his design to commence hostilities against France, but merely to alarm the jacobins by a junction

18. It was on the 18. of March 1792, that the king of Sweden was mortally wounded by the murderer Ankerström.

19. The Emperor Leopold died on the 1. of March 1792, and almost as suddenly as the king of Sweden.

20. Even a month before the declaration of war, Dumouriez, then minister for foreign affairs, wrote a letter to the French ambassador at Vienna, dated 18. March 1792, in which he said: "Les affaires doivent prendre par la mort de "Léopold une nouvelle marche.,, His letter is printed in the Moniteur 18. April, 1792.

of ſeveral powers, and to deter them from offering violence to the perſons of his brother in law and his own ſiſter, whoſe fate he could not regard with indifference [21]. That it was the wiſh, neither of Leopold, nor of his miniſters, to engage in a war with France, is atteſted by the Marquis de Bouillé, who was well acquainted with the ſentiments of the Auſtrian cabinet [22]. And if the teſtimony of a friend of Louis XVI.

21. In a note to the French ambaſſador at Vienna, which is printed in the Moniteur 24. Dec. 1791, he expreſſed himſelf as follows. "On ne peut plus douter de ma façon "de penſer ſur les affaires de la France. Ma derniere decla-"ration, et les ordres que j'ai fait donner par mon gouver-"neur à Bruxelles à l'agent des emigrés Français prouvent "que je regarde mon beau frere comme libre, et que mon "intention n'eſt pas de me mêler des affaires de ſon royau-"me, auſſi long tems que les Français lui laiſſeront tout ce "qu'ils lui ont aſſuré volontairement, et ce qu'il a volontai-"rement accepté dans le nouveau contract conſtitutionnel.,,

22. In his Memoires ſur la révolution Françaiſe, T. II. p. 136, where he ſpeaks of his arrival in Prague at the coronation of the Emperor, he ſays: "J'y arrivai au commen-"cement de Septembre, et j'y reſtai huit ou dix jours ſans "recevoir le moindre ordre de l'empereur. J'y appris, de "maniere à n'en pouvoir plus douter, que les diſpoſitions du "cabinet de Vienne n'étaient point du tout à la guerre; et "je dois au marechal de Laſci la juſtice de declarer, qu'il "m'a pluſieurs fois repété, que les reſſources de la France "étaient immenſes, ſes frontières impénétrables, et qu'il ne

be thought insufficient, we may produce the confession of the opposite party. On the 20. of October 1791, nearly two months after the conference at Pillnitz, Brissot declared to the national assembly, "I can assure "you, that there is no reason to be alarmed at the "conduct of the court of Austria. Its sovereign loves "peace, and wishes for peace. — All circumstances "unite, to induce Leopold to abstain from displaying "the force of arms [23].„ On the 29. of December 1791

"presserait jamais la declaration d'une guerre, qui dans son "opinion pourrait avoir les suites les plus desastreuses pour "l'empereur et pour l'empire. Telle étoit aussi, je l'avoue-"rai, l'avis de tous les ministres imperiaux. Léopold espé-"roit toujours terminer les affaires de France par une nego-"ciation. This moderate conduct of the Emperor was so much the more commendable, as the K. of Prussia was decidedly in favour of war: for M. de Bouillé in relating the conference at Pillnitz (Memoires, T. II. p. 134) says: "Les "vues de l'Empereur étaient pacifiques. *Le Roi de Prusse au "contraire voulait absolument la guerre.* Plusieurs circonstan-"ces de cette entrevue ne me permettent pas de douter des "dispositions dont ces deux Souverains étaient animés. Elles "m'ont d'ailleurs été confirmées par des personnes qui jouis-"saient de leur confiance.„

23. "Je dois vous rassurer sur la conduite de la cour au-"trichienne. Son chef aime la paix, veut la paix. — Tout "fait à Léopold la loi, de ne point déployer la force des "armes.„ Moniteur 22. Oct. 1791.

Briſſot ſaid again, "The wavering meaſures of the "cabinet of Vienna afford us no reaſon to apprehend a "war on the part of the Emperor. As prince, he "wiſhes for peace: as head of the German empire, he "gives himſelf the *air* of wiſhing for war [24]." And this confeſſion was ſo much the more remarkable, as it was delivered in the very ſame ſpeech, in which Briſſot recommended war, as a national benefit to France [25]. From the 29. of December 1791, when the pacific deſigns of Leopold were acknowledged in the national aſſembly, till the time of his death, no circumſtances occurred, which could excite a ſuſpicion of his having changed his political ſyſtem. On the contrary, all his meaſures evinced a determined reſolution, to avoid hoſtilities with France. At the requeſt of the French government, all military exerciſe and the aſſembling of troops was ſtrictly forbidden to the emigrants on the borders of Germany [26]: and ſo con-

24. "Les oſcillations du cabinet de Vienne ne doivent "pas nous faire redouter la guerre de la part de l'Empereur. "Comme prince il veut la paix: comme chef de l'empire "germanique il a *l'air* de vouloir la guerre." Moniteur 30. Dec. 1791.

25. See Note 7.

26. By deſire of the Emperor, the Elector of Treves iſſued an edict, (printed in the Moniteur 10. Ian. 1792) in which he engaged to fulfil the following articles.

ciliatory was Leopold in his conduct toward the national assembly, that when the Prince of Condé, with

1. De faire quitter l'Electorat dans huit jours d'ici, ou disperser tous ceux qui portent la dénomination d'un corps militaire.

2. Toute espece d'exercise militaire sera défendu itérativement, et ceux qui agiront contre l'ordonnance seront tenus de quitter l'électorat dans trois jours; et à cette fin on dénoncera les logemens.

3. Tous les recruteurs étrangers, à l'exception de ceux de sa majesté l'empereur seront arrêtés et condamnés, suivant une ordonnance emanée depuis deux mois, à la forteresse, et aux travaux publics pour deux ans.

In the other articles, it was strictly forbidden to furnish the emigrants with ammunition, horses, waggons, or any thing which could assist them in military operations. And with regard to the Electorate of Mayence, the French minister himself resident at that court gave the following testimony in a Note to his own government, printed in the Moniteur 2. Feb. 1792, "que ni dans l'archéveché de Mayence, ni dans l'éveché de Worms, il ne s'etait fait de rassemblemens militaires „ Further the Emperor himself in his letter to the Elector of Treves (printed in the Moniteur 24. Ian. 1792) said, "he had given orders, that in that case, and *in that* "*case only*, (dans ce cas déterminé, et *dans aucun autre*, as "expressed in the Moniteur) that he should be attacked by "the French without having given provocation by permitting "the emigrants to arm and assemble on his territories (sans "que nous y eussions donné lieu en favorisant ou en tolérant

about eleven hundred emigrants, after having been ordered on the 2. of January 1792 to depart from Worms, retreated to Ettenheim, he gave further orders to the prince to depart likewiſe from that place [27]. In the Auſtrian Netherlands the number of troops did not exceed the uſual peace eſtabliſhment: and neither magazines were formed, nor any other meaſures taken, which indicated a preparation for war [28]. Yet at this very time, France itſelf made the moſt vigourous military exertions: for it appears by the official report of the war miniſter to the national aſſembly on the 12. of January 1792, that there were already aſſem-

"des attroupemens ou des préparatifs de guerre de la part "des Français emigrés) Auſtrian troops ſhould be ſent into "the electorate.,, This order, which clearly evinced the reſolution of the Emperor to act only on the defenſive, was with the uſual French artifice on the 20. of April 1792, the day on which war was declared, converted into an act of hoſtility, by omitting all the words, which I have placed in parentheſes, and thus metamorphoſed was, for want of better reaſons, alleged as one of the motives to a war with Auſtria. See the Moniteur 21. April 1791.

27. Lally Tollendal Defenſe des Emigrés, T. I. p. 196.

28. It is a well-known fact, that, when the French army invaded the Netherlands ſoon after the declaration of war againſt Auſtria, General Beaulieu was ſo little prepared for their reception, that he was obliged to order poſt horſes to expedite the tranſport of artillery.

bled on the borders, from Dunkirk to Befançon, two hundred and forty battalions, an hundred and fixty fquadrons, and artillery fufficient for an army of two hundred thoufand men. The war minifter further reported, that magazines, fufficient to fupply two hundred and thirty thoufand men, and twenty two thoufand horfes, for fix months, were already prepared, and that the moft active meafures were then taking for a further augmentation of them [29]. This extraordinary armament, and thefe vigourous preparations, could not have merely the French emigrants for their object, or be defigned merely to protect the frontiers from an invafion on their part: for even if the emigrants had been permitted to form themfelves into a military corps, which they really were not, ftill the whole number of thofe, who had attached themfelves, as well to the brothers of the king, as to the prince of Condé, did not *at that time* exceed four thoufand feven hundred [30]. Nor could the armament have been

29. "Depuis Dunquerque jusqu' à Befançon l'armée préfente une maffe de 240 bataillons, et 160 efcadrons avec l'artillerie néceffaire pour 200 mille hommes. Les magazins, tant en vivres qu'en fourage, affurent la fubfiftance de 230 mille hommes, et 22 mille chevaux, pendant fix mois. On travaille à la plus grande activité à les augmenter encore.,, Moniteur 14. Ian. 1792.

30. Lally Tollendal Défenfe des Emigrés. T. I. p. 196.

a mere *defensive* measure against the Emperor, since Brissot himself had acknowledged only fourteen days, before the war minister made his report to the national assembly, that the designs of Leopold were pacific. It was evidently therefore the intention of the national assembly to act on the offensive, which actual experience soon afterwards confirmed [31].

197. It is true that at the latter end of Iuly, when the Duke of Brunswick was at Coblentz, their number was thrice as great: but more than three months had then elapsed after the declaration of war.

31. I shall not investigate any further the origin of the war between France and Austria, because the present history is confined to the relations between France and Great Britain. Whoever wishes to examine the subject more fully, may consult the correspondence between the courts of France and Austria from Ian. 15. to April 7, 1792, printed in Rivingtons Annual Register 1792, State Papers, p. 212 — 242: the counter-declaration of the Austrian court of the 4. of Iuly compared with the report delivered to the national assembly on the 20. of April: Lally Tollendal Défense des Emigrés Français, T. I. p. 189 — 209; and the Collection des meilleurs ouvrages qui ont été publiés pour la défense de Louis XVI. T. I. p. 307 — 313. 335 — 338. In this last place is printed a remarkable letter written to Necker on the 8. of Iuly 1792 by Delessart, late minister for foreign affairs, from his prison at Orleans, in which he says: "Je commence "à croire, que toutes les difficultés possibles sont épuisées; "la communication des pièces qui m'étaient nécessaires va

But ſuppoſe, for the ſake of argument, that Auſtria would have attacked France, if France had not attacked Auſtria, it will ſtill remain an undeniable fact, that the national aſſembly, or at leaſt a very great majority of its members, were as deſirous of war, as any ſovereign in Europe could be. The teſtimonies of its leading members, which have been already quoted, remove the queſtion beyond all doubt. The ſame teſtimonies further prove, that the grand object of the national aſſembly in declaring war againſt Auſtria, was to effect the depoſition of the king, and the abolition of royalty in France [32]. But this grand object

"bientôt me mettre en état de travailler à ma défenſe. Mais "je regretterai toute ma vie, qu'elle n'a pu paroître dans le "moment actuel; car elle ſera curieuſe, non pas pour ce "qui ſera de moi, mais par la manifeſtation de ce qui s'eſt "paſſé dans les cours étrangères; *par la demonſtration qu'on "ne voulait point nous faire la guerre; par la preuve ſans re-"plique, que c'eſt nous, qui l'avons provoquée, qui l'avons "commencée, qui avons mis l'Europe contre nous.*" This teſtimony is ſo much the more credible, as Deleſſart could have no view of deriving any advantage from it, ſince it was delivered, in a private letter, to a man in a private ſtation, and then reſident out of France.

32. A ſecondary motive was the conqueſt of the Auſtrian Netherlands, where they had already a conſiderable party. It is true that on the very day, on which war was declared againſt Auſtria, they made the moſt poſitive declaration,

was not yet attained, when the mediation of Great Britain was requested: for Mr. Chauvelin's Note was dated the 18. of June, and the king of France was not dethroned before the 10. of August. Consequently, had it been in the power of the British cabinet to have instantly produced a general peace, the national assembly would in all probability have declared war a second time: for if a general peace had taken place in June 1792, and that peace had continued, the king of France would have preserved both his life, and his crown. But it is evident that the leaders of the national assembly were resolved to run all hazards, rather than not attain their favourite object. The danger from without gave them very little concern, provided they could continue without interruption their intrigues,

"de n'entreprendre aucune guerre dans la vue de faire des conquetes.,, Moniteur 22. April 1792. But at present we all known by experience, what construction is to be put on French declarations. Mr. Becquet however said very candidly on the day on which war was declared: "Elle (l'Autriche) n'a pris, depuis que les negociations sont entamées, que des mesures defensives; trois armées formidables bordaient vos frontieres; elle n'y a opposé qu'un nombre de troupes très inferieur. Vous le savez, et sans doute vous ne voulez l'attaquer en ce moment, que parceque vous êtes certains d'être plus préparés qu'elle dans vos mesures.,, Moniteur 22. Avril 1792.

in the interior: and for this reason the march of the Prussian army made no alteration in the sentiments, which they entertained, when they declared war against Austria. They knew likewise beforehand, that a declaration of war against Austria included a declaration of war against Prussia; for these two powers had in February 1792 concluded a defensive treaty, by which it was stipulated, that in case either of the contracting parties should be attacked, the other party should immediately send a succour of fifteen thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry, and, if these should be deemed insufficient, augment their number according to the nature of the circumstances [33]. All this was known to the

33. The genuine treaty, concluded between Austria and Prussia in Feb. 1792, is printed in Martens Recueil des principaux Traités, T. V. p. 77 — 81. and is merely defensive, not offensive, as some writers have asserted. The preliminaries are dated 7. of February, the ratification 19. of February: and this date proves the spuriousness of the pretended offensive treaty, which bears date the 18. of February, and is printed in the Moniteur 13. April 1792. Even the editor of the Moniteur did not venture, to assert its authenticity: for he called it only "une piece qui *paroît* authentique.„ And the national assembly was fully persuaded of its spuriousness, as appears from the circumstance, that a whole week had elapsed after its appearance in the Moniteur, when

the members of the national aſſembly, before they decreed war againſt Auſtria: it cannot therefore be ſaid, that they were threatened in the month of June with a danger, which they did not apprehend in the month of April. And that during this interval they had not changed their ſentiments, is evident from all their ſpeeches: for whoever conſults the Moniteur, from the declaration of war againſt Auſtria to the propoſal of a mediation, will find that not a ſingle expreſſion eſcaped the leaders of the aſſembly, which indicated a diſpoſition to peace. The augmentation of the force, with which they had to contend, diminiſhed not in the leaſt their ardour for hoſtilities: on the contrary, as Briſſot himſelf ſaid: "vaſt ideas, grand de'ſigns, and an object ſublime and difficult, were ne-

the war againſt Auſtria war decreed, and yet it was not mentioned among the motives, which were alleged in juſtification of the war, though the offenſive treaty, had it really exiſted, would have been the beſt vindication, which the national aſſembly could have produced. It muſt be referred therefore to the claſs of fabrications, which the French rulers and their advocates have propagated with great induſtry and ſucceſs: and we may ſafely conclude, that it was inſerted in the Moniteur a week before the intended declaration of war, in order to prepare men's minds for the event.

"cessary to form men and a great nation [34]." It was in fact their *own* desire, "to break with *all* the courts;" it was their own resolution "to set all Europe at defiance;" it was their own determination "to set the four corners of Europe on fire [35]."

These are the men, for whom Great Britain was requested to procure the blessings of *peace:* these are the men, for whose sakes the British government has been so severely reprehended for not attempting to confer a favour, which the former were as unwilling to accept [36], as the latter was unable to bestow. The

34. "Pour former des hommes, une grande nation, il faut de vastes idées, de grands objets, un but sublime et difficile." Brissot à ses Commettans p. 76.

35. See the 14, 15 and 16 notes to this chapter.

36. Beside the motives already alleged, another reason would have induced the national assembly in the summer of 1792 to reject all offers of peace, namely, fear for their own personal safety. For Roland, the French minister of the interior, said at that time to a friend of Mr. Miles in France: "Peace is out of the question, we have 300,000 men in arms, "we must make them march as far as their legs will carry "them, or they will return and cut our throats." See the Authentic correspondence with Mr. Le Brun the French minister and others to February 1793 inclusive. London 1796. 8. p. 144. 2. ed. The same reason, independent of schemes of ambition, prevents likewise the Directory from

advocates therefore of the French, who reprefent them as "folicitors for peace,,, defend them on grounds, which were openly and avowedly difcarded by their clients themfelves: and if Mr. Chauvelin's Note of the 18. of June be regarded as a requeft from the national affembly, it will become a proof of the blackeft hypocrify. — Confequently, in whatever light we view the anfwer of the Britifh cabinet of the 8. of July, it is in every refpect unexceptionable.

making a general peace: for the moment the French armies ceafe to be occupied with the plunder of foreign countries, they will demand, with arms in their hands, the promifed thoufand millions, and, as it will be impoffible to pay them, will overturn the prefent government. Unhappy conftitution, which requires for its fupport the wretchednefs of all Europe!

CHAPTER VIII.

Senſation produced in France by the ſailing of five ſhips of the line and a few frigates from Portſmouth, to perform naval evolutions in the channel. Propoſal made in the national aſſembly of an immediate armament of thirty ſhips of the line. Chauvelin's Letter to his own government, containing poſitive aſſurances, that the Britiſh cabinet had no views of hoſtility. Reſolution of the national aſſembly, that Chauvelin's Letter was ſatisfactory, and that a naval armament was unneceſſary.

On the 11. of July 1792 a ſmall fleet ſailed from Portſmouth under the command of Admiral Lord Hood, to perform naval evolutions in the channel. The whole fleet conſiſted only five ſhips of the line, beſide frigates and ſloops: it had only a fortnight's proviſion on board, and had manifeſtly no other deſtination, than a ſea-review [1], which, being nothing new in England, ought no more to have excited alarm, than a land-

1. All theſe circumſtances are confirmed by Chauvelin's Letter.

review at Potsdam or Berlin. The matter however was so magnified in France, and was represented in so false a light, that on the 26. of July an immediate armament of thirty ships of the line was proposed in the national assembly, and the marine committee was ordered to draw up a report on the subject, and present it within a few days [2].

In the mean time the following Letter from Mr. Chauvelin to Mr. Chambonas dated London 17. July 1792 was published [3].

"You may have seen, Sir, from the public papers "of this country, that a fleet, which has lately sailed "from Portsmouth, has been for some time the topic "of conversation. From all the information, which "I have endeavoured to procure from the moment I "had knowlege of it, I have partaken, and still partake

2. See the Moniteur 28. Iuly 1792.

3. It was printed in the Moniteur 29. Iuly 1792, and in the original is as follows.

"Londres le 17. Juillet 1792.

"Monsieur, vous avez pu voir dans les papiers publics "de ce pays ci, que depuis assez long tems il a été question "de l'escadre qui vient de sortir du port de Portsmouth. "D'apres tous les renseignemens, que je me suis empressé "de prendre dès le premier moment que j'en ai eu connais-"sance, j'ai partagé à ce sujet, et je partage encore la secu-

"on this ſubject of the ſecurity of the Engliſh, even "of thoſe who are the moſt jealous of the operations of "government. They have all been, and are ſtill of "opinion, that the armament has no other object, than "to exerciſe the Engliſh ſailors in certain evolutions, "and to prepare for the royal family, in the following "month, the ſpectacle of a ſea-review, which may be "conſidered as the counterpart of the camp at Bagſhot. "The ſilence therefore, which I have obſerved, Sir, "on this ſubject, muſt prove to you my conviction, that "the armament is of no importance: and I ſhould not "have broken ſilence even now, without the alarms "ſignified to me by ſome Frenchmen lately arrived "from the continent, who ſeem ſtill to entertain *certain*

"rité de tous les Anglais même les plus jaloux des opera-"tions du gouvernement. Tous ont penſé et penſent encore, "que cet armement n'a d'autre objet que de faire faire quel-"ques evolutions aux matelots Anglais, et de préparer pour "la famille royale, pour le mois prochain, le ſpectacle d'une "revue, qu'on peut regarder comme le pendant de celle du "camp de Bagshot. Auſſi, Monſieur, le ſilence que j'ai gardé "à cet égard, aura-t-il ſans doute été pour vous une preuve "du peu d'importance qu'on doit attacher à cet armement, "et je n'aurais pas rompu ce ſilence ſans les alarmes que "m'ont temoignées quelques Français, qui recemment arri-"vés du Continent paraiſſent avoir conſervé *certaines fauſſes* "*idées ſur les diſpoſitions du gouvernement Anglais.* Ce n'eſt "donc que pour raſſurer ceux qui en France pourraient pen-

"*false notions on the dispositions of the English govern-*"*ment.* With a view therefore of removing the appre-"hensions of those who may be of the same opinion in "France, especially as in similar cases objects seen at a "distance are magnified rather than diminished, I have "determined, Sir, to give you an account of the arma-"ment, of which I send you a list, and to assure you, "that all the intelligence, which I have been able to "collect, unites in convincing me, that the armament "has no relation whatsoever either to France in parti-"cular, or to the continent in general.„

The minister plenipotentiary of France.
Signed, Chauvelin.

"ser comme eux, d'autant plus que dans de pareils cas les "objets vus de loin grossissent plutôt qu'ils ne diminuent, "que je me suis déterminé de vous rendre compte, Monsieur, "de cet armement dont je vous envoie la liste, et à vous "assurer, que toutes les données que j'ai pu recueillir se "réunissent à me convaincre, qu'il n'est en aucune maniere "relatif aux affaires, soit de la France en particulier, soit du "continent en général.

"Le ministre plénipotentiaire de France.
"Signé, Chauvelin.

"Liste des Vaisseaux sortis le 11. Juillet au matin du port de "Portsmouth, pour croiser dans la Manche, sous le com-"mandement de Lord Hood.

On the 4. of August, the day on which the marine committee had been ordered to make its report, Mr. Forfaix, the chairman of the committee, read Mr. Chauvelin's Letter before the national assembly: and it was considered as so satisfactory, in regard to the sentiments of the British cabinet, that the proposed armament was declared unnecessary [4]. We have the testimony therefore of the national assembly itself, that the British cabinet, as far as August 1792, had no hostile views toward France.

"Vaisseaux		Canons
1.	Le Duc . .	90.
2.	L'Alfred . .	74.
3.	Le Brunswick	74.
4.	L'Orion . . .	74.
5.	L'Annibal .	74.
"Fregattes		
6.	L'Iphigenie .	32.
etc.	etc.	etc.

"En commission dans le port de Plymouth: 1 vaisseau de 74, "1 de 24, 2 cutters de 16, 1 yacht de 10.

"L'escadre n'a des vivres à son bord que pour quinze jours.,,

4. See Moniteur 6. Aug. 1792.

CHAPTER IX.

Recall of the British ambassador from Paris, after the king of France was dethroned. Examination of the question, whether this recall was a breach of neutrality toward France.

It is well known, that on the 10. of August 1792 the palace of the king of France was attacked by an armed populace, that his guards were murdered, and he himself obliged to seek refuge in the national assembly, where he was at last doomed to hear the decree, by which he was deposed, and sent prisoner to the Temple. Now as according to the constitution of 1791, which placed the legislative power in the national assembly, but the executive in the hands of the king, the credentials of the British ambassador in Paris ceased after this event to be valid, his further residence in that city was deemed unnecessary. On the 17. of August therefore a letter of recall [1] was dispatched by the

1. It is printed in Rivington's Annual Register 1792. State Papers p. 326. In this letter the following instructions were given to Lord Gower. "In all the conversations, which "you may have occasion to hold before your departure, you

British government to Lord Gower, who communicated a translation of it to Le Brun, the French minister for foreign affairs, and member of the council, to which the executive power was intrusted after the deposition of the king. To this letter the French minister returned an answer, in the name of the new republican government of France [2], expressing the greatest satis-

"will take care to express yourself in a manner conformable "to the sentiments herein communicated to you: and you "will take especial care not to neglect any opportunity of "declaring, that at the same time *his Majesty means to observe* "*the principles of neutrality in every thing, which regards* "*the arrangement of the internal government of France*.,,

2. Le Brun's Note to Lord Gower is printed in the Moniteur 26. August 1792; and as it is a document of some importance, it is necessary to produce it at length in the original.

"Le soussigné, ministre des affaires étrangeres, s'est "empressé à communiquer au conseil executif provisoire, la "lettre dont son excellence M. le comte de Gower, ambassa- "deur extraordinaire de S. M. Britannique lui a fait part.

"Le conseil a vu avec regret, que le cabinet britannique "se decidât à rappeler son ambassadeur, dont la présence "attestait les dispositions favorables d'une nation libre et gé- "néreuse, et qui n'avait jamais été l'organe que de paroles "amicales, et de sentimens de bienveillance. S'il est quel- "que chose qui puisse diminuer ce regret, c'est le renouvelle- "ment de l'assurance de neutralité donnée par l'Angleterre "à la nation Française.

faction at the friendly conduct of the Britifh cabinet, and containing affurances, that the fame justice and

"Cette affurance paraît être le réfultat de l'intention "fagement refléchie et formellement exprimée par S. M. Bri- "tannique, de ne point fe mêler de l'arrangement intérieur "des affaires de France. Une pareille déclaration ne peut "furprendre de la part d'un peuple éclairé et fier, qui le "premier a reconnu et établi le principe de la fouveraineté "nationale; qui fubftituant l'empire de la loi, expreffion de "la volonté de tous, aux caprices arbitraires des volontés "particulieres, le premier a donné l'exemple de foumettre "les rois eux mêmes à ce joug falutaire, qui enfin n'a pas "cru acheter trop cher, par de longues convulfions et de "violens orages, la liberté à laquelle il a dû tant de gloire "et de profperité.

"Ce principe de fouveraineté inalienable du peuple va "fe manifefter d'une maniere éclatante dans la Convention "nationale, dont le Corps legislatif a decreté la convocation, "et qui fixera fans doute tous les partis et tous les interêts. "La nation Française a lieu d'efperer, que le cabinet britan- "nique ne fe départira point, en ce moment décifif, *de la "juftice, de la modération, et de l'impartialité*, qu'il a montrée "*jusqu'à préfent.*

"Dans cette confiance intime *fondée fur les faits*, le "fouffigné renouvelle à fon excellence M. le comte de Gower, "au nom du confeil executif provifoire, l'affurance qu'il a eu "l'honneur de lui donner de vive voix, que les relations de "commerce entre les deux nations, et toutes les affaires en "général feront fuivies de la part du gouvernement français

impartiality would be obſerved by the French executive council.

But as the recall of Lord Gower has been ſince repreſented as a violation of that neutrality, which by the acknowledgement of Le Brun himſelf in the above-mentioned anſwer, and afterwards by the acknowledgement even of the national convention [3], had been at leaſt till that time obſerved by the Britiſh government, hiſtorical accuracy requires a full inveſtigation of the ſubject. To determine this queſtion, there is no neceſſity for previouſly inquiring, whether the mere *legiſlative* aſſembly of France had a right to annihilate the conſtitution of 1791, in which a decree of the conſtituent aſſembly had forbidden the legiſlative aſſembly to make the leaſt alteration, which had been accepted by the king as well as by the people, and to which the legiſlative aſſembly itſelf had thrice ſworn

"avec la même juſtice, et la même loyauté. Le conſeil ſe "flatte, que la réciprocité ſera entiere de la part du gou-"vernement britannique, et qu'ainſi rien n'altérera la bonne "intelligence, qui regne entre les deux peuples.

"Le miniſtre des affaires étrangeres, Le Brun.,,

3. In the liſt of grievances alleged againſt the Britiſh government, at the time of the declaration of war, there is none prior to the recall of Lord Gower. See Moniteur 3. Feb. 1793.

allegiance, firſt at its meeting on the 3. of October 1791, ſecondly on the 7. of July 1792 in its public hall, and laſtly before the altar of freedom on the 14. of July, only three weeks before the reſolution was formed to overturn it. There is no neceſſity for inquiring, whether, after the diſapprobation expreſſed by ſeventy one out of the eighty three departments at the events of the 20. of June [4], the legiſlative aſſembly had a right to deprive the king of his authority, though he committed none of the three miſdemeanors [5], which alone, by the conſtitution of 1791, warranted his depoſition. Theſe are queſtions, which belong to other courts of inquiry, and we have at preſent only to con-

4. "Les réclamations contre la journée du 20. Juin "furent générales dans tout l'empire; ſur 83 départemens "ſoixante et onze écrivirent à la legislature pour demander "la punition des ſeditieux, qui avaient offenſé la loi ſi ſcan-"daleuſement.,, Coll. de meilleurs ouvrages pour la défenſe de Louis XVI. Tom. I. p. 208. Likewiſe Briſſot ſays: "Les "révolutions repondait-on, ne ſe font qu'avec les minorités. *"C'eſt la minorité qui a fait la revolution françaiſe.,,* A ſes Commettans, p. 87.

5. Namely, the refuſal to take the oath required by the conſtitution, the placing himſelf at the head of a foreign army deſtined to act againſt France, or his quitting the kingdom. See Ch. II. Sect. I. Art. 5. 6. 7. of the Conſtitution of 1791.

fider the refult of the fact itfelf, whether the injuftice, which occafioned it, be admitted or not [6].

An immediate and unavoidable confequence of the revolution of the 10. of Auguft was a fufpenfion of the diplomatic relations between the Britifh ambaffador in Paris and the French government; for, fince his letters of credence had been made out to Louis XVI. as to the perfon invefted with the executive power of France, they of courfe ceafed to be of any value, after the king was depofed, and his authority transferred to a provifional executive council [7]. There were only three poffible modes therefore, which could be adopted by the Britifh government: either to let Lord Gower continue in Paris in a private capacity: or to renew

6. However I cannot avoid quoting a remarkable confeffion made by the celebrated legiflator Condorcet, who in his fpeech of the 20. of April 1792 faid: "La nation Françaife "a une conftitution, cette conftitution a été reconnue, adop-"tée par la généralité des citoyens: *elle ne peut être changée* "*que par le voeu du peuple, et fuivant les formes* qu'elle même "a prefcrites.,, Moniteur 22. Avril 1792.

7. This was mentioned in the Letter to Lord Gower, of which a tranflation was communicated to the French minifter, for it is there faid: "As it appears, that in the "prefent ftate of affairs the exercife of the executive power "has been withdrawn from his moft chriftian majefty, the "credentials, which have hitherto been made ufe of by your "excellency can no longer be valid.,,

his diplomatic relations by fresh letters of credence: or to recall him. But it would have rendered no service either to France in general, or to the national assembly in particular, to have suffered a person, who by the revolution of the 10. of August was reduced to a private station, to continue his residence in that country. On the contrary, it would in all probability have produced rather discontent than satisfaction: for, though he was become a private person, and must remain as such till he had received new credentials, yet his former diplomatic relations would not have been forgotten, and his presence would have so frequently reminded the new executive power of the difference between his former and his present character, that it would have gradually become a subject of complaint. With regard to the second mode, there were likewise very weighty reasons, which dissuaded the British government from adopting it. For had new letters of credence been sent to Lord Gower, he must have been accredited either to the executive council or to the national assembly. But the very title of the executive council, conseil exécutif *provisoire* [8], clearly indicated,

8. Le Brun himself in his Note to Lord Gower used this title. Likewise in the fourth article of the decree, which passed in the night of the 10. of August, was said: "Les ministres actuellement en activité continueront *provisoirement* l'exercise de leurs fonctions.,, Moniteur 12. Aug. 1792.

that its institution was merely temporary. Consequently letters of credence, addressed to the executive council, could likewise have been only temporary: and it might be expected that in a very short time fresh credentials would be required for some other council or committee. Still less could a British ambassador be accredited to the national assembly: for this very assembly had in the night of the 10. August pronounced its own dissolution, and ordered the election of a national convention [9]. Further it was declared in the same decree, that the king was only *provisionally* suspended from his functions [10]. All authorities therefore in France were at that time merely transient: and consequently the most prudent part, which England could take, was to wait at least till the new constitution had been determined by the national convention, for which purpose it was ordered to assemble. This was certainly no breach of neutrality, especially as in the

9. The first article of the decree of the 10. of August is: "Le peuple Français est invité à former une convention nationale.„ Ib.

10. The second article is: "Le chef du pouvoir exécutif est *provisoirement* suspendu de ses fonctions, jusqu' à ce que la convention nationale ait prononcé sur les mesures, qu'elle croira devoir adopter pour assurer la souveraineté du peuple, et le regne de la liberté et de l'égalité."

the letter by which the Britiſh ambaſſador was recalled, the moſt ſolemn declaration was made, that it was not the intention of the Britiſh government to interfere in the arrangement of the internal affairs of France. Beſides, when it is the intention of a court to abandon its ſyſtem of neutrality, its ambaſſador uſually quits the country, againſt which hoſtilities are intended, without taking leave of the government. But this did not happen in the preſent inſtance, for Lord Gower communicated his letter of recall even to the *new* government of France: nor did Le Brun in his anſwer expreſs the leaſt ſuſpicion, that it was the deſign of the Britiſh cabinet to violate the neutrality toward France. On the contrary, he declared, not only that the French nation confided in "the juſtice, the moderation, and the impartiality of the Britiſh cabinet,", but likewiſe that "this confidence was *founded on facts* [11]:" and in his report on the ſituation of France in reſpect to the different powers of Europe, delivered to the national aſſembly on the 23. of Auguſt, he aſſerted that on the ſubject of neutrality the Britiſh ambaſſador "had left *a ſatisfactory teſtimony of the ſentiments of his court* [12]." Indeed the whole conduct of

11. Dans cette confiance intime *fondée ſur les faits* etc, See Note 2.

12. "Il reſte à parler de l'Angleterre et de la Hollande: "ces deux puiſſances annoncent toujours le deſir de reſter

the British government afforded ample proof, that it was not its intention to seek a quarrel with France: for had it really entertained any such design, it would not have neglected the most favourable opportunity, that ever offered, of humbling its rival, the month of August 1792. A glorious peace with Tippoo Saib, which was already known in Europe, afforded full scope to the operation of the British arms: France stood unsupported by a single ally, like England at the commencement of the American war: yet though France had taken ungenerous advantage of the one period, England refused even to retaliate at the other, notwithstanding the repeated solicitations of the confederate powers [13]. Nay so favourable was the conduct

"dans les termes de stricte neutralité. L'Ambassadeur britannique, en s'éloignant momentanement de la France, "nous laisse à cet égard *un temoignage satisfaisant des sentimens de sa Cour.*" Moniteur 25. Août 1792.

13. We have already seen that the British government was solicited in 1791 to join a coalition against France, and that the proposal was rejected. That it was again invited by various powers in the summer of 1792 and with the same success, appears from the speech of Mr. Dundas in the House of Commons on the 14. of December 1792. See likewise Mr. Miles's Letter to le Brun, the French minister, dated 18. Dec. 1792, in the Authentic Correspondence, Appendix p. 75.

of Great Britain toward France, that the free exportation of arms and proviſions was ſtill permitted, and ceaſed not till the decree of the 19. of November, with its concomitant circumſtances, had placed beyond a doubt the hoſtile diſpoſition of France.

How then can any man with juſtice aſſert that the Britiſh government was guilty of a breach of neutrality toward France in Auguſt 1792? The mere recall of an ambaſſador from a foreign court, if attended with no indications of hoſtility, cannot poſſibly be conſtrued into a breach of peace. Almoſt all the other ambaſſadors left Paris about the ſame time with Lord Gower: even the Daniſh ambaſſador, Baron Blohm, received letters of recall, and the only reaſon, why he did not leave Paris, was that he was too ill at that time to undertake a long journey. No one has ever reproached the Daniſh court with having violated, by the command ſent to the Daniſh ambaſſador, its neutrality toward France. Why then ſhall the Engliſh government be accuſed, for ſending a ſimilar command? An appeal has indeed been made to the ſecond article of the treaty of commerce between France and England: but the proof, which has been founded on this article, reſts on a falſe interpretation of it. For by this article was ſtipulated, not that the mere recall of an ambaſſador, either from Paris or from London,

ſhould be regarded as a breach of peace, but ſimply that in caſe the two powers ſhould happen to be at variance, and a rupture ſhould be likely to enſue, hoſtilities ſhould not be conſidered as actually commenced, till the ambaſſadors of both powers were either recalled or diſmiſſed [14]. Now the caſe aſſumed in this article did not take place in Auguſt 1792, and conſequently the article itſelf is not applicable to the recall of Lord Gower. Beſides, the French miniſter in London was ſtill permitted to remain there: for he continued in England not leſs than five months after the period in queſtion, and even communicated with the Britiſh miniſtry, though his communications, for obvious reaſons, could not be conſidered as ſtrictly official [15].

14. "Si quelque jour il ſurvient quelque mauvaiſe intel-"ligence, interruption d'amitié ou rupture entre les couron-"nes de leurs majeſtés, ce qu' à Dieu ne plaiſe (laquelle "rupture ne ſera cenſée exiſter que lors du rappel ou du "renvoi des ambaſſadeurs et miniſtres reſpectifs) etc.,, Martens Recueil des principaux traités, Tom. II. p. 681.

15. It is likewiſe to be obſerved that the whole of the Britiſh embaſſy did not leave Paris with Lord Gower: for Mr. Lindſay, the ſecretary of legation ſtaid behind, and would probably have continued his reſidence there, if the murder of two Britiſh ſubjects under the pretext of their being ariſtocrats, and the butcheries of the 2. of September, had not excited apprehenſions for his perſonal ſafety.

But it is ſaid: if the French nation thought proper to eſtabliſh a republic, what neceſſity had the Britiſh government to trouble itſelf about the forms of a letter of credence? An ambaſſador might have been accredited to the nation at large, without regard to the perſons, who in Auguſt 1792 conducted its affairs! — But in the firſt place we muſt aſk, what is meant by an ambaſſador's being accredited to the nation at large. No ambaſſador can negotiate with the whole body of the people; his conferences muſt be confined to the perſons, who are in actual poſſeſſion of the executive authority. Theſe perſons may indeed aſſert that they act in the name of the whole nation: and in a republic, in which order and durability of government is to be found, the actual rulers may aſſert it without contradiction. But in 1792 and 1793 the adminiſtration of public affairs in France was highly defective, as well in order, as in durability: one party rapidly ſucceeded another, and each party pretended, while in power, to act in the name of the nation, but was branded, when fallen, with the appellation of a faction. By what criterion then was the Britiſh government to determine, to which of the parties the honourable title of nation, and to which the diſgraceful name of faction was due? Had the Girondiſts been aſked, they would have anſwered, *we* repreſent the nation: and the very ſame anſwer would have been given by

the Anarchists, who considered *themselves* as the nation, and the Girondists as a faction [16]. In this situation

16. The public administration of affairs at that time is represented by Brissot in his work. A ses commettans in very striking colours: The following passages may serve as examples. P. 2. Des loix sans execution, des autorités constituées, sans force et avilies, le crime impuni, les proprietés attaquées, la sureté des individus violée, la morale du peuple corrompue, *ni constitution, ni governement, ni justice.* — P. 33. Maintenant je le demande à tout homme de bonne foi: où donc est maintenant la puissance suprême? Est-ce dans la Convention, ou dans le Tribunal revolutionaire? Est-ce dans ce tribunal, ou dans Marat? Est-ce dans Marat, ou dans les factieux, qui le protègent? — P. 37. Ce n'est pas encore dans la commune de Paris que reside l'exercise de la souveraineté nationale, c'est dans un club, ou plutôt dans une vingtaine de brigands, qui dirigent ce club, qui font courber devant eux toutes les autorités constituées par la nation. — P. 39. Je le demande à tout homme, qui a étudié les bases des républiques, peut-il exister à côté d'un foyer aussi actif de conspirations, qui communique à ceux de la municipalité des sections et des autres clubs de l'empire; peut-il exister une convention libre et indépendante, un gouvernement, une justice? — P. 41. Tous les pouvoirs sont necessairement au club; voilà le corps législatif, ou plutôt voilà le corps au dessus de la loi, au dessus de toutes les autorités constituées, voilà le souverain de la France entiere. J'ai fait voir que le club des anarchistes était le souverain de la convention; il est encore des ministres *depuis le 10. Août.*

the British government could not treat with the party, which was in power, and which called itself the nation, without incurring the danger of being accused by the succeeding ruling party of having treated with factionists. The new party might have even asserted that Great Britain intermeddled in the internal affairs of France [17]: and, according to the doctrine of the national assembly itself, this was one of the greatest offences, which one nation could commit toward another.

Besides, all diplomatic connexions with so fluctuating an administration appeared to be useless: a treaty made with one party might have been regarded as not valid by the other: and therefore Great Britain could

— P. 46. Je reviens aux ministres qui, puisqu'il faut enfin trancher le mot, *ont été et sont plutôt les ministres des jacobins de Paris, que ceux de la nation.* It is true that the description, which Brissot here gives of France applies immediately to the spring of 1793: but it is equally applicable to the latter half of 1792, and one passage in particular is expressly dated from the 10. of August.

17. For this reason, in the Letter to Lord Gower, immediately after the passage quoted above in Note 7 was added: "His majesty is therefore of opinion that you ought "not to remain any longer in Paris, as well on this account, "as because this step appears to him the most conformable "to the principles of neutrality, which he has hitherto "observed.,,

not expect under such circumstances that any convention with France would have a lasting effect[18]. Nor was it certain in August 1792 that the king of France would not be re-instated: for no one expected after the celebrated Declaration at Coblentz of the 25. of July, that the close of the Prussian campaign would so ill correspond to the commencement of it. And if Louis XVI. had been restored to his former authority, the British government, by a connexion with either of the republican parties in France, would have materially injured its own interests in regard both to the king and to the allied powers, which no one had a right to expect, since there is a duty, which we owe to ourselves, as well as to our neighbours. But even if this duty be set aside, and even if no attention was due to the possibility of a revolution in favour of the deposed king, at least regard was to be had to another revolution, which was expected by the republicans

18. Brissot, in the above quoted work p. 103. says: "Les puissances étrangères, qui voudraient traiter avec nous, "dans l'état où nous sommes, pourraient-elles concevoir "un espoir semblable? Non; elles se disent: la France est "divisée par des factions; l'une triomphe aujourd'hui, de-"main ce sera l'autre. Traitez avec l'une, l'autre casse le "traité. Rien n'est stable; attendons cette stabilité, et nous "traiterons.„ And p. 112 he says: *"On ne traite point avec "l'anarchie.„*

themſelves: for Briſſot in his Addreſs to the republicans of France, which is dated October 1792, declared, that as the firſt revolution deſtroyed deſpotiſm, and the ſecond overturned royalty, a third was neceſſary to put an end to anarchy [19]. Conſequently the moſt prudent conduct which Great Britain could obſerve was to continue neutral toward all parties [20], and not to renew the diplomatic connexions with France, which the revolution of the 10. of Auguſt had interrupted, till a ſtable government, or a ſettled conſtitution, whether monarchical or republican, was fully eſtabliſhed. But the new conſtitution, which it was the buſineſs of the national convention to determine, and then preſent to the primary aſſemblies for their approbation, was not even drawn up before February [21].

19. His own words are: "J'ai toujours penſé qu'il nous "fallait trois révolutions: la premiere a renverſé le deſpo"tiſme, la ſeconde la royauté, la troiſieme détruira l'anarchie.,,

20. See Note 17.

21. It was firſt preſented to the convention on the 15. of February 1793 by Condorcet in the name of the conſtitutional committee. See the Moniteur 17. and 18. Feb. 1793. But though preſented, it was not adopted by the convention: for that which is called the conſtitution of 1793, and was really adopted was drawn up much later in that year. And even this conſtitution was not only ſuſpended within a ſhort time after its adoption, but is conſidered by the preſent ru-

1793: and after that period the reſidence of a Britiſh ambaſſador in Paris was no longer a queſtion, ſince on the firſt of that month the convention had already declared war againſt Great Britain.

Laſtly the perſonal ſafety of the Britiſh ambaſſador in Paris was not unworthy of conſideration. But in a city, in which the licentiouſneſs of a blood-thirſty populace either was not, or could not be reſtrained within due bounds, in a city where the moſt horrid murders were committed without regard either to age or character, and where even Britiſh ſubjects had fallen

lers of France as ſo defective, that on the 16. of April 1796 a law was made, which condemned to *death* all perſons, who by their *writings or ſpeeches* ſhould attempt to re-eſtabliſh it: for on that day the following law, propoſed by Treillard, was unanimouſly decreed by the council of five hundred, and immediately ratified by the council of elders. "Sont coupables de crime contre la ſureté interieure de la "republique et contre la ſureté individuelle des citoyens, et "ſeront punis de la *peine de mort*, conformément à l'article "612 du code des delits et des peines, tous ceux qui par "*leurs diſcours, ou par leurs écrits, ſoit inprimés ſoit diſtri*-"*bués, ſoit affichés*, provoquent la diſſolution de la repréſen-"tation nationale ou celle du directoire exécutif, ou le "meurtre de tous ou aucuns des members qui le compoſent, "ou le rétabliſſement de la royauté, *ou celui de la conſtitution* "*de* 1793, etc.„ Moniteur 20. Avril 1796.

a prey to the fury of a Parifian mob, no Britifh ambaffador could have remained with fafety. On *this* ground therefore, as well as on the preceding, his departure from Paris was the moft adviſeable ftep, which under thofe circumftances could have been taken.

From the prefent period to the middle of November, no events took place, which belong to an hiftory of the relations between Great Britain and France. During this interval, which comprifed about three months, the former remained a quiet fpectator of all that paffed on the continent: and the latter was too much engaged with Auftria and Pruffia to pay much attention to Great Britain [22]. But in the middle of November the fcene changed, and at that time, as will appear from the following chapter, was laid the foundation of the war, which ftill fubfifts between the two countries.

22. I defignedly fay "*much* attention,, becaufe even before the end of September France began the augmentation of its marine.

CHAPTER X.

French conquests in Germany, the Netherlands, and Savoy. A French fleet in the Mediterranean harasses the coasts of several Italian states. Other naval armaments in France. Opening of the Schelde. Decree of the 19. of November, by which assistance was promised to all nations, that were willing to take up arms against their governments. Deputies from certain British societies appear at the bar of the French national convention, and signify their intention of establishing a national convention in Great Britain. Encouragement thereto on the part of the French convention. Measures taken in consequence, and commotions in Great Britain.

Toward the middle of November 1792 the arms of France were victorious in every quarter. The decisive battle of Gemappe, which was fought on the 6. of this month, had rendered the French absolute masters of the Austrian Netherlands: and General Custine was not only in possession of Mayntz and Franc-

fort [1], but was making vigourous preparations to penetrate ſtill further into Germany [2]. The dutchy of Savoy had been already conquered, and before the expiration of the month it was formally incorporated into France [3]. At the ſame time the Toulon fleet, under the orders of Admiral Truguet haraſſed both the coaſt of Piemont, and that of other Italian ſtates. Nor was this fleet, which conſiſted of fifteen ſail of the line [4], the only naval armament, which France had fitted out at this period: for it appears from the report delivered to the national convention by the marine miniſter, Monge, on the 23. of September 1792, that even then not leſs than *twenty one ſhips of the*

1. It was not before the 2. of December, that Francfort was re-captured.

2. All theſe facts are ſo well known, that it would be ſuperfluous to quote authority for them.

3. "Gregoire lit un projet de décret ſur l'incorporation "de la Savoie. La queſtion eſt miſe aux voix par aſſis et levé. "*Un ſeul membre ſe leve contre.*,, Moniteur 28. Nov. 1792. The circumſtance, that there was only one diſſenting voice on this queſtion, is ſo much the more remarkable, as the incorporation of Savoy was in direct contradiction to the ſolemn pledge, repeatedly given by the French rulers, "that they renounced all conqueſt and aggrandizement.,,

4. Briſſot à ſes commettans p. 42. NB. Whenever I quote this Work, I mean the original Paris edion.

line, thirty frigates, ten ſhips armed en flute, and forty two ſmaller ſhips of war were actually at ſea [5]. It appears further from the ſame report, that, *thirty four ſhips of the line*, in addition to the preceding, were in a ſtate to be inſtantly commiſſioned, that nineteen more were capable of being refitted, that ſeven were building, of which three were ready to be launched, and that out of one and forty frigates twenty three were in ſuch a ſtate of forwardneſs, that they were capable of being put in immediate commiſſion, beſide ſix which were on the ſtocks. Such was the naval armament, and ſuch were the preparations, which were made in France for a ſtill further augmentation of it, at a time when Great Britain had only ſixteen thouſand ſailors and marines in pay, which were hardly ſufficient to man even twelve ſhips of the line, with the proportionate number of frigates, ſloops, and cutters.

5. Séance du 23. Septembre "M. Monge fait un rapport ſur le departement de la marine. Il en réſulte que la république *fait flotter ſur mer* 102 pavillons tricolors; ſavoir 21 gros vaiſſeaux, 30 fregattes, 18 corvettes, 24 aviſos, 10 fluttes ou gabarres; que 34 autres vaiſſeaux de ligne ſont prêts à être armés, 19 ſuſceptible de radoubement, 7 ſont en conſtruction, dont 3 prêts à être mis en mer, que ſur 41 fregattes, 23 ſont en état d'être armés ſur le champ, outre 6 qui ſont ſur les chantiers.,, Moniteur 25. Sept. 1792.

The rapid progreſs of the French arms, and the vigourous preparations, which were making for new conqueſts, unavoidably excited the attention of the Britiſh government. The plan of ſubjugation and aggrandizement, which had hitherto lain concealed in embryo, began now to unfold itſelf; and the ſyſtem, which the French rulers have ſince followed with ſo much ſucceſs, became viſible to the eye of the ſagacious obſerver. By the incorporation of Savoy they had trodden under foot the principle, on which they had ſolemnly pledged themſelves to found the new fabric of French politicks: and it was now become evident, that the promiſed renunciation of conqueſt and aggrandizement was nothing more than a maſk, under which they endeavoured to cover their real deſigns. In the Netherlands however they thought it prudent not to lay aſide the maſk at once, as they did in Savoy: they declared the Belgians a free and independent people, and expreſſed only a deſire of affording them the protection of a friendly neighbour. But the Belgians poſſeſſed too ſmall and too open a country to be able, in the neighbourhood of France, to form a perfectly independent ſtate: and it was certain, that their new protectors would at the ſame time exercise the power of governors. In reſpect to England therefore it was a matter of indifference, whether Belgia bore the tittle of an independent ſtate, or that of

a French department, ſince in the former, as well as in the latter caſe, the coaſt of Flanders, like the coaſt of France itſelf, muſt neceſſarily become an hoſtile coaſt to England. The declaration however of Belgia's independence was nothing more than a prelude to its union with France, and the only reaſon, why its incorporation did not immediately follow that of Savoy, was the neceſſity of deceiving the *people*, though not the government, of Great Britain: for the war againſt Great Britain had been declared only two days, when the commiſſioners of the French convention, aſſembled at Bruſſels, decided that Belgia ſhould be incorporated with France [6].

Ten

6. The documents relative to this ſubject are printed in Chauſſard Memoires hiſtoriques et politiques ſur la révolution de la Belgique et du pays de Liege. (Paris 1793. 8.) p. 78 — 85. Chauſſard's own vote was delivered in the following words: "Je vote la réunion de la Belgique à la "France. — On m'oppoſe le voeu du peuple; *le voeu d'un* "*peuple enfant ou imbecille ſerait nul*, parceque qu'il ſtipule-"rait contre lui-même,,, The vote of Chepy is likewiſe worthy of notice: "Je vote pour que la réunion de la Belgi-"que à la république Françaiſe ſoit operée par la puiſſance "de la raiſon, par les touchantes inſinuations de la philan-"thropie, de la fraternité, et *par tous les moyens* de tactique "révolutionaire; et au cas que nos efforts ſoient infructueux, "et que l'on continue à nous oppoſer le ſyſtême déſeſpérant

Ten days after the battle of Gemappe had put the Auſtrian Netherlands in the poſſeſſion of the French, the executive council reſolved, that the Schelde, in which the Dutch by virtue of various treaties, poſſeſſed the excluſive right of entering with ſhips of a certain burden, and eſpecially ſhips of war, ſhould be opened [7]. It would be uſeleſs to examine, whether theſe treaties, as the executive council aſſerted, were contrary to the

"de la force d'inertie, j'eſtime que *le droit de conquête*, *de-* "*venu pour la premiere fois utile au monde et juſte*, doit faire "l'education politique du peuple Belge et le préparer à de "brillantes et heureuſes deſtinées.„ Further, that notwithſtanding the all-promiſing manifeſto, with which the entry of the French army into Belgia was accompanied, it was by no means the intention of the French government to eſtabliſh an independent republic there, appears from the following confeſſion of General Dumouriez: "L'intention "*ſecréte* à Paris n'étoit point que le peuple Liegois, et "encore moins celui de la Belgique ſe réunît en corps de "nation pour ſe donner une conſtitution et des loix; on "craignait qu'une fois aſſemblés, ces deux peuples ne con- "nuſſent leurs forces et ne fondaſſent une république indé- "pendante.„ Vie de Dumouriez, Tom. III. p. 348.

7. This reſolution was made by the executive council on the 16. of November 1792, and on the 21. was preſented to the national convention, which received it with great applauſe. See Moniteur 22, Nov. 1792.

law of nature or not [8]. It is sufficient that such treaties existed: France itself had garanteed them [9], in conjunction with other powers: and they could not be violated, without destroying that law of nations, which from the time of the general treaty of Westphalia had united the European states into a kind of great republic.

8. The executive council adopted, as the basis of the resolution, the following principle: "that rivers are the common and inalienable property of *all* those nations, through whose territories they flow.,, Now the Schelde from only a league below Fort Lillo to the mouth of it flowed through Dutch territory, for on the north side lay the province of Zealand, and on the south side Dutch Flanders: and every nation considers itself as possessing the right to exercise sovereignty over a river, as far as its own territory extends. The French themselves at least would certainly not suffer any nation to deprive them of this right in regard to their *own* rivers: and if in the year 1792 the inhabitants of Geneva, or of the country of Valais had applied to the Rhone the principle, which the executive council applied to the Schelde, and had said: "the Rhone flows through our territory, consequently we have as good a right as you to the free navigation of it from Lyons to the Mediterranean,, the inference would certainly have been rejected as devoid of foundation.

9. See the second article of the treaty of 1785 between France and Holland in Martens Recueil des principaux traités, Tom. II. p. 614.

In declaring that the Dutch ſhould no longer exerciſe their accuſtomed ſovereignty over the Schelde, the French government had two objects in view, an immediate, and a diſtant one. The immediate object was to ſend French ſhips of war into the Schelde, to bombard the citadel of Antwerp; and this object was very ſoon attained, for on the 1. of December 1792, a French frigate, a brig, two gun-veſſels, and three other armed veſſels from Dunkirk entered the Schelde in defiance of the ſolemn proteſtation of the States General [10]. The diſtant, but main object, was to convert the mouth of the Schelde into a ſtation for French ſhips of war, in order to acquire a naval advantage in the North ſea, which France had hitherto

10. In a Note delivered by the States General to the imperial ambaſſador at the Hague, was contained the following paſſage: "Que L. H. P. ont prié S. A. le Prince "d'Orange etc. d'ordonner à l'officier qui commande le vaiſ- "ſeau de garde, ſtationné à l'embouchure de l'Eſcaut, de ne "pas accorder le paſſage, mais d'informer le commandant "Français, qu'en vertu de traités la riviere d'Eſcaut eſt cloſe "pour les vaiſſeaux de guerre.„ Moniteur 16. Dec. 1792. And immediately in the ſame article is added: "On apprend "que, ce nonobſtant, une fregatte Françaiſe, l'Ariel, un "bricq, deux chaloupes canonieres, et trois barques de pe- "cheur Dunquerquoiſes armées, ont remonté l'Eſcaut le 1. "de ce mois.„

not possessed. This design did not escape the notice of the British ministers: and it could not be a matter of indifference to them, whether France, which at that time had no harbour on the northern coast, in which ships of the line could enter, acquired this advantage or not, because it exposed not only the British commerce, but the eastern coast of Britain itself to a new and very material danger.

By another resolution of the executive council likewise of the 16. of November, the commander in chief of the French army in the Netherlands was ordered to attack the Austrians even on the Dutch territory, in case they retreated thither [11]. It is unnecessary at present to examine, whether according to the usual practice of war, it is allowable in any instance

11. "Extrait du registre des deliberations du conseil exécutif provisoire. Du 16. Novembre 1792, l'an premier de la republique.„

"Le conseil exécutif provisoire délibérant sur l'état actuel de la guerre, notamment dans la Belgique — arrête qu'en conséquence de la deliberation du 24. Octobre dernier, il sera donné ordre au général commandant en chef l'expedition de la Belgique, de continuer à poursuivre les ennemis *même sur le territoire Hollandois*, dans le cas où ils s'y feraient retirés.„

Correspondance du Général Dumouriez avec Pache. (Paris 1793 8.) p. 71.

to attack an enemy on neutral ground: for whether it be allowable or not, the haſte, with which this reſolution was made, ſhews that the executive council regarded the neutrality of Holland as a matter of abſolute indifference. They would otherwiſe have made previous repreſentations to the States General, they would have waited till the Auſtrian army had been permitted to take refuge on the Dutch territory, and they would not have made the reſolution at a time, when the Auſtrians were retreating to Liege, and every movement indicated, that it was not their deſign to enter Holland.

But all the meaſures, which the French government had hitherto taken, though they neceſſarily excited uneaſineſs in the Britiſh cabinet, were trifles in compariſon of other meaſures, which were adopted in the ſame month: for at this very time was formed the determination to overturn the Britiſh government, and the Britiſh conſtitution. By the correſpondence of the Jacobin club with various ſocieties the ſeeds of diſcord and ſedition had been already ſown in great abundance: and the principle adopted by the French rulers, "that the governed muſt be excited to rebel againſt their governors [12]", had been already applied in England

12. "Que penſaient les hommes éclairés, républicains avant le 10. Août, les hommes qui voulaient la liberté,

with great industry and success. For in the first place, on account of the political liberty, which existed in England, it was easier to set the people in commotion, than the people of any other state in Europe[13]: and in the next place, no object appeared so desireable to the French, as the utter destruction of their ancient and formidable rival, which the excitement of a civil war afforded both the easiest and the surest means of attaining. During a considerable time their operations were carried on in the dark: but as soon as they were become all-potent conquerors, and the national convention had acquired sufficient power to act an open part, it was no longer thought necessary to make a secret of their designs. The decisive battle of Gemappe

"non seulement pour leur pays, mais pour toute l'Europe? "Ils croyaient qu'on pouvait l'établir par-tout, *en soulevant* "*les administrés contre les administrans, en faisant voir aux* "*peuples la facilité et les avantages de ces soulevemens.*,, Brissot à ses Commettans p. 81.

13. So early as the 5. of January 1792, Isnard had said: "Voici l'instant qui peut-être doit decider à jamais des "despotes et des nations; c'est vous que le ciel reservait à "ces grands évenémens: élevez vous au niveau de vos de-"stinées,,, and a few lines after: "est-il bien vrai qu'un lan-"gage national ne ferait entendu dans aucune contrée? ah "sans doute les Anglais feraient un peuple digne de l'enten-"dre.,, Moniteur 6. Jan. 1792.

and the conqueſt of the Auſtrian Netherlands preſented the moſt favourable opportunity for a public declaration: and accordingly on the 19. of November 1792 the national convention announced by a formal decree, which was tranſlated into all the European languages, *that France was ready to aſſiſt every nation, which was willing to rebel againſt its own government* [14].

14. "Séance du Lundi 19. Novembre.
"Lépaux propoſe, et la Convention adopte la redaction "ſuivante. La Convention nationale declare, au nom de la "nation Françaiſe, qu'elle accordera fraternité et ſecours à "tous les peuples qui *voudront* recouvrer leur liberté; et "charge le pouvoir exécutif de donner aux généraux les or-"dres neceſſaires pour porter ſecours à ces peuples, et dé-"fendre les citoyens qui auraient été vexés, ou qui pour-"raient l'être pour la cauſe de la liberté.
"Sergent. Je demande que ce décret ſoit traduit et im-"primé dans *toutes les langues*.
"Cette propoſition eſt decretée.„ Moniteur 20. Nov. 1792. Briſſot, though he made no objection to this decree at the time when it was propoſed, for it paſſed with enthuſiaſm (le decret paſſa d'enthouſiaſme) as he himſelf ſays, called it afterwards on mature reflexion, "l'abſurde et impolitique decret du 19. Novembre, qui a *juſtement* excité les inquietu-des des cabinets étrangers.„ A ſes Commettans, p. 68. It is remarkable that the perſon, who propoſed this decree, was elected one of the firſt five Directors, though in other reſpects he is by no means a diſtinguiſhed character.

The measures adopted by the national convention even previous to this decree, but more particularly the decree itself, produced in England the desired effect, and set various societies, who were already disaffected to government, in agitation. So early as the 7. of November [15] an address voted by five thousand persons, members of the united societies of London, Manchester and other places [16], was delivered to the national convention, containing the following passages. "They "are of opinion (namely, they who voted the address) "that it is the duty of true Britons to support and assist "to the utmost of their power the defenders of the "rights of man, the propagators of human felicity, and "to swear inviolable friendship to a nation, which pro-"ceeds *on the plan which you have adopted.*,, — (It is to be observed that this plan was the abolition of royalty). — "What is liberty? What are our rights? "Frenchmen, you are already free: *and Britons are* "*preparing to become so.* A triple alliance, *not of crowns,*

15. Even on the 14. of August several Englishmen appeared at the bar of the national assembly, and congratulated the French on the energy which they had displayed on the 10. of August (de l'energie qu'ils ont montrée dans la journée du 10. Août). Moniteur 17. Aug. 1792.

16. "Cette addresse a été votée par 5000 Anglais réunis dans les societés de Londres, Manchester etc.,, Moniteur du 8. Nov. 1792.

"but of the *people* of America, of France, and of *Great* "*Britain* etc. [17]." This language was very intelligible: but no ſooner was the decree of the 19. of November generally known, than a more open and daring language was adopted, for within nine days after the publication of this decree, deputies from certain Britiſh ſocieties appeared at the bar of the national convention, and ſignified their intention of adopting the form of government introduced in France, and of eſtabliſhing *a national convention in Great Britain.* "We hope," ſaid the orator of the firſt deputation, "that the troops "of liberty will never lay down their arms, as long as

17. "Ils croient qu'il eſt du devoir des vrais Bretons, de "ſoutenir et aſſiſter de tous leurs moyens les defenſeurs des "droits de l'homme, des propagateurs du bonheur de l'hu-"manité, et de jurer à une nation, qui procede *d'après le* "*plan que vous avez adopté*, une amitié inviolable. — Qu'eſt "ce que la liberté? Quels ſont nos droits? Français vous "êtes déja libres; *mais les Bretons ſe préparent à le devenir.* "La triple alliance, *non de couronnes*, mais des peuples de "l'Amerique, de la France, et *de la Grande Bretagne* etc.," Moniteur 8. Nov. 1792. The addreſs is ſigned, Maurice Margarot, Preſident: Thomas Hardy, Secretary: and contains ſeveral other paſſages equally expreſſive of a determination to aboliſh royalty in England. They who have not acceſs to the Moniteur, will find the whole addreſs, in Engliſh, in Rivington's Annual Regiſter 1792. State Papers, p. 344.

"tyrants and ſlaves ſhall continue to exiſt [18]. — Our "wiſhes, citizen-legiſlators, render us impatient to ſee "the moment of this *grand change.* — Nor are we "alone animated by theſe ſentiments: we doubt not, "that they would be equally conſpicuous in the great "majority of our fellow countrymen if the public "opinion were conſulted there, *as it ought to be*, in a "NATIONAL CONVENTION [19]. To this addreſs

18. Every rational man muſt deplore the exiſtence both of tyrants and of ſlaves: but *theſe* gentlemen by the word "tyrant" underſtood every king, however mild his government, or however limited his authority; and by the word "ſlave" they underſtood every inhabitant of a country, where kingly government was eſtabliſhed. Thus do men become the dupes of mere *names*, as if the word "king" neceſſarily involved the idea of ſlavery, or the word "director" the idea of liberty. It is not the title, but the power annexed to it, which is to be taken into conſideration: the ſovereign of Great Britain is called king, the ſovereigns of France are called directors: yet Great Britain is ſtill the land of liberty, and France is now the land of abject ſlavery.

19. "Nous eſpérons que les troupes de la liberté ne les "(i. e. les armes) poſeront, que lorſqu'ils n'y aura plus de "tyrans ni d'eſclaves. — Nos voeux, citoyens legislateurs, "nous rendent impatiens de voir le moment heureux de ce "grand changement. — Nous ne ſommes pas les ſeuls ani-"més de ces ſentimens, nous ne doutons pas, qu'ils ne ſe

the Prefident made the following reply in the name of the French convention. "Citizens of the world, etc. — "principles are waging war againft tyranny, which will "fall under the blows of philofophy. *Royalty in Europe "is either deftroyed, or on the point of perifhing* on the "ruins of feodality: and the declaration of rights, placed "by the fide of thrones is a devouring fire, which will "confume them. *Worthy republicans*, congratulate your-"felves on thinking, that the feftival, which you have "celebrated in honour of the French revolution, is *the "prelude to the feftival of nations.*,,

But the language held on the fame day by the deputies of the fociety for conftitutional infor-

"manifeftaffent également chez la grande majorité de nos "compatriotes, fi l'opinion publique y étoit confultée, *comme "elle devait l'être*, dans une convention nationale.,, Séance du 28. Novembre. Moniteur 29. Nov. 1792.

Le Prefident à la deputation.

"Citoyens du monde etc. Les principes font la guerre "à la tyrannie, qui tombera fous les coups de la philofophie. "La royauté eft en Europe ou détruite ou agoniffante fur les "décombres féodaux; et la declaration des droits placée à "côté des trônes eft un feu dévorant, qui va les confumer. "(Applaudiffemens). *Eftimables republicains*, felicitez vous "en penfant, que la fête que vous avez celebrée en l'hon-"neur de la révolution Françaife, *eft le prelude de la fête des "nations.*,, Ib.

mation [20], as well as the language of the President, in his reply to *them*, was ſtill more expreſſive. "Citizens "of France,,, ſaid the orator of the deputation, "we "are ſent by a patriotic ſociety in London to congra- "tulate you, in their name, on the triumphs of liberty. "— After the example, which France has lately given, "*revolutions will be rendered eaſy*: and it will not be "extraordinary, if in a *ſhort ſpace of time* addreſſes of "congratulation be ſent to a NATIONAL CONVEN- "TION OF ENGLAND [21].,, At theſe words the French convention applauded. The addreſs itſelf was then read by one of the ſecretaries, which, after much abuſe of the Engliſh, and much panegyric on the French government, concluded with a ſentence con-

20. The ſame ſociety in its addreſs to the jacobin club, which was ſent a few days before the royal proclamation of the 21. of May was iſſued, diſplayed ſimilar principles, though not ſo openly, as after the decree of the 19. of November.

21. "Citoyens de France, nous ſommes deputés par une "ſocieté patriotique de Londres, pour vous feliciter en ſon "nom des triomphes de la liberté. — D'après l'exemple que "vient de donner la France, *les revolutions vont devenir fa- "ciles*; il ne ſerait pas extraordinaire, *que dans un court "eſpace de tems il arrivât auſſi des felicitations à une* Convention "nationale d'Angleterre.,, (Applaudiſſemens). Moniteur 29. Nov. 1792.

taining the following words: "others will *ſoon* march in *your* footſteps, in this career of *uſeful changes* [22]." And theſe *uſeful changes*, according to the interpretation of the deputies themſelves, were to conſiſt in the eſtabliſhment of a national convention, and conſequently in the *total* abolition of the Britiſh conſtitution [23]. As ſoon as the ſpeech of the deputies was

22. "D'autres marcheront *bientôt* ſur vos traces dans "cette carriere *d'utiles changemens*." Ib. The addreſs is ſigned: Sempill, Preſident. D. Adams, Secretary. In the Moniteur it is ſigned likewiſe by Joel Barlow and John Froſt, the deputies, who delivered it to the French convention.

23. It is extraordinary that, notwithſtanding the public acts of this and other ſimilar ſocieties, which are recorded in the Moniteur, and lie open to the whole world, both eminent orators and eminent writers ſhould ſo long have perſiſted in the aſſertion, that nothing more was intended than a parliamentary reform. In like manner it has been aſſerted even till the breaking out of the Iriſh rebellion, that the United Iriſhmen had no other object in view than a reform in the Commons Houſe of Parliament. But at preſent we all know from the Report of the Secret Committees of the two houſes of the Iriſh Parliament, publiſhed in Auguſt 1798, and founded on the evidence of Arthur O'Connor, Emmet, Macnevin, and other chieftains of the rebellion, that a parliamentary reform was nothing more than a maſk, under which the United Iriſhmen endeavoured to cover their real deſigns, that they were in fact cloſely allied with the

ended, and the addrefs itfelf had been read, the Prefident of the French convention returned an anfwer,

enemies of Great Britain, and that in the fummer of 1796 Lord Edward Fitzgerald and Arthur O'Connor went to Francfort, as deputies from the Irifh Union, to fettle with General Hoche the plan of the landing in Ireland, which was then in agitation, and which was attempted, though unfuccefsfully, before the clofe of the year. And ftill more extraordinary is it, that members of the Britifh fenate, hardly two months before Arthur O'Connor himfelf made thefe acknowledgements could venture to declare in a court of juftice, that they were acquainted with the political character of this man, and that they believed him to be fincerely attached to the principles, which placed the prefent family on the throne. The impofitions, which have been practifed fince the French revolution by the term "parliamentary reform,, appear further from a memoir delivered in 1797 by Lewines, the ambaffador of the United Irifhmen, to the French minifter for foreign affairs at Paris, in which was the following paffage. "The *delufions* of Reform and Emancipation are beginning to fail from the delay etc.,, See the Report of the Secret Committee of the Irifh Houfe of Commons in Auguft 1798, an extract from which is printed in the Times of the 27. of Auguft. Thus have the common people in Ireland, who, as Oliver Bond acknowledged, cared very little about a parliamentary reform, been rendered the dupes of thofe, who, as the fame perfon added, "thought for them,,, or, in plain terms, wifhed to facrifice their country to gratify their private ambition. The

which contained the following paſſages. "The defen-"ders of *our* liberty will one day become the defenders "of *your own.* — The ſhades of Pym, of Hampden, "and of Sidney hover over your heads: and without "doubt *the moment is approaching*, when the people of "France will come to offer their congratulations to "THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF GREAT "BRITAIN [24].,,

Such anſwers to *ſuch* ſocieties [25], united with the

ſame *deluſions of reform* were attempted to be practiſed in England, when the above-quoted addreſſes were preſented to the French convention in November 1792: but, fortunately for Great Britain they produced not the intended effect.

24. "Les defenſeurs de *notre* liberté le ſeront un jour de "*la votre.* — Les ombres de Pym, de Hampden, de Sidney, "planent ſur vos têtes: *et ſans doute il approche le moment,* "*où les Français iront feliciter* la Convention nationale de la "Grande Bretagne.,, Moniteur 29. Nov. 1792. The convention then decreed, that the addreſſes, with the anſwers of the Preſident, ſhould be tranſlated into all languages. Ib.

25. On the 29. of November another addreſs was preſented to the convention from a ſociety at Rocheſter, in which after much declamation againſt the Britiſh government, mention was made, in very intelligible though general expreſſions, of people, "who wiſhed to receive from the French nation the benefit of liberty,, (qui aſpirent à reçevoir de lui le bienfait de la liberté). Moniteur 30. Nov. 1792. Another paſſage in this addreſs, "reſolu que le préſident de la ſocieté

decree of the 19. of November [26], were equivalent to a formal declaration of hoſtilities againſt the Britiſh government: and the general promiſe of aſſiſtance, which had been given to revolutioniſts of all nations, was by the conduct of the national convention on the 28. of November confirmed, and applied to Great Britain in particular. This was the reward of all the benefits, which had been conferred on France: this was the return, which was made for the refuſal to join the coalition

"invitera tous les amis de l'égalité, *toutes les ſocietés correſpondantes en France*, à employer leur zéle, leurs efforts, "leurs ſollicitations aupres *du conſeil exécutif* etc.,, affords an additional proof, not only that ſocieties in England correſponded with ſocieties in France, but likewiſe that theſe ſocieties ſtood in immediate connexion with the French executive council. — Beſide this addreſs and the three others above-mentioned, ſeveral more were ſent to France about this time: for Lord Grenville in his ſpeech of the 13. Dec. 1792 ſaid: "he held in his hand no leſs than *ten* addreſſes, preſented to the national convention of France by ſubjects of this country.,, See the New Annual Regiſter 1793. Britiſh and foreign Hiſtory p. 22. See alſo Rivington's Annual Regiſter 1792. State Papers, p. 344 — 352.

26. The explanation of this decree, which was afterwards given by the French executive council, will be examined in a ſubſequent chapter, where it will appear that the explanation was founded on the blackeſt hypocriſy.

coalition, for the ſalvation of the French colony of St. Domingo, for the permiſſion to import from England bread and arms, and for the preſervation of neutrality even at a time, when France might have been attacked with the utmoſt advantage. But what gratitude could be expected from men, who convert religion and morality into ſubjects of ridicule? They acted only, at that time, as they have acted ever ſince: for their whole conduct affords one continued proof, that from the moment they acquire the means of conqueſt, neither neutrality, nor juſtice, nor gratitude prevent them from the execution of their deſigns.

It is true, that the national convention pretended an eſpecial friendſhip for the *people* of Great Britain. But what right did they poſſeſs to interfere in the internal affairs of a neutral country, and to ſeparate the people from the government? According to their own maxims, this was the greateſt offence, of which one nation could be guilty toward another. The Britiſh government had not acted in this manner toward France: for ſo late as the end of Auguſt Le Brun himſelf acknowledged, that "it had conducted itſelf to that very period with juſtice, with moderation, and impartiality [27]." But let us aſk, what they meant by

27. Le Brun's own words were, "la juſtice, la modération, et l'impartialité, qu'il a montrée jusqu' à préſent." See his Note to Lord Gower quoted Ch. IX. Note 2.

friendſhip for the people, and enmity to the government of Britain; and how they could attack the latter, yet leave the former unmoleſted. It is not the members of a government, which uſually take the field, when a country is invaded, but the ſoldiers, and the other inhabitants, who fight under the orders of government: the very perſons therefore, for whom the French pretended a particular friendſhip, were thoſe, who were immediately expoſed to the effects of their enmity. Who therefore can be ſo blind, as not to ſee, that ſuch declarations were nothing more than attempts to delude the unwary, and to convert them into inſtruments of French ambition? If we further aſk, in what the amity of the French rulers for the *people* of foreign countries really conſiſts, the anſwer is obvious. Agreably to their pretended doctrine, they declared war only on the Stadtholder of Holland, and yet reduced the once wealthy inhabitants of that country to beggary: they declared war, as they aſſerted, only on the oligarchs of Bern, and then ſubjected even the democratic cantons of Switzerland to ſlavery: they declared war on the ſenate of Venice, and ſold the *people* to a foreign maſter. Such is the friendſhip of theſe promoters of the rights of man, and ſuch is their regard for what they call the ſovereignty of the people. It was ſurely therefore the duty of the Britiſh government to reſcue the natives of our free

and happy iſland from the influence of *ſuch* friendſhip [28].

In fact, the means which have been adopted by the republican governors of France, to gratify their ambition, and extend their conqueſts, are the moſt deteſtable, which human ingenuity can invent. The monarchs of France, eſpecially Louis XIV, had indeed likewiſe attempted to ſubjugate the neighbouring ſtates: but they went more openly to work, and deluded not the inhabitants of the countries, which they inva-

28. It is true that the number of thoſe, who have ſuffered themſelves to be deceived by the ſpecious profeſſions of the French rulers has been very conſiderable even in Great Britain: but at preſent, after an experience of ſeven years has enabled us to compare promiſes with the performance of them, I believe that every man, who *chooſes* to ſee, *muſt* ſee the error. On this ſubject I can quote ſo high an authority, as that of Mr. Sheridan himſelf, who in the admirable ſpeech, which he delivered in the Houſe of Commons on the 20. of April 1798, ſaid: "If then they attempt "to invade us, they will no doubt come furniſhed with "flaming manifeſtoes. The Directory may inſtruct their "generals to make the faireſt profeſſions of how their army "is to act, *but of theſe profeſſions ſurely not one can be believed.*" And a few lines after, he added with great energy: "*Can "there be ſuppoſed an Engliſhman ſo ſtupid, ſo beſotted, ſo "befooled, as to give a moment's credit to ſuch ridiculous pro- "feſſions?*" See the Morning Chronicle 21. April 1798.

ded, by promises of felicity, which they were determined not to fulfil. They made no ostentation of propagating the rights of man: yet they oppressed them infinitely less than the modern despots of republican France. They intrigued, as well as the Convention and the Directory: but their intrigues were less injurious to mankind, for the intrigues of the former were confined chiefly to the great, or to the courts of princes, whereas the intrigues of the latter operate on whole nations. The republican governors of France set the vilest of the human passions in commotion, they work on the illiterate multitude, who are not aware, that they are mere engines in the hands of their employers, and that they themselves, as well as those, against whom they are employed, will at last become the miserable slaves of their pretended deliverers. The national convention toward the close of the year 1792 had its secret agents in almost every quarter, who endeavoured by all the arts of systematic deception to seduce especially the lower orders of society. Chaussard, who was well acquainted with the principles of the new French government, and was himself one of the agents in the Austrian Netherlands, speaking of the revolution professors [29], as he calls them, says: "it is not at the tables of the great, but

29. "Professeurs de révolution."

under the thatch of the cottager, that the toasts of liberty must be given [30].,, He has described likewise the means, which were adopted to bring the people of foreign countries into the views of the French convention: and these means consisted in promises of unlimited freedom, and an absolute exemption from all taxes [31]. By such insidious and delusive professions, by assurances of wealth and liberty, have the modern governors of France reduced those, who have been

30. "Ce n'était point aux banquets des administrateurs, "qu'il fallait porter les *toasts* de la liberté; c'était sous le "chaume du pauvre.,, *Chauffard* Memoires historiques etc. p. 53.

31. Ib. To set the populace more effectually in commotion, a procession of butts of bier, ornamented with branches, and bearing the inscription, "free and exempt from duties,,, was held at Brussels for this very purpose. Chauffard's own words in the place just quoted are: "Ces "tonneaux chargés de palmes promenés en pompe, portant "pour inscription: *Libres et affranchis de droits*, escortés "d'une cour plus pompeuse, que celle des monarques, c'était "celle du peuple; ces acclamations de joie et de franchise, "ces flots de la liqueur nationale écumeux et ruissélans, tout "présentait une leçon en action, tout cela parlait plus haut "et plus éloquemment encore que la philosophie.,, See likewise the first article of the decree of 15. Dec. 1792, where he same delusive promises are given.

weak enough to believe in them, to the loweſt indigence and the meaneſt ſervitude [32].

The engines, which they ſet to work with ſo much ſucceſs in the Netherlands, they endeavoured likewiſe to employ in England: for at the end of November and the beginning of December 1792 London abounded with revolution profeſſors, as Chauſſard called them, or miſſionaries, as they were termed by Gregoire [33], who were amply ſupplied with money for the purpoſe of bribing and ſeducing the lower or-

32. Dumouriez himſelf ſays: "C'eſt le 15 Decembre que "fut donné le fameux decret qui prouvait aux Belges et à "tous les peuples, qui avaient appellé les Français ou qui les "avaient reçus, *que la convention n'envoyait les armées chez* "*eux que pour les ſpolier et les tyranniſer.* — On diſait aux "Belges dans le préambule, qu'ils étaient libres; on les trai-"tait en eſclaves.,, Vie de Dumouriez, Tom. III. p. 373. 374.

33. In a report, which Gregoire delivered to the national convention on the 27. Nov. 1792, he ſaid: "Veut-on "nous dire, que les peuples ayant des conſtitutions differen-"tes les fonderont toutes ſur les principes de l'égalité, de la "liberté, et ſe chériront en freres? C'eſt le cas d'appliquer le "conſeil d'un miniſtre à l'abbé St. Pierre. *Envoyez préalable-*"*ment des miſſionaires pour convertir le globe.* Pluſieurs con-"trées de l'Europe et de l'Amerique aggrandiront bientôt le "domaine de la liberté.,, Moniteur 28. Novembre 1792. But Camille Jordan has given theſe miſſionaries their true name, and called them *apoſtles of rebellion.* "Continuant à "profeſſer toutes les maximes revolutionaires *et inondant tous*

ders of the people. Various circumſtances attending this infamous plot are well known: but as no one ſeems to have been more intimately acquainted with it, than the author of a tract publiſhed in the Collection of the works, which have been written in defence of Louis the Sixteenth [34], it will not be ſuperfluous to quote the following paſſage [35]. "The king of England,, ſays the author of this tract, "knew the leaders, the "agents, the ſocieties, the correſpondences, the emiſ- "ſaries, the periods of their meeting, their journies, "and their reſolutions. He knew that the plan was "laid, to ſeize the Tower, to plunder the arſenal, to "break open the priſons, to pillage the public buildings "and the houſes of the rich, and to cut off at one "ſtroke the ſeveral branches of the conſtitution His "Majeſty knew that the execution of the plan was "fixed for Saturday the firſt, or Monday the third of "December: he ſaw likewiſe a model of the daggers, "with which the inſurgents were to be armed, and this "model was found in the hands of a Frenchman. He "knew where twenty thouſand pounds of iron lay in

"*les pays de leurs apôtres de rebellion* etc.,, Camille Jordan à ſes Commettans ſur la revolution du 18. Fructidor, p. 90.

34. Collection des meilleurs ouvrages, qui ont été publiés pour la défenſe de Louis XVI. Paris 1793. T. II. 8. This tract is printed in Tom. II, p. 251 — 286.

35. P. 272. 273.

"ſuch a ſtate of readineſs, that in the ſpace of ſix and "thirty hours the whole could be forged into pikes. "He knew what member of the national convention "complained, that the plot was not conducted with "ſufficient vigour, who wrote to one of the agents, that "he did not work as he ought, and that he did not "earn the money of the republic. His Majeſty knew "what other members of the French convention formed "a plan for the inſurrection and the arming of the "negroes, to ruin the engliſh colonies, and to annihi-"late, whatever it might coſt, the power of England. "He knew what emiſſary, after remaining only four "and twenty hours in London, ſet off for the Hague, "with orders to revolutionize Holland. He knew what "other emiſſary wrote to France in the middle of No-"vember, with aſſurances that the inſurrection ſhould "ſoon break out, but wrote again in the middle of "December, that all hopes of an inſurrection were loſt. "His Majeſty knew, which of the emiſſaries warned "his agents, to take care, as the firſt attempt had fai-"led, how they engaged in a ſecond. He knew the "number and the names of the French cannoniers, who "being no longer of uſe in England, after the plot had "failed, were ordered to embark for Ireland an Mon-"day the 17. of December; he knew which of the "leaders recalled this order, and ſent them to France, "whither he repaired alſo himſelf.„

Here we have a minute defcription of feveral remarkable circumftances relative to the plot, which was laid to excite an infurrection in London toward the clofe of the year 1792, a plot, of which the exiftence [36] may be proved from the actions, fpeeches, and confeffions of the French rulers themfelves. For that the avowed principles, "the governed muft be excited to rebel againft their governors,, "miffionaries and revolution-profeffors muft be fent out to convert the globe,, "every nation, which choofes to rebel againft its government fhall receive affiftance from France,, were particularly applied to England, appears from the above-defcribed conduct of the national convention on the 28. of November [37]. The application of thefe principles to England and Ireland appears further from the confeffion of Briffot himfelf: for in his Addrefs to his Conftituents he faid: "it was neceffary to encourage

36. As the bare *exiftence* of the plot is fufficient for the prefent hiftory, it is immaterial, whether credit be given to the above-mentioned *circumftances* or not. Nor do I quote them as abfolutely certain, becaufe they are not taken from an official document.

37. From the documents on this fubject, which are recorded in the Moniteur, there lies no appeal: and thefe documents alone are a fufficient proof that the national convention co-operated in the plan to overturn the Britifh conftitution.

the movements of liberty in Ireland [38],, "we could set England in alarm *by exciting a fermentation in its own bosom* [39]. And that the French emissaries in London were supplied with considerable sums by the national convention, to enable them to operate with the utmost vigour, appears likewise from the same work. For Brissot says: "These republicans have never ceased to "assert, that, if we expect to succeed we must have *mo-* "*ney for secret expences,* partly for the purpose of dividing "the cabinets, and partly for the purpose of *exciting the* "*people* against their tyrants. We want it for the North, "we want it for the South, we want it for *the Indies* [40].,,

38. "L'Irlande dont il fallait *encourager les mouvemens de la liberté*.,, Brissot à ses Commettans, p. 73.

39. "Nous pouvions inquieter l'Angleterre *en excitant la fermentation dans sons sein*.,, Ib. 78. That attempts were made to excite an insurrection in England long *before* the declaration of hostilities (which is very different from assisting a disaffected party when two nations are *already* at open war) appears likewise from the circular letter of the marine minister Monge dated 31. Dec. 1792, which will be quoted in a following chapter.

40. "Ces républicains ne cessaient de dire: Si l'on veut "réussir, il faut du secret, il faut de l'argent pour les *dépenses* "*secretes*, soit pour diviser les cabinets, soit pour *exciter les* "*peuples* contre leurs tyrans. Il en faut pour le Nord, il en "faut pour le Midi, il en faut pour les Indes.,, A ses Commettans p. 74.

This paſſage undoubtedly applies to England. And a few lines after, Briſſot adds: "It was Cambon and Barrere, "who cauſed the decree to be made, by which the "executive council was authorized to take, under the "head of army extraordinaries, *unlimited ſums for theſe "ſecret operations* [41]." Laſtly Briſſot acknowledges that before the declaration of war not leſs than *twenty five millions of livres* had been ſent to England from the national treaſury, and that Cambon, the preſident of the committee of finance, had kept their deſtination a ſecret [42].

That a plot therefore, to overturn the Engliſh government and conſtitution toward the cloſe of the year 1792, not only exiſted, but that the national convention took a very active part in it admits of no

41. "C'eſt Cambon avec Barrere, qui a fait rendre un "decret pour autoriſer le Conſeil exécutif à prendre des *ſom-"mes illimités* ſur l'extraordinaire des guerres, pour ces *ope-"rations ſecrètes*." Ib.

42. "A cette epoque (lors de la declaration de guerre) "la tréſorerie dirigée par Cambon, avait pour 25 millions de "numeraire achetés en Angleterre, et qui furent expoſés à "être pris. Que ſont-ils devenus? On l'ignore." Ib. 97. Immediately before this paſſage, he had ſaid that five other millions had been depoſited in the Houſe of Bourdieu and Chollet in London, and that after the war broke out they fell into the hands of the Engliſh government.

doubt [43]. The members of the national convention in general, and of the executive council in particular, believed likewise that nothing was more easy at that time, than the excitement of a rebellion, as well in

43. Another unanswerable proof of the part, which the French government took in this plot, is contained in the two following passages of a Letter written by Mr. Miles to Le Brun on the 2. of January 1793. "Rappelez donc *tous* "*vos émissaires; que la propagande finisse,* et ne cherchez plus "à troubler la tranquillité publique dans ce pays. — Au "nom de Dieu, si vous voulez éviter un embrasement uni"versel, ne vous mêlez pas de notre gouvernement; si nous "sommes moins libres que vous, même si nous étions dans "l'esclavage le plus affreux, laissez nous nos fers, et puis"qu'ils ne nous gênent pas, pourquoi vous inquietent-ils? "Je m'étends d'autant plus sur cet article que je n'ignore "pas les espérances mal fondées que vous avez conçues "d'une révolte générale, et pendant que *vous encouragez de* "*tels projets*, il me sera impossible de vous aider, et mê"me d'entretenir aucune correspondance ni avec vous, ni "avec le Conseil exécutif.„ See p. 96. of the Appendix to the work entitled: Authentic Correspondence with M. Le Brun, the French Minister and others 10 February 1793 inclusive; published as an Appendix to other matter not less important, with a préface and explanatory notes. By W. Miles. London 1796. 8. Mr. Miles further observes (Appendix p. 59.) that persons were employed to propose, in the debating societies in London, such questions as were suitable to the views of the national convention.

England as in Ireland: for they confidered the numerous addreffes, delivered to them in November 1792, as expreffive of the fentiments of the people at large, in which opinion they were undoubtedly miftaken, the great majority of the nation being even at that period well affected to the ancient conftitution. Mr. Miles, who during the time that he was intrufted with a miffion to the Prince Bifhop of Liege had contracted an intimacy with Le Brun, afterwards French minifter for foreign affairs, who continued his correfpondence with Le Brun and other men of confequence in France, till the national convention thought proper to break with England, who had frequent intercourfe in the latter part of the year 1792 with French agents in London, and even acted as mediator between them and the Britifh miniftry, who may be fuppofed therefore to have been well acquainted with the views of the French government, and who is certainly not, as appears from his prefent writings, unjuftly partial to the prefent adminiftration, fays expreffly in a paffage, where he fpeaks of the month of November; "It is "worthy of obfervation that the executive council had "made up their minds *at this time* on the part they had "refolved to take [44]." And then obferving that "the executive council looked upon a revolt as inevitable,",

44. Authentic Correfpondence, p. 88.

he proceeds to give account of a note, which he committed to writing in November 1792 in the presence of a French agent, and says: "I have printed the Note "exactly as it was taken in the presence of the person, "with whom I conversed, omitting nothing but some "wild assertions [45] respecting these societies [46], which "he, as well as the rest of his countrymen, considered "as means in the last resort, to force the British cabi-"net to chuse between dishonourable concession and a "war, which they considered would place the minister "so completely between two fires, that government "assailed at the same time by civil insurrection and "foreign hostility, would inevitably fall, and this coun-"try incapable of mischief, would fall into impotency "and ruin by its own distractions. *Such I aver on the "faith of an honest man, were the delusive hopes enter-"tained by Le Brun, and many others,* who, unfortuna-"tely for both nations, had more power and influence

45. Mr. Miles probably omitted them out of respect to this person, whom he calls (p. 87.) his friend. But though they are omitted in the Note (which is printed in the Appendix p. 57 — 60.) it is very easy to collect their meaning from what Mr. Miles himself relates p. 88. 89. in the passage which I here quote.

46. Certain English societies, which Mr. Miles however has not mentioned by name.

"at that moment than ſenſe and diſcretion [47]." In vain did Mr. Miles attempt to undeceive Le Brun, and to convince him that his expectations of a general in-

47. The aſſertions and ſpeeches of the French rulers themſelves clearly prove, that Mr. Miles was not miſtaken. Kerſaint, one of the principal orators of the national convention delivered a ſpeech on the 1. of January 1793, in which the following paſſages occurred. "Les inquietudes du "premier miniſtre Pitt, maitre abſolu de l'Angleterre, depuis "huit ans, et que *les orages d'une révolution, ou ceux d'une* "*guerre menacent également de ſa chute* etc.," — "L'Irlandais "ſemble tourner ſes regards vers nous, et nous dire: *Venez,* "*montrez vous, et nous ſommes libres.*," — "Le ſentiment "des verités, que je viens de developper eſt répandu dans "une foule de bons eſprits en Angleterre: *le gouvernement* "*doit en redouter l'exploſion, et les evenemens de la guerre* "*doivent la hater.*," — "C'eſt ſur la ruine de la Tour de Lon- "dres, que vous devez ſigner avec *le peuple Anglais détrompé* "le traité qui reglera les deſtines des nations, et fondera la "liberté du monde.," Moniteur 3. Jan. 1793. Even in November 1792 a French agent ſaid to Mr. Miles that: "Such was the actual ſtate of Great Britain, that we did not dare to call out the militia," (Authentic Correſpondence, p. 96): and in Condorcet's Journal, though I do not recollect the particular number, it was aſſerted in poſitive terms, that the Engliſh nation was on the eve of aboliſhing royalty, and of eſtabliſhing a national convention. In the reports both of Briſſot and of Le Brun in December 1792 and January 1793 to the French convention, and even in Chauvelin's Note to Lord Grenville of the 27. of December, may be

ſurrection in England were ungrounded: in vain did he attempt to convince the French miniſter of the abſurdity of declaring war againſt a powerful nation, which, with exception to a few democratic ſocieties, was ſincerely attached to the exiſting conſtitution, and ready to ſacrifice the laſt drop of blood in its defence [48]. Le Brun, in defiance of all repreſentations, perſiſted in

found expreſſions, which indicate the ſame expectation. And this expectation had neceſſarily very great influence on the ſyſtem of fraterniſation, which was particularly calculated for England. See what Mr. Miles ſays on this ſubject, Appendix p. 115. Laſtly, as ſoon as war was declared, and the leaders of the French convention had no longer need to conceal the motives of their actions, they openly avowed, not only that the expected rebellion was the grand inducement to their declaration of war, but that they believed the deluded Engliſh would be kind enough to become the inſtruments and the dupes of French ambition. For no ſooner was the hoſtile decree pronounced on the 1. of February 1793 than Barbaroux ſaid in poſitive terms: "J'ai voté la guerre contre le cabinet de Saint James, *parceque* j'ai l'eſperance de voir le *peuple Anglais* ſortir enfin de la ſtupeur, où l'a plongé la longue habitude de ſon eſclavage conſtitutionel, et nous venger *lui meme* d'une Cour etc.„ Monit. 3 Feb. 1793.

48. On the 19. of December Mr. Miles wrote a Letter to Le Brun, which ended with the following paſſage. "Mr. Maret vous donnera ſans doute des éclairciſſemens ſur bien des "choſes que vous ne pouvez ſavoir que par lui. Il ne vous

in the error, into which both himſelf and his colleagues had fallen: the reſolution, which had been taken in conſequence remained unaltered: and a war with England was irrevocably decided in the French cabinet [49].

"diſſimulera pas l'attachement du peuple pour la conſtitution, "et ſa loyauté pour le Roi et ſon gouvernement. Il vous "dira que loin d'adopter les rêveries bizarres, qui ſont à la "mode actuellement en France, il eſt determiné coute qu'il "coute de laiſſer choſes comme elles ſont, et de ne permet-"tre, qu'on porte à la conſtitution aucune atteinte ſous pre-"texte de réforme; par conſequent, on vous a cruellement "trompé en vous aſſurant "*que le peuple Anglais mécontent et* "*opprimé n'attend que le ſignal pour ſe révolter* *),,; au con-"traire, il eſt content, heureux, et attaché au Roi, aux loix, "et à ſa patrie, et prêt à les defendre jusqu'à la derniere "goutte de ſon ſang. Voilà le vrai état des choſes. *Jugez* "*d'après cela, s'il vous convient de déclarer la guerre à une* "*nation unanime et ſi puiſſante?,,* J'attends votre réponſe avec "empreſſement.,, Authentic Correſpondence, Appendix, p. 65. Whether Le Brun ſent an anſwer to this Letter Mr. Miles has not mentioned: but, if he did, it muſt have been a very unſatisfactory one, as Mr. Miles judged it neceſſary to write to him again on 2. Jan. 1793, and to ſay to him what has been already quoted in Note 43.

*) "Report of Le Brun to the Convention.,, Note of Mr. Miles.

49. Dumouriez himſelf ſays: "Le Brun pria même le "général (Dumouriez) *d'écarter tout ce qui concernait les né-* "*gociations avec l'Angleterre et la Hollande:* il n'en fut pas du "tout queſtion.,, Mem. de Dumouriez, T. I. p. 108. 2. ed.

CHAPTER XI.

Official communications between the governments of Great Britain and Holland, on the progress of the French arms in the Austrian Netherlands. Uneasiness produced by the resolution to open the Schelde. Further alarm in Great Britain occasioned by the decree of the 19. of November, and the concomitant measures taken by the national convention in conjunction with certain British societies. Proclamation of the 1. of December, for calling out the Militia: and another of the same date, for the meeting of Parliament. Spirited declaration of the bankers, merchants and other inhabitants of the city of London in favour of the constitution. Meeting of Parliament, and speech from the throne. Means adopted for the external as well as internal defence of Great Britain. Reflexions on this subject.

Toward the close of the year 1792 Great Britain and Holland were nearly in the same political situation, and the interests of the two countries were so interwoven with each other, that an attack on the one might be justly considered as an attack on the other. In both countries there was a considerable French

party, though in Holland it was not only more numerous, but poſſeſſed the power of impeding the operations of the Dutch government by means which were inapplicable in Great Britain. The protection of the two countries againſt the machinations of the French convention made one common cauſe: for it was eaſy to foreſee that the ruin of Britain would inevitably draw after it the ruin of Holland, and that the conqueſt of Holland would place its ally at leaſt in a very dangerous ſituation. Further they were cloſely cemented by the treaty of 1788, by which they had engaged, in caſe of an attack from any European power, to protect each other by ſea as well as by land, and reciprocally to garantee all the countries, places, and privileges, which the contracting parties hitherto poſſeſſed [1]. In conſequence of this intimate union, and reciprocal obligation, the Britiſh ambaſſador at the Hague, ſeven days after the battle of Gemappe, when the army of Dumouriez was advancing toward the Dutch frontiers, delivered, by order of his government, the following note to the States General [2].

1. See the ſecond article of this treaty in Martens Recueil des principaux traités. Tom. III. p. 128.

2. The French original is printed in the Moniteur 27. Nov. 1792. It is dated there Nov. 16.: but 16 appears to be an error for 13, not only becauſe the anſwer of the States General is dated Nov, 16, and it is not probable that the

"The underfigned ambaffador extraordinary and "minifter plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majefty, has "received the King's order to inform their high migh- "tineffes the States General of the United Provinces, "that his majefty feeing the theatre of war brought fo "near to the frontiers of the republic by the recent "events, which have happened, and being fenfible of "the uneafinefs, which may naturally refult from fuch "a fituation thinks it due to the connexion, which fub- "fifts between him and the republic, that he fhould "renew to their high mightineffes, on this occafion the "affurances of his inviolable friendfhip, and of his de- "termination to execute, at all times, with the utmoft "good faith, all the different ftipulations of the treaty "of alliance fo happily concluded in 1788 between his "majefty and their high mightineffes. In making to "their high mightineffes this declaration, the king is "very far from fuppofing the probability of any inten- "tion, on the part of any of the belligerent parties, to "violate the territory of the republic, or to interfere "in the internal concerns of its government. The king "is perfuaded, that the conduct, which in concert with "his majefty, their high mightineffes have hitherto ob-

anfwer was given on the fame day, but becaufe Lord Auck- land himfelf, in his Note of the 25. Jan. 1793 mentions it as dated 13. November. Mr. Dundas likewife in his fpeech of 14. December quoted it by the fame date.

"ſerved, and the reſpect, to which the ſituation of his
"majeſty and the republic juſtly entitles them, are
"ſufficient to remove any ground of ſuch apprehenſion.
"His majeſty therefore confidently expects, that no
"events of the war will lead to any circumſtance from
"without, which may be injurious to the rights of their
"high mightneſſes; and he ſtrongly recommends to
"them to employ, in concert with his majeſty, an un-
"remitted attention and firmneſs to repreſs any at-
"tempts, which may be made to diſturb the internal
"tranquillity of the provinces. His majeſty has directed
"this communication to be made to their high mighti-
"neſſes, in the full perſuaſion, that nothing can more
"effectually conduce to the intereſts and happineſs of
"both countries, than the continuance of that intimate
"union, which has been eſtabliſhed between them for
"the maintenance of their own rights and ſecurity, and
"with a view to contribute to the general welfare and
"tranquillity of Europe.„

(Signed) Auckland.

This note was nothing more than a meaſure of precaution, which the exiſting circumſtances required: it contains nothing, which could give offence to the French government, not even a ſuppoſition of hoſtile deſigns [3],

3. The two orders of the French executive council, the one to open the Schelde, the other to attack the Auſtrians

and diſplays a moderation, which forms a ſtriking contraſt with the language adopted at this time in the national convention relative to the Britiſh government. On the 16. of November the States General returned the following anſwer [4].

"Their high mightineſſes are moſt ſtrongly impreſſed "by the renewal of the aſſurances, which his Britannic "Majeſty has now been pleaſed to make, of his inviolable "friendſhip for this republic, and his determination to "execute at all times, with the moſt ſcrupulous good "faith, all the different ſtipulations of the treaty of "alliance ſo happily concluded in 1788 between his "majeſty and their high mightineſſes. The ſtates ge-"neral have never doubted theſe generous ſentiments "on the part of his Britanic majeſty: but the declara-"tion, which his majeſty is pleaſed to make of them at "the preſent moment cannot but be extremely agreable "to their high mightineſſes, and inſpire them with the

on the Dutch territory if they retreated thither, were not given, as appears from the preceding chapter, before the 16. Conſequently on the 13. there exiſted no public document, which *officially* proved a diſpoſition on the part of the convention to violate the neutrality in reſpect to Holland: and therefore prudence required, that the Britiſh government ſhould rather imply the contrary, as was really done.

4. The original is printed in the Moniteur 30. Nov. 1792.

"liveliest gratitude and the most devoted attachment to "his Britannic majesty. The states general moreover "perfectly agree with his majesty in the persuasion that "there is not the least reason to attribute to any of the "belligerent powers hostile intentions against the re-"public: and indeed their high mightinesses are equally "persuaded with the king, that the conduct and the "strict neutrality, which in concert with his majesty "they have hitherto so carefully observed, and the re-"spect, to which the situation of his majesty and the "republic justly entitle them, are sufficient to remove "any ground of such apprehension. With respect to "the internal tranquillity of the republic, their high "mightinesses are perfectly sensible of the necessity of "continuing to secure to its inhabitants so invaluable "an enjoyment, and they are not negligent of any "means, for the attainment of that salutary end. The "states general, in concert with the provinces of the "union, have already taken, and continue to take, the "necessary measures for preventing any interruption of "this tranquillity in the present circumstances. They "have the satisfaction of being able to assure his majesty, "that their efforts have so far been crowned with the "desired success; and they have reason to flatter them-"selves, that with the blessing of Providence those "efforts will be equally fortunate in future. Finally their high mightinesses do not hesitate to declare, that

"they agree with his Britannic majesty in the persua-"sion, *that nothing can more effectually conduce to the* "*happiness and mutual interests of the two nations, than* "*the continuance of that intimate union, which has been* "*established between them, and which their high mightines-*"*ses on their part will neglect no opportunity of cementing* "*and strengthening, for the maintenance of the mutual* "*rights and interests of the two countries, and for the* "*security of the general welfare and tranquillity of* "*Europe* [5]."

(Signed) W. H. Wassenaer.
(Countersigned) H. Fagel.

But on the very day, on which the States General expressed their expectation, that the neutrality, which they themselves had preserved, would not be violated by other nations, it was grossly violated on the part of

5. This last sentence proves, what some persons have called in question, that the Dutch government, from the very commencement of the communications between Great Britain and Holland, relative to the power and influence of France, was decidedly of opinion, that it was necessary for the two countries to make one common cause. Indeed the necessity of it was so obvious, that no one, who did not wish, that the arms and intrigues of France might overturn the Dutch constitution, could have supported a contrary opinion.

France: for it was on this day, as appears from the preceding chapter, that the executive council made the two refolutions, to attack the Auftrians even on the Dutch territory, and to deprive the United Provinces of their fovereignty over the Schelde. The firft refolution indeed created very little uneafinefs, becaufe, when the intelligence of it arrived at the Hague, the Auftrians were already retreating toward Aix la Chapelle, and gave no indications of a defign to retire toward Holland: but the other refolution excited a general alarm throughout the United Provinces, becaufe it was obvious, that the execution of it would be highly detrimental, if not deftructive, to the Dutch commerce, and confequently to the general welfare of the nation. "It would be difficult,,, fays a Dutch correfpondent in a letter dated Hague 30 November, and printed in the Moniteur 9. December 1792, "to "form an idea in France of the terrible commotion "which this decree has excited. At Amfterdam and "Rotterdam the principal merchants have experienced "a fudden coolnefs for the French caufe, which is not "at all furprifing. Perhaps they propofe to make a "common caufe with the Stadtholder, and to prevent "the execution of the decree by force of arms. With "refpect to the government, *they have inftantly difpat-* "*ched feveral couriers to England to demand fuccour*: "and all means are employed to make Great Britain

"sensible, that its own interests are equally affected "with those of Holland [6].„ The States General protested likewise publickly against the decree and commissioned the Stadtholder to send positive orders to the captain of the guardship, which lay at the month of the Schelde, to prevent all French ships of war from entering it, and to inform the commanders, that by virtue of treaties the Schelde was shut to all armed vessels [7]. Yet,

6. La Haie Nov. 30. "On aura peine à se faire une idée "en France de la terrible commotion, que ce decret a excité "en quelques esprits. A Amsterdam et à Rotterdam les prin"cipaux négotians en ont éprouvé un refroidissement subit "pour la cause Française, cela n'a rien d'étonnant. Peut-être "songent-ils à faire cause commune avec le Stadthouder, "pour arrêter par la force des armes l'execution de ce décret. "Quant au gouvernement, il a depeché d'abord divers cou'riers en Angleterre pour en reclamer des secours: et tous "les moyens sont mis en oeuvre pour faire sentir à la Grande "Bretagne, que son interêt y est tout aussi compromis que "celui de la Hollande.„ Moniteur 9. Dec. 1792. As this letter is printed in the Moniteur, and was therefore undoubtedly written by a person attached to the French cause, no one can well object that the description, in this instance, exceeded the reality. However, as it is not an official document, I shall make no further use of it.

7. The following is the official note, which the States General delivered to the imperial ambassador at the Hague at the beginning of December 1792. "Que depuis le com"mencement des troubles survenus entre la maison d'Autriche

notwithſtanding this proteſt, ſeveral French ſhips of war forced a paſſage on the I. of December, in order to bombard the citadel of Antwerp.

"et la France, L. H. P. ont obſervé la plus ſtricte neutralité, "et ont taché d'en concilier les devoirs avec l'amitié et les "égards, qu'elles ont de tout tems manifeſté pour S. M. I. "Que les Etats géneraux ſentent, que ce ferait s'écarter de "cette neutralité, que de permettre à des navires français de "remonter l'Eſcaut pour attaquer la citadelle d'Anvers. Que "L. H. P. n'ignorent pas non plus combien cette démarche "ſerait contraire aux traités ſubſiſtans; et que c'eſt d'après "ces principes, *qu'elles n'ont pu accorder la demande du com-* "*mandant des chaloupes canonieres françaiſes de remonter l'Eſcaut* "*jusqu' à Anvers*, mais qu'elles ont prié S. A. le prince "d'Orange et de Naſſau, comme amiral-general de cette ré- "publique, d'ordonner à l'officier qui commande le vaiſſeau "de garde, ſtationné à l'embouchure de l'Eſcaut *de ne pas* "*accorder le paſſage*, mais d'informer le commandant Français, "*qu'en vertu de traités la riviere d'Eſcaut eſt cloſe pour les* "*vaiſſeaux de guerre*.,, Moniteur 16. Dec. 1792. Here we have a formal proteſt, on the part of the Dutch government, againſt the opening of the Schelde: and this *official document* is alone ſufficient to confute the aſſertion that the States General were wholly indifferent on the ſubject (which even without this document would be almoſt incredible), and that the Britiſh government determined to ſupport their rights, when they themſelves did not wiſh for any ſuch ſupport. It is true that a great part of the Dutch, namely the French party in Holland, were ſo far from deſiring aſſiſtance from England, that

The decree for the opening of the Schelde, and the force which was employed to put it in execution, could not be regarded with indifference by the Britiſh government. The dangerous conſequences of it to England, when France is in poſſeſſion of the Low Countries, have been already repreſented in the preceding chapter. At this time the political ſituation of England was very different from that of the year 1785, when the Emperor Joſeph likewiſe propoſed to open the Schelde. For as long as the Netherlands were poſſeſſed by the Emperor, the opening of the Schelde could do no injury to England: Auſtria was not a maritime power, could not therefore convert the Schelde into a ſtation for ſhips of war, and England could at all times, with only a few frigates, have cloſed the Schelde, and put an end to the imperial commerce. Further, there was reaſon to believe that it was not ſo much Joſeph's intention, really to open the Schelde,

they would, if poſſible have repelled it. But at that time the French party in Holland by no means conſtituted the Dutch government, and when two nations negotiate, whether they are monarchical or republican, the negotiations muſt be conducted by their reſpective governments. Nor could this party in the year 1792, though numerous and formidable, be conſidered as the Dutch nation: for the Stadtholderian party, eſpecially if regard be had to landed property, was at that time very conſiderable.

as to frighten the Dutch, and to induce them to ward off the danger by the payment of ſome millions of florins, which they effectually did. Nor was it the duty of England in the year 1785 to aſſiſt the Dutch againſt the Emperor: England and Holland had been lately at war, the definitive treaty of peace was not ſigned before the 20. of May [8] 1784, and in the ſhort interval, which elapſed, no treaty of alliance had been made between the two powers. But in the year 1792 England, by virtue of the treaty of 1788, was really bound to aſſiſt, in protecting not only the territory of the United Provinces, but likewiſe their franchiſes and liberties, of which that which they exerciſed over the Schelde was one of the principal [9]. With great injuſtice therefore has the Britiſh government been accuſed

8. Martens' Recueil des principaux traités. T. II. p. 520.

9. The ſecond article of this treaty is: "Dans le cas, "où une des deux parties contractantes ſerait hoſtilement "attaquée par quelque puiſſance Européenne, dans quel-"que partie du monde que ce puiſſe être, l'autre partie "contractante s'engage de ſecourir ſon allié, tant par mer "que par terre, pour ſe maintenir, et ſe garantir mutuelle-"ment dans la poſſeſſion de tous les Etats, Domaines, Villes "et Places, *Franchiſes et Libertés*, qui leur appartenaient "reſpectivement avant le commencement des hoſtilities.,, And in the fifth article is ſaid: "Elle l'aſſiſtera même *de toutes ſes forces*, ſi les circonſtances l'exigent.,, See Martens' Recueil des principaux traités. Tom. III. p. 128. 129.

of inconsistency, in remaining perfectly tranquil, when the Emperor attempted to open the Schelde in year 1785, and yet not shewing a similar indifference, when the same resolution was formed by the French government in year 1792. The mere circumstance, that the French were become masters of the Austrian Netherlands, by whatever name the dependence of these countries on France might be decorated, could not but excite uneasiness in the British ministry: and when we consider that the Schelde was to become a station for French ships of war, they would have acted faithlessly, as well to their own country, as to the allies of England, if they had not at least attempted to prevent the execution of the design. The superiority likewise, which this station gave the French on an invasion of Holland, an invasion which was in agitation so early as December [10] 1792, was much too great to be disre-

10. In a letter written to Dumouriez by Pache, the war minister, dated Paris 6. Dec. 1792, occur the following expressions. "Ainsi si l'armée de la Belgique *se porte sur la* "*Hollande*, et ne passe point la Meuse etc.,, — "Les divers "motifs ci dessus, Général, ont determiné le conseil à per-"sister dans son ancien arrêté: il a deliberé comme mesure "d'urgence, *et qui devait dévancer l'expedition de la Hollande* "etc.,, Correspondance de Dumouriez avec Pache (Paris 1793. 8.) p. 137. These expressions clearly prove that even at that time an attack on Holland was in agitation. Chaussard likewise (Memoires p. 278.) uses the expression "opera-

garded by the Britiſh government. And it was of the higheſt importance to England, to prevent, if poſſible, the French from becoming maſters of Holland, as it was obvious, that, with the additional advantage of the Dutch coaſt and the Dutch navy, they would take the earlieſt opportunity of attacking England with double force [11].

tions executées dans la Flandre, *et projettées ſur la Hollande.,,* And Briſſot though before the declaration of war he denied, with his wonted hypocriſy, that the French government had any deſign of invading Holland, made no ſcruple to complain afterwards (A ſes Commettans p. 79.), *that Holland was not ſooner attacked.*

11. Briſſot himſelf, in his ſpeech of the 12. Jan. 1793, made the following acknowledgement, in ſpeaking of the Engliſh nation. "Sans doute elle avait raiſon, lorsque la "France était ſous le deſpotisme: *elle avait raiſon à s'oppoſer* "*à l'extenſion en Hollande de l'influence de la France:* cette "influence ne tendait qu'à augmenter ſes forces.,, Moniteur 15. Janvier 1793. He immediately added indeed: "mais ſi jamais la République Françaiſe était appellée à rendre la liberté à la Hollande, ce ne ſerait pas pour augmenter ſon influence; elle n'en veut aucune ſur les états étrangers.,, But the ſophiſtry of this diſtinction could deceive only thoſe, who either were, or choſe to be, blind: and at preſent every one knows by experience, whether republican France diſplays leſs ambition, and leſs deſire to extend its influence over foreign countries than monarchical France formerly diſplayed.

When we further take into the account the decree of the 19. of November, with all its concomitant circumstances described in the preceding chapter, we must acknowledge, that the British government had not a moment to lose, and that vigourous preparations were necessary to rescue Great Britain from the destruction, with which it was threatened. On the 1. of December therefore, as soon as intelligence arrived in London of the public encouragement which had been given by the national convention on the 28. of November, to those societies, who had announced their design of overturning the British constitution, the following proclamation was drawn up and immediately published.

"Whereas by an act passed in the 26. year of our "reign, intituled, an act for amending and reducing "into one act of parliament the laws relating to the "Militia in that part of Great Britain called England, "it is enacted that it shall be lawful for us, in the ca- "ses and in the manner therein mentioned, the occa- "sion being first declared in council and notified by "proclamation, if no parliament shall be then sitting, to "order and direct the drawing out and embodying of "our militia forces or any part thereof: *and whereas "we have received information that in breach of our laws, "and notwithstanding our royal proclamation of the 21. "day of May last, the utmost industry is still employed "by*

"by evil-diſpoſed perſons within this kingdom, acting in "concert with perſons in foreign parts, with a view to "ſubvert the laws and eſtabliſhed conſtitution of this realm, "and to deſtroy all order and government therein, and "that a ſpirit of tumult and diſorder, thereby excited, has "lately ſhewn itſelf in acts of riot and inſurrection: and "whereas under the preſent circumſtances it is more "particularly neceſſary, that, for the immediate ſup-"preſſion of ſuch attempts, ſome addition ſhould be "made, as the exigency of the caſe may require, to "the force which may be in readineſs to act for the "ſupport of the civil magiſtrate: we therefore being "determined to exert the powers veſted in us by law "for the protection of the perſons, liberties and proper-"ties of our faithful ſubjects, and fully relying on their "zeal and attachment to our perſon and government, "and to the happy conſtitution eſtabliſhed in theſe "kingdoms, have thought fit to declare in our council "our royal intention, for the cauſes and on the occaſion "aforeſaid, to draw out and embody ſuch part of our "militia forces, as may more immediately enable us to "provide for the ſaid important objects. And we do "hereby in purſuance of the ſaid recited act, notify to "all our loving ſubjects our ſaid intention, and the "cauſes and occaſion thereof.„

On the 1. of December was iſſued likewiſe another proclamation, by which the meeting of parliament

was fixed for the 13. of this month [12]. But before the parliament aſſembled, a very numerous meeting of the merchants, bankers and traders of the city of London was held at Merchant Taylors Hall, at which the following *Declaration in ſupport of the conſtitution of Great Britain* was unanimouſly reſolved [13].

"We the merchants, bankers, traders, and other "inhabitants of London, whoſe names are hereunto "ſubſcribed, perceiving with the deepeſt concern, that "attempts are made to circulate opinions contrary to the "deareſt intereſts of Britons, and ſubverſive of thoſe "principles, which have produced and preſerved our "moſt valuable privileges, feel it a duty we owe to "our country, ourſelves, and our poſterity, to invite "all our fellow ſubjects to join with us, in the expreſ- "ſion of a ſincere and firm attachment to the conſtitu- "tion of theſe kingdoms, formed in remote, and im- "proved in ſucceeding ages, and under which the glo- "rious revolution in year 1688 was effected; a conſti-

12. It is printed in the New Annual Regiſter 1792. Public Papers, p. 59. It contains nothing more than uſual, except the mention of a law, which enacts, that if the militia be called out, when the parliament is not ſitting, and the prorogation will not expire within fourteen days, a proclamation ſhall be iſſued for its aſſembling within that time.

13. Ib. p. 67.

"tution wifely framed for the diffufion of happinefs "and true liberty, and which poffeffes the diftinguifhed "merit, that it has on former occafions been, and we "truft in future will be found, competent to correct its "errors, and reform its abufes: our experience of the "improvements in agriculture and manufactures, of the "flourifhing ftate of navigation and commerce, and of "increafed population, ftill further impels us to make "this public declaration of our determined refolution to "fupport, by every means in our power, the ancient "and moft excellent conftitution of Great Britain, and "a government by *King*, *Lords*, *and Commons*, and to "exert our beft endeavours to imprefs on the minds of "thofe connected with us a reverence for and a due "fubmiffion to the laws of their country, which have "hitherto preferved the liberty, protected the property, "and increafed the enjoyments of a free and profperous "people.„

About the fame time various affociations were formed in fupport of the ancient conftitution of *King*, *Lords*, *and Commons*, in oppofition to thofe focieties, who on the 28. of November had folemnly announced their defign of introducing *a national convention.* Active meafures were taken alfo both by government and by the magiftrates of London to counteract the effects of the projected infurrection. The guard at the Bank was augmented, the Tower was put into a ftate of

defence, and ſeveral regiments were aſſembled in the neigbourhood of the metropolis. On the 13. of Dec. the parliament met and was opened by the following ſpeech from the throne.

"My Lords and Gentlemen

"Having judged it neceſſary to embody a part of "the militia of this kingdom, I have, in purſuance of "the proviſions of the law called you together within "the time limited for that purpoſe, and it is, on every "account a great ſatisfaction to me to meet you in par-"liament at this conjuncture. I ſhould have been hap-"py, if I could have announced to you the ſecure and "undiſturbed continuance of all the bleſſings, which "my ſubjects have derived from a ſtate of tranquillity: "but events have *recently* occurred, which require our "united vigilance and exertion, in order to preſerve "the advantages, which we have hitherto enjoyed. "The ſeditious practices, which had been in a great "meaſure checked by your firm and explicit declaration "in the laſt ſeſſion, and by the general concurrence of "my people in the ſame ſentiments, *have of late been* "*more openly renewed, and with increaſed activity.* A "ſpirit of tumult and diſorder, the natural conſequence "of ſuch practices, has ſhewn itſelf in acts of riot and "inſurrection, which required the interpoſition of a "military force in ſupport of the civil magiſtrate. The

"industry employed to excite discontent on various pre-"texts, and in different parts of the kingdom, has ap-"peared to proceed from a design, to attempt the de-"struction of our happy constitution, and the subver-"sion of all order and government: *and this design has "evidently been pursued in connexion and concert with "persons in foreign countries.* I have carefully observed "a strict neutrality in the present war on the continent, "and have uniformly abstained from any interference, "with respect to the internal affairs of France: *but it "is impossible for me to see, without the most serious un-"easiness, the strong and increasing indications, which "have appeared there of an intention to excite distur-"bances in other countries, to disregard the rights of "neutral nations, and to pursue views of conquest and "aggrandizement, as well as to adopt toward my allies "the States General, who have observed the same neutra-"lity as myself, measures which are neither conformable "to the law of nations, nor to the positive stipulations of "existing treaties.* Under all these circumstances I have "felt it my indispensable duty to have recourse to those "means of prevention and internal defence, with which "I am entrusted by law; and I have also thought it "right to take steps for making some augmentation of "my naval and military force, being persuaded that "these exertions are necessary in the present state of "affairs, and are best calculated both to maintain in-

"ternal tranquillity, and to render a firm and tempe-"rate conduct effectual for preserving the blessings of "peace. Nothing will be neglected on my part, that "can contribute to that important object consistently "with the security of my kingdoms, and with the faith-"ful performance of engagements, which we are bound "equally by interest and honour to fulfil.,,

When we consider the magnitude of the danger, which immediately as well as mediately, threatend the British empire, we must admit that his Majesty's speech was couched in terms of great moderation: and this moderation will appear still more conspicuously, if it be compared with the insulting and menacing language, which had been lately held by the president of the national convention. The speech contained no proposal of a declaration of hostilities, but expressed an ardent desire for the preservation of peace. It is true, that an augmentation was proposed both of the naval and military force: but this augmentation was absolutely necessary for the preservation of Britain, and presented the only hope, which now remained, of securing the continuance of peace with France; because, when one nation is threatened by another, especially by a nation, which displayed such ambition and thirst of conquest, it cannot possibly expect to prevent the intended attack by any other means, than by vigourous preparations

of defence. If, inſtead of having recourſe to preparations of defence, an ambaſſador had been ſent to Paris, to make repreſentations to the national convention, which had already, in the moſt ſolemn and public manner, declared itſelf hoſtile to the Britiſh government, and conſequently to the Britiſh nation [14], the danger would not have been averted, but augmented: the convention would have regarded the meaſure as a token of fear, the pride and ambition of the French

14. Whatever theory be adopted in regard to the origin of the power exerciſed by a government, or to the ſource from which that power is derived, every one muſt admit, that as long as the majority of a nation does not wiſh for a revolution, a declaration of hoſtilities againſt its government and conſtitution is a declaration of hoſtilities againſt the nation at large. But there can be no doubt, that the great body of the Britiſh nation, even in the year 1792, was ſincerely attached to the preſent conſtitution: and that, though the ſocieties, who wiſhed to eſtabliſh a national convention, were really formidable in conſequence of their unremitted aſſiduity and their connexions with France, they were not, will all their proſelytes and advocates, to be compared, either in point of property, or even in point of number, with thoſe, who wiſhed to preſerve the ancient conſtitution. For this objection however the French rulers had an excellent ſalvo. "Les révolutions, repondait-on, ne "ſe font qu'avec les *minorités*: c'eſt la minorité qui a fait la "revolution Françaiſe.„ Briſſot à ſes Commettans, p. 87.

rulers would have received new nourishment, and the resolution expressed on the 28. of November would have been more strongly confirmed. The result of a conference, which Mr. Pitt, a few days before the meeting of parliament, had already had with Mr. Maret [15], affords ample proof of this assertion: for Mr. Pitt's bare consent to negotiate with an agent of the executive council, was openly attributed in the national convention by Le Brun, the French minister for foreign affairs, to a supposed dread of the French power on the part of the British ministry. Besides, what reception could an ambassador of his Britannic majesty have expected from the president of the French convention who had received with every mark of friendship, and every token of applause, the deputies of those societies, who declared their resolution of overturning the British government and constitution? The United States of America, against whom the present Directory of France acts the same insidious part, as the national convention acted against England in the year 1792, have in 1797 attempted an embassy under similar circumstances: and it has ended, as every man acquainted

15. This conference, with the result of it, will be related at large in the thirteenth chapter, where all the diplomatic communications between Great Britain and France will be particularly examined.

with the politicks and principles of the modern French rulers naturally expected. For the American ambaſſadors, inſtead of obtaining ſatisfaction for paſt injuries, and ſecurity for the future, were not admitted even to an audience, and were obliged to return, after their miſſion had anſwered no other purpoſe, than to increaſe the weight of the indignities, which had been already offered to their government and nation. But there is no neceſſity for having recourſe to analogical arguments: for the national convention ſolemnly declared on the 15. of December 1792, that they acknowledged no political inſtitution, which was inconſiſtent with the ſovereignty of the people, and conſequently, according to their own repeated explanations, no kingly government [16]. If therefore a Britiſh ambaſſador had been ſent to Paris in December 1792, at a time when projects of revolution and conqueſt had reduced the

16. In the introduction to the decree of the 15. of Dec. (of which more will be ſaid in the following chapter) was declared: "La convention nationale — fidele aux principes de la Souveraineté des peuples, *qui ne lui permet pas de reconnaitre aucune inſtitution qui y porte atteinte, etc.*" Moniteur 17. Dec. 1792. — It is a curious circumſtance, that it was on the very day, on which the national convention virtually refuſed to acknowledge any kingly government, that Mr. Fox made his motion in the Houſe of Commons for ſending an ambaſſador from his Britannic majeſty to France.

national convention to a ſtate of political intoxication, he would in all probability have been received with an addreſs of the following kind. "Do you come, "Sir, from the Britiſh people, or do you come from "the king? If you come from the people, we are "ready to receive you, and to ſhew the ſame friend-"ſhip and fraternity, as we ſhewed to the deputies "in the month of November. But if you are ſent "by the king,, (to which the ambaſſador muſt have replied in the affirmative) "our anſwer has been "already given: we acknowledge no other ſovereignty, "than that of the people.,, Thus would the Britiſh government, in ſending at that time an ambaſſador to Paris, not only have failed of removing the cauſes of complaint, but would have brought on the whole nation new injuries and inſults. Beſides, when an unarmed nation negotiates with an armed nation, the latter will always preſcribe laws to the former, eſpecially if the unarmed nation takes the firſt ſtep: for it is to be obſerved, that as ſoon as a negotiation was opened by the French miniſter in London, the Britiſh miniſtry continued it. They did not therefore abſolutely refuſe to negotiate with France: and the negotiation could be conducted full as well in London as in Paris. But we ſhall ſee in one of the following chapters, what was the reſult of it; we ſhall ſee, that the declarations of the French government were in direct contradiction to

its actions, that the former were as falſe, as the latter were unjuſt, and that the whole negotiation had no other object, than to amuſe the Britiſh miniſtry, till the plan for the deſtruction of Great Britain was ripe for execution. An armament therefore, by ſea as well as by land, was the only means of warding off the impending danger: and this inference was ſo obvious, that in the Houſe of Lords the addreſs to his majeſty was voted without a diviſion, and even in the Houſe of Commons the oppoſition was reduced to fifty members [17]. The two houſes of parliament, or at leaſt a very great majority, ſaw further, that, beſide an armament by ſea and land, other meaſures were neceſſary, in order to prevent on the one hand the breaking out of the intended inſurrection, and on the other hand to diſarm as much as poſſible the French government, and to throw impediments in the way of its already avowed hoſtile deſigns. Of the former kind was the alien bill, and the bill for preſenting the circulation of French aſſignats in England: of the latter kind were the two bills, by which the exportation of corn, arms, and military ſtores to France were prohibited. But as each of theſe bills was made a ſubject of complaint, it will not be ſuperfluous to take a curſory review of them.

17. New Annual Regiſter 1792. Britiſh and foreign hiſtory, p. 21. 23.

The alien bill was brought into the upper house by Lord Grenville on the 19. of December 1792, and on the 4. of January 1793 it finally passed the commons [18]. On this bill, which equally affected strangers of every country, and included royalists as well as democrats, no government in Europe made the least complaint, except the French. It was regarded as a matter of national police, which every nation is entitled to regulate according to the existing circumstances: and it was acknowledged, that more than usual precaution was requisite to counteract the machinations of the numerous emissaries, with which England was at that time overrun. But the national convention made most bitter complaints, which was not at all extraordinary, as the alien bill presented a very material obstacle to its correspondence with the societies, with which it acted in concert. As this reason however could not be openly alleged, it was necessary to seek a pretext for complaint elsewhere: and they discovered a most excellent one, as they supposed, in the fourth article of the treaty of commerce [19]. But this article, though

18. Ib. p. 36 — 43.

19. The article runs thus. "Il sera libre aux sujets et habitans des états respectifs des deux souverains d'entrer et d'aller librement et sûrement, *sans Permission ni Saufconduit général ou special*, etc.,, Martens Recueil des principaux traités. Tom. II. p. 632. To this article the French minister,

it has been quoted for the ſame purpoſe likewiſe by Britiſh orators and Britiſh writers, was the moſt unfortunate, which could have been adopted: for it had been violated, ſeven months before the period in queſtion, by a decree of the national aſſembly [20], which ſtill continued in force; and conſequently the article was no longer binding on Great Britain. On the 18. of May, namely, the national aſſembly had paſſed a decree, relative to ſtrangers reſident in France, which perfectly correſponded to the alien bill propoſed in the Britiſh parliament in the following month of December [21]: for by that decree was ordained, that every

Le Brun, appealed in his ſpeech in the convention of 31. Dec. 1792, and Mr. Chauvelin in a Note to Lord Grenville of 7. Jan. 1793. See the Moniteur, Jan. 3. 17. 1793.

20. Yet Mr. Chauvelin, in his Note to Lord Grenville of the 7. Jan. 1793, had the aſſurance to ſay: "C'eſt ainſi que le gouvernement Britannique a *le premier* voulu rompre un traité à qui l'Angleterre doit une grande partie de ſa proſperité actuelle, onéreux pour la France, arraché par l'addreſſe et l'habileté à l'imperitie ou à la corruption des agens du gouvernement, qu'elle a détruit, *traité qu'elle n'a cependant jamais ceſſée d'obſerver religieuſement.*" Le Brun likewiſe ventured to aſſert the ſame in his ſpeech of 31. Dec.

21. Though the decree of the 18. May 1792, or the French alien act, had probably eſcaped the notice of thoſe members of the Britiſh ſenate, who oppoſed our own alien act, yet it could not have been forgotten by the French

ſtranger (without any exception in favour of the Engliſh) who had arrived in Paris after 1. Jan. 1792, ſhould, within eight days after the publication of the decree, declare to the committee of the ſection, where he lodged, his name, his character, his uſual place of abode, and his abode in Paris, and likewiſe preſent his paſsport, if provided with one: and it was further enacted, that every ſtranger, who neglected to make the required declaration, ſhould be fined an hundred livres, and ſentenced to an arreſt not exceeding three months [22],

miniſters; and therefore, when *they* objected to the Engliſh alien bill on the ground of its being a violation of the fourth article of the treaty of commerce, they made the objection with the conſciouſneſs of having already broken it themſelves. This is one of the many inſtances of hypocriſy and duplicity diſplayed by the virtuous republicans of France in their dealings with England.

22. In a preceding debate on the French alien bill, Carnot propoſed that every ſtranger, who neglected to make the required declaration within twenty four hours after his arrival in Paris, ſhould be impriſonned to the end of the war: and this propoſal, though it was modified on the 18. of May, when the decree finally paſſed the aſſembly, was received at the time with great applauſe. In the words of the original Carnot's propoſal run thus. "Tout voyageur, "étranger et particulier, qui n'habite point Paris depuis le "1. Mars dernier ſera tenu dans les 24 heures de remettre à "la police un bulletin ſigné de deux citoyens actifs, conte-

but that whoever made a falſe declaration, ſhould be fined a thouſand livres, and condemned to an arreſt not exceeding ſix months [23]. Further every Engliſhman, who travelled at that time in France, can atteſt, that he was not permitted to go from one place to another, till he was furniſhed with a paſsport as accurately deſcriptive of his perſon, as when a thief is advertiſed in a public newspaper: and it was even dangerous to deviate from the route, which had been once aſſigned, and which was ſpecified in the paſsport [24].

"nant l'indication de ſon nom, de ſon état, de ſa demeure, "*ſous peine de priſon jusqu' à la fin de la guerre*.„ (On applaudit). Moniteur 17. May 1792.

23. The firſt and fifth articles of the decree of the 18. May are as follows.

1. "Toute perſonne venue à Paris depuis le 1. Janvier "1792 fera dans la huitaine de la publication du préſent de-"cret, au comité de ſa ſection la declaration de ſon nom, "ſon état, ſon domicile habituel, et ſon domicile à Paris; "et il exhibera ſon paſſeport, s'il en a un.

5. "Les étrangers, qui ne feront pas la declaration exigée, "ſeront condamnés à une amende de 100 livres, et à une "detention, qui ne pourra être de plus de trois mois. Ceux "qui font de fauſſes déclarations ſeront condamnés à 1000 "livres d'amende, et ſix mois de detention.„ Moniteur 19. Mai 1792.

24. The French paſsports delivered to Engliſhmen in the year 1792, long before our own alien bill was introduced,

The municipal officers were likewife fo ftrict in the examination of pafsports, that the Britifh ambaffador himfelf, when he returned from Paris in Auguft 1792, was detained more than once on the road, and was obliged to fend meffengers to Paris, in order to remove the difficulties, which were thrown in his way [25]. On thefe police regulations in France, which were a violation of the fourth article of the commercial treaty, to fay the leaft of them, in an equal degree with any thing contained in the alien bill afterwards introduced in England, the Englifh government made no complaint, becaufe it was declared in the national affembly, that they were abfolutely neceffary, to preferve internal tranquillity [26]. But fimilar regulations were at leaft

contained a claufe not generally known, namely an order to arreft every one who departed from the fpecified route ("s'il fe détourne de la dite route, de le mettre en état d'arreftation.,,) Whether *all* the French pafsports delivered to Englifhmen at that time contained this claufe I cannot fay: but I myfelf know an inftance at leaft of one, and have no reafon to fuppofe that it formed an exception to the general rule.

25. For this affertion I have no other authority, than the newspapers of the day: but, as it has never been contradicted, we may conclude that it is true.

26. On the 15. of May 1792, when the French alien bill was propofed, the neceffity of it was alleged in the following

leaſt as neceſſary in December 1792 to preſerve the internal tranquillity of England. Conſequently, as the Engliſh government made no objection to the ground, on which the French alien bill was framed, notwithſtanding the fourth article of the commercial treaty, by which it had been ſtipulated, that every Engliſhman ſhould travel, without a paſsport, without detention, and as freely in France as in England, the French government ought likewiſe to have admitted the validity of the reaſons in favour of the Engliſh alien bill. This however they thought proper to refuſe, and by ſo doing ſubſcribed their own condemnation: for their appeal to the treaty of commerce involved a tacit acknowledgement, that this very treaty had been already violated on the part of France by the decree of the 18. of May, and conſequently could no longer

terms. "Une des cauſes des inquietudes de cette grande "cité vient de la circulation rapide d'étrangers, que la cu-"rioſité, le beſoin, ou leurs affaires y attirent; elle doit ac-"cueillir ſans doute tous ceux qui viennent accroitre la maſſe de ſes richeſſes, *mais non recevoir les monſtres, qui voudraient déchirer ſon ſein.* Les habitans de Paris n'ont pas de plus mortels ennemis, que ceux *qui ſe couvrent d'un nom ſacré pour former les projets les plus horribles*.„ Moniteur 17. May 1792. This deſcription applies to the ſituation of London in December 1792 ſtill better than it applied to that of Paris in May 1792.

be enforced on Great Britain. In whatever light therefore the British alien bill be viewed, the national convention had no right to complain of it [27]: and, when we further take into the account, that when the French alien act was made, which no more excepted British subjects, than the British alien act excepted French subjects, the British government had not deviated from the strictest neutrality [28], but that before the British

27. See Le Brun's acknowledgement, made at the end of August 1792, and quoted at the beginning of Ch. IX. It deserves likewise to be noted, that Chauvelin's Letter of the 28. April, containing the most positive assurances of the pacific dispositions of the British cabinet was read in the national assembly on the 7. of May, only a week before the French alien bill was proposed. See Ch. V. Note 2.

28. Another objection however occurs to me, which I cannot pass over in silence. It has been said, that the English ministry ought to have offered to the executive government of France some explanation on the alien bill. But it may be asked in reply: Why was it necessary that the government of Great Britain should make a diplomatic communication on this subject to that of France, when the French government, at the time its own alien bill passed, made so such communication to the government of Great Britain? And if we further ask, in what the required explanation should have consisted, they, who censure the omission of it, will find it difficult to give a satisfactory answer. For the explanation must either have implied, that the national convention acted in concert with persons, who were

alien bill was introduced, the national convention had publickly expreſſed its readineſs to aſſiſt in the overthrow of the Britiſh conſtitution, the charge, which has been laid to Britain, recoils with ten-fold force on France.

While the alien bill was ſtill under the conſideration of parliament the aſſignat bill was brought in by the attorney general on the 26. of December, and paſſed in a few days with hardly any oppoſition from either houſe. This bill, of which the object was to make both the payment and the tender of French aſſignats illegal, was equally neceſſary with the preceding: for, not to mention the immenſe loſs, which would have been finally ſuſtained by a continued circulation of French aſſignats [29], the national convention, as long as its paper was taken in payment, could create at its pleaſure even in Great Britain whatever ſums it thought proper, and employ them as the means

attempting to overturn the Britiſh conſtitution, or it muſt have implied the contrary. But an explanation, which implied the former poſition, would certainly not have ſatisfied either the French or their friends: and an explanation, which implied the latter, would have contained an abſolute falſhood.

29. I have been informed from very good authority, that the city of Hamburg loſt not leſs than four and twenty millions of livres, or a million of pounds ſterling, by the French aſſignats.

of effecting the intended insurrection. Merely during the time that Cambon was at the head of the committee of finance, assignats were issued to the amount of three thousand millions of livres [30]: and hence we may conclude, that the quantity, which circulated in England in December 1792, was not inconsiderable. Further, that Cambon sent thither, immediately from the national treasury, at least as much paper, as was necessary to purchase five and twenty millions of livres, appears from a passage quoted in the preceding chapter [31] from Brissot's address to his constituents: and that these five and twenty millions were purchased with *secret* views, is evident from the circumstance, that no account, as Brissot himself acknowledges [32], was ever given of them. Lastly, that the *secret* views of the French rulers, in making these remittances to England, was to promote the rebellion, which they expected would soon break out, appears likewise from

30. "Son genie est dans un mot: émettre èt toujours "émettre des assignats. Il en a augmenté la masse de plus de "trois milliards en dix-huit mois.,, Brissot à ses Commettans, p. 95.

31. Note 42. The expression used by Brissot: "Vingt cinq "millions de numeraire *achétes* en Angleterre,,, clearly proves that the remittance was made, not in hard cash, but in assignats, or other promissory notes from the French treasury.

32. Ib.

their own confeſſions [33]. Under theſe circumſtances the introduction of the aſſignat bill was a very wiſe and a very neceſſary meaſure, as it deprived the French government of one of the moſt powerful engines, which it intended to employ in overturning the Britiſh conſtitution.

Before the cloſe of December the two other bills were brought into parliament, by which the exportation of arms and corn from Great Britain to France was prohibited. The neceſſity of this prohibition was ſo obvious, that it is extraordinary how any one could call it in queſtion: for as ſoon as one government has reaſon to believe, that another is hoſtilely inclined, (and the hoſtile deſigns of the national convention againſt the Britiſh government and conſtitution was already recorded in its own public acts) it would be the height of infatuation, if the former continued to augment the ſtrength of the latter by a further ſupply

33. See Note 40 and 41 to the preceding chapter. The French aſſignats were conſidered alſo as fit inſtruments for ruining the bank of England, as Chauſſard acknowledges, p. 17: and that they were likewiſe applied to the purpoſe of draining Great Britain of bullion as well as of coin, appears from Chalmers' Eſtimate of the comparative ſtrength of Great Britain, where it is ſhewn that in the year 1792 not leſs than 2,909,000 ounces of ſilver were purchaſed with aſſignats, and ſent to France.

of the two grand materials of war, arms and bread. On the prohibition of the exportation of arms, neither M. Chauvelin nor the national convention made the leaſt complaint, being conſcious that a complaint of this kind would be too groſs even for themſelves: but as ſome writers have really ventured to make it, and to aſſert, that the arms and ammunition bill was a violation of the treaty of commerce, it will not be ſuperfluous to note, that the national aſſembly, thirteen months before the period in queſtion, had ſtrictly prohibited the exportation of arms and ammunition of every kind from France [34], and conſequently that, *if* ſuch a prohibition was a violation of the treaty of commerce, France itſelf had already violated the treaty likewiſe in *this* point, and hence had forfeited all pretenſions to the obſervance of it on the part of England.

With reſpect to the corn bill, it muſt be obſerved, that the exportation of wheat grown in England is ſubject to different regulations from that of foreign wheat, which has been imported into England. To prevent ſcarcity in our own country, his majeſty, with the advice of his privy council, is empowered by an act of parliament, made long before the preſent war, to prohibit by a public order the exportation of Britiſh wheat. An order of this kind was iſſued on the 15. of

34. See the 13. Article of the decree of 8. Nov. 1791.

November 1792, and was printed in the London gazette: it was a *general* order, and affected all other countries, as well as France: and it was nothing new, becauſe at all times, when circumſtances require it, a ſtop is put to the exportation of Britiſh wheat. The French themſelves had already adopted a ſimilar meaſure: for during the whole of the year 1792 no wheat of French growth was exported from France, becauſe they wanted it for their own conſumption. On the order therefore, which was publiſhed on the 15. of November the French government could make no complaint: and Mr. Chauvelin himſelf, in his Letter to Lord Grenville of the 7. of January [35], admitted, that it was nothing more than "the effect of the foreſight and prudence of the Engliſh adminiſtration [36]." But the act of parliament which paſſed at the end of December included foreign corn, which had been

35. To prevent miſtakes, it is neceſſary to obſerve, that Mr. Chauvelin ſent two Letters to Lord Grenville on the 7. of January 1793. They are, both of them, printed in the Moniteur 17. Jan. 1793: but the former, which related to the alien bill, and has been already quoted, is there termed, "*Note* remiſe par le citoyen Chauvelin à Lord Grenville:" the latter, which relates to the corn bill, and is meant in the preſent place, is termed "*Lettre* du citoyen Chauvelin à Lord Grenville."

36. His own words were "un effet de la prévoyance et de la ſageſſe de l'adminiſtration Anglaiſe."

imported into England, and prohibited the exportation of it in any veſſel bound to France [37]. This act affected therefore France alone, and conſequently, had the national convention acted amicably toward Great Britain, would have been an inſtance of blameable partiality. But who will venture to blame this partiality, who has read the facts recorded in the preceding chapter [38]? An enemy has no right to expect, that he ſhould be treated as a friend: and as the national convention had publickly profeſſed itſelf, a whole month before the corn bill paſſed, an enemy to the Britiſh government, it could not be ſuppoſed that the latter would further to contribute to the ſupport of the former. Beſides, there is great reaſon to believe, that the orders given by the French government toward the

37. About a week before the bill was brought into the houſe of commons, government had iſſued orders to ſtop the ſailing of veſſels laden with corn for France, till the parliament ſhould come to a deciſion on the ſubject, for which reaſon the bill was called the "corn indemnity bill.„

38. Mr. Chauvelin however, whoſe *temperateneſs* of language has been highly extolled, preſumed in his Letter to Lord Grenville of the 7. of January to term it, "un acte de *perfidie*.„ He muſt undoubtedly have taken for granted that the Britiſh miniſters were wholly unacquainted, not only with the *ſecret* machinations of the French convention, but even with the *public* declarations made on the 28. of Nov.

close of the year 1792 for the purchase of corn in England had not merely the supplying of France for its object: for, though there was already as much wheat in France, as was necessary for the consumption of the country [39], it was purchased in England by the French minister of the interior, at the beginning of December, at a much higher price, than it could have been purchased elsewhere [40]. The French government therefore had without doubt *secret* views: and these secret views were, to occasion a scarcity of corn in England, to excite thereby a general discontent, and thus promote the wished for insurrection [41]. Did

39. This is expressly asserted in the report made by the Comité des subsistances to the national convention on the 29. of November. See the Moniteur 1. December 1792.

40. In the sitting of the 6. of December 1792 Marat brought the following complaint against the minister of the interior. "Un citoyen honnête, qui a été dans le commerce des grains s'est présenté au ministre de l'interieur; il lui a offert de procurer des grains à 27 livres le septier, tandis que le ministre les achete à 54 livres dans les ports d'Angleterre.„ Moniteur 8. Dec. 1792. It is true, that Marat's word is in general of no great authority: yet he would have hardly been so absurd, as to assert so simple a fact before the national convention, which, had it been false, the minister of the interior could and would have instantly confuted.

41. Brissot himself says (A ses Commettans p. 78.) "Ainsi nous pouvions gêner les approvisionemens de nos

France deſerve then to be treated on the ſame footing with friendly nations: and is the complaint about partiality founded on juſtice? No one, who has a regard for truth, will venture to aſſert it, or to maintain that the Britiſh government ought to have diminiſhed its own, and have increaſed the ſtrength of its enemy. Self preſervation is not only a right, but a duty: and the preſervation of the Britiſh government and conſtitution was a duty, which miniſters owed to the nation at large.

It is evident therefore, that the four acts of parliament, which have been the ſubjects of the preceding inquiry, were nothing more than meaſures of precaution, which the danger then impending over Great Britain required. And as to the naval armament, which was ordered at this time, it was ſo very moderate, that it did not equal the number of ſhips, which the French had already in commiſſion. Only nine thouſand ſeamen and marines were voted on the 20. of December in addition to the peace eſtabliſhment, which was ſixteen thouſand [42]: and no further addition was made till ten days after the national conven-

"ennemis, en déſolant leur commerce, *et exciter des* "*mouvemens chez eux par la diſette et la cherté de ces pro-* "*viſions*.„

42. See the ſupplies granted by Parliament for the year 1793, in the New Annual Regiſter. Public papers p. 121.

tion had declared war [43]. But five and twenty thousand ſeamen and marines were hardly ſufficient to man eighteen ſhips of the line, with the proportionate number of frigates, ſloops, and cutters: whereas the French, even three months before the preſent period, had not leſs than twenty one ſhips of the line, thirty frigates, eighteen ſloops, four and twenty cutters, and ten ſhips armed en flute, not only in commiſſion, but actually at ſea [44]. The guards and garriſons in Great Britain amounted in December 1792 to only fifteen thouſand ſeven hundred men: and even this ſmall number was not augmented, before the declaration of war, with more than ſixteen hundred [45]. Hence in that part of his majeſty's ſpeech, which was particularly addreſſed to the houſe of commons, it was eſti-

43. Ib.

44. See the report of the miniſter of the marine on 23. Sept. 1793, quoted in the preceding chapter, Note 5. Briſſot likewiſe (A ſes Committans p. 57) ſays: "L'Angleterre, qui n'a commencé d'armer *que trois mois après nous etc.*,, and p. 56. "Dès le mois d'Octobre on avait prévu la poſſibilité d'entrer en guerre avec les puiſſances maritimes; le comité diplomatique et de défenſe générale en avaient prévenu Monge; *on avait mis à ſa diſpoſition des ſommes conſiderables.*,,

45. Compare the army Supplies granted by Parliament on February 16. 1793 with thoſe which were voted December 26. 1792.

mated, that the preparations then making would be amply defrayed "from the exceſs of the actual revenue beyond the ordinary expenditure [46]." But it appears from the fourth chapter of the preſent work, that this exceſs, which had been added to the ſinking fund, did not, after the reduction of the taxes, that had taken place in the preceding ſeſſion, amount to more than two hundred thouſand pounds: and with two hundred thouſand pounds it was not poſſible to fit out a fleet, which, if we conſider the forward ſtate of the French navy at that time, could do more than act on the defenſive. The French miniſter for foreign affairs, in his report to the national convention on the 19. of December, ſpeaking of the preparations then making in England, ſaid himſelf: "*There is nothing in theſe "armaments, which ought to alarm us*, ſince they exceed "by only four ſhips of the line the number which has "been commiſſioned in the preceding years; ſince "among the ſixteen ſhips now in commiſſion there are "at leaſt ten, which are known by the name of guard-"ſhips, that is, the oldeſt and the leaſt ſerviceable in "the Engliſh navy; and laſtly, ſince the king has de-"clared that theſe armaments would require no addi-"tional taxes, and that they would be defrayed by the "additional ſum appropriated to the extinction of the

46. New Annual Regiſter 1792. Public papers, p. 61.

"national debt [47].„ On the 31. of December the ſame French miniſter, after ſeveral ſhips of the line had been put in commiſſion, in addition to the four, which he had mentioned on the 19., ſtill acknowledged that France had no great reaſon to be alarmed [48]. Indeed he could not with truth have aſſerted the contrary: for he well knew that France had a more conſiderable fleet in readineſs than Great Britain was then preparing, and that great exertions were making for a further augmentation of it. With great injuſtice therefore,

47. "Ces armemens *n'ont rien qui doive nous allarmer*, puisqu'ils n'excedent que de 4 vaiſſeaux de ligne ceux qui ont eu lieu dans les années précedentes; puisque ſur 16 vaiſſeaux en armement il y a au moins 10 connus ſous la denomination de garde-côtes, c'eſt à dire, les plus vieux et les plus détériorés de la marine Anglaiſe; puisqu'enfin le roi a déclaré, que ces armemens ne néceſſiteraint aucun impôt extraordinaire, et qu'il ſuffirait, pour y ſubvenir, des fonds deſtinés à l'amortiſſement annuel de la dette nationale.„ Moniteur 21. Dec. 1792.

48. His own words were: "préparatifs qui toutefois *ne ſont pas encore trop effrayans*, ſi nous conſiderons que les ordres pour l'armement de 13 vaiſſeaux de ligne n'ont été donnes que *depuis quinze jours*, ſi nous ſongeons à la grande difficulté de completter l'équipage de ces gros vaiſſeaux par le manque de matelots etc.„ Monit. 3. Janv. 1793. Even on the 12. of January 1793 Briſſot made a ſimilar acknowledgement, which will be quoted at length in the following chapter.

and with equally great inconſiſtency, were complaints made of the naval armament of Great Britain in Dec. 1792. For even if the national convention had betrayed no deſire of conqueſt on the continent, had ſeized neither on Savoy nor on the Netherlands, had neither ſubdued a part of Germany, nor threatened Holland with an invaſion, the mere circumſtance, that France had fitted out a formidable fleet, would have juſtified an equal armament on the part of Britain: and ſince the national convention on the 28 of November had formally declared itſelf the enemy of the Britiſh government, the latter was not only juſtified, but in duty bound, to counteract the machines, which were then at work for its deſtruction. The reproach therefore, which was made to the Britiſh government on account of the naval armament in December 1792, deſerves, like many other cenſures, which have been made to it during the preſent war, to be wholly inverted: and France itſelf muſt be reproached, not only with having armed at ſea three months before Britain even made a commencement [49], but with having ordered the armament at a time, when by the ackowledgement of the national convention, the Britiſh government had not transgreſſed the ſtricteſt limits of neutrality [50].

49. See Note 44.

50. The introduction to the decree of 13. Jan. 1793 is

In this ſituation of affairs, while the Britiſh government was taking only meaſures of defence, a war between France and Great Britain might have been ſtill avoided, had it been the will of the national convention, and the executive council [51]. That it dé-

as follows. "La convention nationale informée par le Miniſtre des affaires étrangeres des préparatifs extraordinaires de l'Angleterre, conſidérant le changement de conduite de ce pays relativement au caractere de neutralité, *qu'il avait conſervée jusqu'ici touchant les affaires de la France etc.*,, Monit. 16. Janv. 1793. By this acknowledgement the national convention has undeſignedly ſubſcribed its own condemnation.

51. The following is an extract from a Letter written by Mr. Miles on 2. Jan. 1793 to Le Brun, the French miniſter for foreign affairs: "Je vous ai tracé la route que vous "avez à ſuivre; *et ſi vous ſuivez mes conſeils, le Cabinet An-"glais ne s'aviſera pas de vous déclarer la guerre.* Mais ſoyez "de bonne foi; ne me trompez pas; n'écoutez pas ces petits "meſſieurs qui vous entourent, et vous flattent, et qui aime-"raient mieux jouer du plus fin, que de marcher droit. "Rappellez vous toujours, que vous tenez entre vos mains "par le hazard le plus extraordinaire et le plus bizarre la "deſtinée, pour ainſi dire, de l'Europe entière, et qu'en "vous écartant des principes que je vous ai tracés dans une "lettre précédente, et que Maret vous a certainement répetés "ſelon les inſtructions que je lui ai données, vous prononce-"rez un arrêt de mort contre des millions peut-être de vos "ſemblables. Pouvez vous, oſez vous y penſer ſans frémir? "*La paix, je vous le repete, eſt facile à conſerver;* et la paix

pended entirely on the French government, whether peace should be preserved or not, has been admitted by

"une fois assurée, voilà la pierre fondamentale posée de cette "alliance entre nos deux pays, alliance que j'ai tant desirée, "et que pour l'obtenir je suis prêt de sacrifier ma vie. La "Nation Anglaise est bien disposée vers la France, et comme "la nation compte pour beaucoup dans ce pays-ci, le gou-"vernement n'osera jamais marcher en sens contraire: mais "de votre coté il ne faut pas effaroucher ni fatiguer le peuple, "en décriant une Constitution à laquelle elle est attachée "d'une maniere que rien ne peut ébranler. Voilà cependant "l'écueil, sur lequel je crains que vous n'alliez échouer, et "sans parler de l'indécence qu'il y aurait à vouloir s'immiscer "dans les affaires interieures d'une autre nation, il faut con-"venir qu'une démarche si peu mesurée serait aussi indécente, "qu'injuste et dangereuse. Le malheur est que vous semblez "avoir la manie de vous mêler de tout; et souvenez vous, "mon ami, qu'en se mêlant de tout, on gâte tout. — Ecou-"tez moi encore une fois et une fois pour tout; *ne rendez "pas la guerre necessaire, ni comme mesure de precaution, ni par "necessité, pour repousser une aggression de votre part, et vous "ne l'aurez pas;* comptez là dessus et je repondrai du reste. "J'entrevois même des dispositions très favorables *en faveur "de la paix:* ne forcez donc pas Mr. Pitt par votre impru-"dence à se déclarer contre vous.,, Authentic Correspondence etc. Appendix p. 94 — 97. On the false report, which was propagated with great industry, that Mr. Pitt had then intermeddled in the internal affairs of France, in order to effect a counter-revolution, Mr. Miles had already written to

by French writers, who were not only intimately acquainted with the ſtate of politicks at that time, but were themſelves in high and official employments. I will quote at the bottom of the page [52] only a few

Le Brun on 18. Dec. 1792 as follows. "Le rapport également "denué de tout fondement que Mr. Pitt était l'ennemi juré "de la revolution, fut reçu avec cette facilité aveugle, qui "donne toujours aux menſonges la victoire ſur la verité. "J'oſe vous renvoyer à toutes les déclarations publiques et "reconnues du miniſtre Anglais, depuis le commencement "de la révolution, pour vous convaincre, qu'il s'eſt fait un "devoir de ne point ſe mêler des affaires interieures de votre "gouvernement. Je crois qu'il a toujours rejetté avec fer-"meté toutes les propoſitions d'attaques qui lui ont été faites "contre les Français, et qu'il n'a jamais voulu s'engager en "aucun projet de contrerevolution; s'il s'eſt fait un devoir "de ne jamais ſe mêler de vos affaires, il ſe fait auſſi une "gloire, d'être reſté attaché à ſes principes ſages et equita-"bles.,, Ib. p. 75.

52. "La Clos, qui venait d'être nommé commandant dans l'Inde, propoſait qu'on le fit partir avec quinze mille hommes et quinze vaiſſeaux de guerre, ce qui ſuppoſait né-ceſſairement la guerre avec les Anglais et les Hollandais, guerre qui n'était point déclarée, *et qu'il eût été très-facile et très neceſſaire d'éviter.*,, Memoires de Dumouriez, Tom. I. p. 105. ed. 2. — "Dans cette poſition on aurait pu négocier une paix avantageuſe. L'Empire et le Corps Helvetique n'auraient certainement pas rompu la neutralité que ce der-nier peuple a conſervée jusqu'à préſent. *La Hollande et l'An-*

passages from the writings of Dumouriez and Brissot, which remove the question beyond the possibility of doubt. That the views of Mr. Pitt were pacific, and that he really wished to avoid a war with France, is a fact, which even his enemies have been obliged to admit: for Kersaint, a leading man in the national convention, and who was moreover decidedly in favour of a war with England, entered on 1 January 1793 into a very minute examination of the views and interests both of the ministerial and the opposition party in England, and thence deduced the following conclusion: "*Pitt therefore does not wish for war* [53]." It was

gleterre ne se seraient pas non plus déclarées. L'Europe serait en paix, et la nation française n'aurait pas comblé tous ses crimes par le meurtre de la famille royale, par la destruction de la religion et des lois, et par une anarchie barbare." Vie de Dumouriez, Tom. III. p. 251. — "Cette guerre (avec l'Autriche) promettait les plus heureux succès; la chûte de la maison d'Autriche, la liberté des Pays-Bas devait en être l'infaillible conséquence, *si l'on avait eu la prudence d'éviter une guerre maritime.*" Brissot à ses Commettans, p. 68. Brissot wrote this in May 1793: and his acknowledgement, that France might have avoided the war with England, is the more worthy of notice, as he himself, only a few months before, had been one of the principal advisers of the declaration of it.

53. His own words were: "Pitt ne veut pas donc la guerre." Moniteur 3. Jan. 1793. Yet this very Kersaint said

indeed impoſſible that he ſhould: for he muſt have foreſeen that the execution of his favourite projects, the diminution of the national debt, the abolition of taxes, and the promotion of the general welfare of Great Britain, would be impeded by the expences reſulting from a war with France. No man can wiſh to be diſturbed in his darling occupation, no man can

in a ſubſequent part of his ſpeech: "C'eſt ſur la ruine de la Tour de Londres que vous devez ſigner avec *le peuple Anglais* détrompé le traité qui réglera les deſtins des nations.„ The pacific views of the Britiſh cabinet, and the hoſtile views of the French government were acknowledged therefore without reſerve at one and the ſame time. Carra likewiſe, who was not only a violent but even virulent adverſary of the Britiſh adminiſtration, ſaid in his ſpeech of the 2. Jan. 1793: "Ne jugez donc point de ce que vous devez craindre par les préparatifs de l'Angleterre, et la comédie qui s'eſt jouée dans le parlement de concert avec la cour, *et croyez que l'intention de la cour n'eſt réellement pas de nous faire la guerre*, mais ſeulement d'intimider la convention nationale.„ Moniteur 4. Jan. 1793. That the Britiſh government wiſhed to deter the national convention from the execution of its ambitious projects, could hardly be thought blameable even by the French themſelves. On the 12. of January 1793. Briſſot alſo in a ſpeech, which is however full of ſophiſtry and contradictions, ſaid: 'Je n'étendrai pas plus loin ces reflexions qui doivent vous prouver, *que vous ne devez pas craindre de voir le cabinet d'Angleterre ſe joindre à vos ennemis*.„ Moniteur 15. Jan. 1793.

desire to be prevented from finishing a work, which he himself beholds with admiration, nor is it possible to derive gratification from destroying the fruits of one's own ingenuity and labour. Lastly the armament itself, which was so arranged, that the expences of it should be defrayed by the excess of the revenue above the ordinary expenditure, without either loan or taxes, shews how firmly he held, and how unwilling he was to part with his adopted plan. But the national convention wrested it from his hands; and, as will appear from the following chapter, left him no other choice than either to prepare for a serious combat, or to lay his country at the feet of France [54].

54. Chronological order would require, that a few words should be said here in regard to the well-known Mr. Maret, who was in London at the beginning of December 1792. But as the thirteenth chapter will be wholly devoted to the diplomatic communications between Great Britain and France, the story, that Mr. Maret was at this time authorized by the French executive council, to treat with the British ministers, will be there examined, and confuted.

CHAPTER XII.

Decree of the 15. of December 1792, and the interpretation of it by the executive council. New exhortation to all nations, who were inclined to insurrection. Menace in the national convention of an appeal from the government to the people of Great Britain, with Brissot's interpretation of it. Barailon's proposal, to except Great Britain from the decree of the 19. of November, rejected by the national convention. Circular letter of the marine minister, Monge, to the inhabitants of the French sea ports, to rouse them to a war with Great Britain, and to attempt the conquest of it. Attack on a British ship of war before the harbour of Brest. Mission of Mr. Genet to the Unites States of America, with proposals of an alliance with France against Great Britain. Order issued by the French executive council to General Miranda, on the 10. of January 1793, to invade Dutch Flanders and the province of Zealand, at furthest within twelve days. Armament of thirty ships of the line and twenty frigates, in addition to the twenty two ships of the line and the thirty two frigates

already in commission, in order to act against Great Britain.

While the British government was engaged in taking measures of defence, in consequence of the danger with which it was already threatened, the national convention still continued its hostile projects, and gradually converted the probability, that it was determined to involve Great Britain, as well as Holland, in a war with France, into absolute certainty.

By the decree of the 19. of November, and the conduct of the national convention on the 28 of the same month, its sentiments relative to Great Britain had been already laid open to public view: but as various persons, either through ignorance, or with the view of throwing ridicule on the uneasiness expressed by the British cabinet, had represented that decree as an empty gasconade, and since this notion, had it become prevalent, might have excited in the minds of many, who were inclined to insurrection, a distrust in the promised assistance of France, the national convention judged it necessary, by a new decree of the same kind, to satisfy the world, that its intentions of overturning the neighbouring governments, were really serious. On the 19. of December therefore a decree was made, which was prefaced by the following introduction. "The national convention, after having

"heard the report of the united finance, military, and "diplomatic committees, *faithful to the principles of the "sovereignty of the people, which does not permit them to "acknowledge any institution that militates against it* [1], and "willing to fix the regulations to be observed by the gene-"rals of the armies of the republic, in those countries to "which they may carry their arms, decrees as follows [2].,,

The decree itself consists of eleven articles, and contains instructions to be observed by the French generals and commissaries, in every country, into which the French arms might be able to penetrate. The executive council, that the purport of this decree might not be mistaken, accompanied it moreover with a commentary: and, as both the one and the other are worthy of notice, it will be necessary to quote a few

1. Thus the national convention virtually declared, that it acknowledged no kingly, and consequently not the British government: for kingly government, of every description, had been repeatedly reprobated, as an institution inconsistent with the sovereignty of the people.

2. Séance du 15. Decembre. "La Convention nationale "après avoir entendu le rapport de ses comités de finance, "de la guerre, et diplomatique réunis, fidele aux principes "de la Souveraineté des Peuples, *qui ne lui permet pas de re-"connaitre aucune institution qui y porte atteinte*, et voulant "fixer les régles à suivre par les généraux des armées de la "République dans les pays où ils portent les armes, decréte "ce qui suit.,, Moniteur 17. Dec. 1792.

passages from each [3]. The first article begins thus. "In those countries, which are, *or shall be* [4] occupied "by the armies of the French republic, the generals "shall immediately proclaim, in the name of the French "nation, the sovereignty of the people, and *the aboli-* "*tion of all constituted authorities etc.* [5]„ Here we have

3. The text of the decree, together with the commentary, is printed in Chauffard Memoires historiques et politiques p. 180 — 228. The text itself is printed in Italic, the commentary in Roman characters, in order to distinguish them: the whole is signed by the six ministers, who formed the executive council, Le Brun, Roland, Claviere, Monge, Garat, Pache: and commentary and text are there dated 8. January 1793. Of this celebrated decree there are various editions, which do not all agree, the reason of which is, that it received on the 17 and 22. of December some alterations and additions, whence it is called in Chauffard's particular instructions dated 31. December, "le décret de la convention nationale des 15. 17. et 22. Decembre.„ (Chauffard p. 156). Hence likewise in the Moniteur 17. December the two last articles are not contained. Now as that text of the decree in question, which was signed by the executive council, and delivered to the commissaries for the Netherlands, of whom Chauffard was one, must be regarded as the authentic text, I have strictly adhered to it.

4. This expression shews, that the decree was applicable to *all* countries, and consequently to Great Britain.

5. "Dans les pays qui sont, *ou qui seront occupés* par les "armées de la République les généraux proclameront sur le

a positive and decisive declaration, that the national convention was resolved to overturn the constitution of every country, which had either folly enough to receive, or not force enough to repel a French army [6]: but the executive council, in order to give it more energy, added in the commentary: "It is necessary, that not even the *shadow* of these authorities remain [7]." The means likewise, by which even the shadow of the ancient authorities should be made to vanish, were assigned by the executive council: and these means consisted in the following order to their commissaries. "They shall not only encourage the writings destined "to this instruction (namely the instruction of the "people), the patriotic societies, and all the establish-"ments consecrated to the propagation of liberty [8], but

"champ, au nom de la nation Française, la souveraineté du "peuple, *la suppression de toutes les autorités établies etc.*" Chaussard p. 187.

6. In *this* respect, every man must confess that the modern rulers of France have kept their word.

7. "Il ne faut pas que *l'ombre même* de ces autorités subsiste." Chaussard p. 189.

8. It is well known, that in England particularly this encouragement was given in every imaginable mode. But in England there was already as much liberty, as any rational man could wish: and it was this rational liberty, this liberty founded on law, that the national convention, under the

"they themselves shall likewise have immediate com-
"munication with the people: they shall prevent, by
"frequent explanations, the false interpretations [9], the
"false reports, and all the falshoods, by which evil-
"minded persons may endeavour to lead astray the
"public opinion. In short, it is with the view of
"assisting the commissaries in this important part of
"their ministry, that the council has thought proper to
"associate with them a certain number of agents, more
"particularly destined to these instructive communica-
"tions with the inhabitants of the countries. Further,
"*in the different countries, to which they shall be sent* [10],

pretence of promoting it, wished to destroy, that free-born Britons might become the slaves of French tyrants.

9. No interpretation could place the conduct of the French in a more unfavourable light, than the true one: for that must certainly be considered as the true interpretation, which the executive council itself gave. The bitterest enemies of France therefore had no need of false interpretations.

10. As the above-quoted expression, "qui *seront* occupés,,, proves the universality of the decree, so this expression (*divers* pays où ils *seront* envoyés) proves the universality of the commentary, and shews, that though it was first used in Belgia, it was by no means designed for that country alone. Further, throughout the whole decree no particular mention is made of that country under any name whatsoever; and all the expressions are of such a kind, that

"ſhall be tranſmitted to them liſts of thoſe citizens, "who are known for their patriotic ſentiments, and "who are the moſt capable of co-operating in the miſ- "ſion of the commiſſaries [11].„

In the firſt article of this decree was further promiſed to all nations who ſhould receive a French army,

they are equally applicable to every country. In the particular inſtructions given to Chauſſard was ſaid likewiſe, "*tous* les peuples chez leſquels la république Françaiſe a porté, *et portera ſes armes.*„ Chauſſard p. 157. Laſtly Chauſſard himſelf, p. 25. has declared in poſitive terms, "Les inſtructions étaient *générales.*„ — This note deſerves the attention of thoſe gentlemen, who were ſo fond of applying to the Britiſh miniſters, at the period in queſtion, the title of *alarmiſts.*

11. "Non ſeulement ils encourageront les écrits deſtinés "à cette inſtruction, les ſociétés patriotiques et tous les "établiſſemens conſacrés à la propagation de la liberté, mais "encore ils communiqueront eux-mêmes avec le peuple; ils "préviendront par des explications frequentes les fauſſes in- "terpretations, les faux bruits, et tous les menſonges par "leſquels les malveillans chercheroient à égarer l'opinion. "Enfin c'eſt pour ſeconder les commiſſaires dans cette partie "importante de leur miniſtère, que le Conſeil a cru devoir "leur adjoindre un certain nombre d'agens deſtinés plus par- "ticuliérement à ces communications inſtructives avec les "habitans de ces pays. Il leur ſera en outre remis des liſtes "des citoyens *des divers pays où ils ſeront envoyés,* connus "pour leurs ſentimens patriotiques, et les plus capables de "concourir à la miſſion des commiſſaires.„ Chauſſard, p. 191.

"the suppression of all taxes [12]:„ and in the second article was promised, "peace, aid, fraternity, liberty, and equality [13].„ So far the decree has a very fine

12. Immediately after the words "la suppression de toutes les autorités établies„, quoted in Note 5, was added, "des impôts ou contributions existans.„ By such alluring promises, and by assurances of exemption from all taxes, the national convention hoped to seduce the ignorant and the unwary to its own interest, and to encourage them to rebel against their governments. But the artifice was so gross, that it is really astonishing, that so many persons have been credulous enough to enter into the snare, especially as the decree itself carried with it its own antidote. For in the fourth article it is said: "Les généraux mettront de suite *sous* "*la sauvegarde et protection de la république Française* tous les "biens meubles et immeubles appartenant au fisc, au prince, "à ses fauteurs, adhérens, et satellites volontaires, aux éta-"blissemens publics, aux corps et communautés laïques et "ecclésiastiques.„ Chaussard p. 196. The expression "to put under the safeguard of the French republic„ needs no explanation. Further it was said in the seventh article: "Le Con-"seil exécutif nommera aussi des Commissaires pour se con-"certer avec les Généraux et l'administration provisoire nom-"mée par le peuple sur les mesures à prendre pour la défense "commune, et *sur les moyens à employer pour se procurer les* "*habillemens et subsistances necessaires aux armées, et pour ac-* "*quitter les depenses qu'elles ont faites, ou feront*, pendant "leur séjour sur son territoire.„ Chaussard, p. 207.

13. "Ils (les Géneraux) annonceront au peuple qu'ils lui

appearance: and one ſhould ſuppoſe, that it was the will of the national convention to fix the ſovereignty of the people in all countries on ſo firm a baſis, that they ſhould at all times, and in all reſpects, enjoy the full power of acting according to their own fancy. It is true, that the firſt and ſecond articles of this decree were equivalent to a declaration of war againſt all exiſting governments: but then they *ſeemed* at leaſt, like the decree of the 19. of November, to favour the ſubjects of each country, whom the generous governors of France were willing to take under their high protection. The decree of the 19. of November had even left to every nation the choice of rebelling againſt its government, or not, a choice, which could not be refuſed, without manifeſtly infringing on the *ſovereignty* of the people. But on the 15. of December the revolutionary zeal of the national convention aroſe to ſuch an height, that they deprived at once the *ſovereign* people of all choice in regard to inſurrection, and in the eleventh article of the decree in queſtion made the following declaration. "The French nation declares, "*that it will treat as an enemy* that people, which re- "fuſing or renouncing liberty and equality, ſhould "chuſe to preſerve, or recall, or treat with its prince,

"apportent paix, ſecours, fraternité, liberté et égalité." Chauſſard, p. 193.

"and privileged orders [14]." Here we have a formal declaration of war, not only against every existing government, but likewise against every *people* that did not chuse to change their political constitution. But the great majority of the people of Britain were warmly attached to their present form of government, and by no means wished for a revolution: consequently the eleventh article of the decree of December 19 contained a declaration of war against the *people*, as well as against the king of Great Britain. Nothing can be more clear, than this article: but though it was not wanting in perspicuity, the executive council judged it necessary, by the following commentary to give it a greater degree of energy. "It is evident, that a people "so enamoured of its chains [15], and so obstinately at-

14. "La nation Française déclare, *qu'elle traitera comme* "*ennemi* le peuple, qui refusant la liberté et l'égalité ou y "renonçant voudrait conserver, rappeller, ou traiter avec le "prince et les castes privilegiés." Chauffard, p. 225.

15. But if any nation was really enamoured of its chains, what right had the rulers of France to rob it of the object of its admiration? And what right had they to determine, in the name of any nation, the question, whether the bands, which united it in civil society, were to be termed chains, or not. This was a question, which every nation had probably a right to determine for itself, without calling in the aid of French arbitration. If it be further asked, in what the liberty consists, which these gentlemen every where sub-

"tached to its ſtate of brutiſhneſs, as to refuſe the reſt-"oration of its rights, is the accomplice, not only of "its own deſpots, but even of all the crowned uſurpers, "who divide the domain of the earth and of men [16]; "that ſuch a ſervile people is the declared enemy, not "only of the French republic, but even of all other "nations, and therefore that the diſtinction, which we "have ſo juſtly eſtabliſhed between government and "people, ought not be obſerved in favour of a people "of this deſcription [17]; in ſhort, that the right of na-

ſtitute in the place of what they call ſlavery, the anſwer can be moſt eaſily given by the Dutch and the Swiſs. Theſe unhappy people would anſwer, if they dared to ſpeak: "We "now enjoy the liberty of emptying our purſes, of abandon-"ing our trade and manufactures, of ſacrificing our privile-"ges, of ſeeing the true lovers of our country murdered or "baniſhed, of returning thanks for the gracious chaſtiſement "inflicted on us, and of applying to our executioners the "appellation of deliverers.

16. No crowned head on earth enjoys this privilege in an equal degree with the five uncrowned lords of France.

17. Unhappy people, that muſt be treated with all the rigours of war, for no other reaſon, than becauſe it is contented with its government! The ſource of its happineſs ſhall be dried up *becauſe* its thence derived its happineſs! Such are the bleſſings beſtowed by the great nation. Well therefore did Dumouriez ſay: "C'eſt le 15. Dec. que fut don-"né le fameux Décret, qui prouvoit aux Belges, *et à tous les*

"tural defence, the duty of insuring the preservation "of our liberty and the success of our arms [18], the "general interest of restoring peace to Europe, *which it* "*cannot obtain but by the annihilation of the despots and* "*their satellites* [19], all conspire in inducing us *to treat* "*such a people according to the rigour of war and of* "*conquest* [20].„

It

"*peuples*, qui avoient appellés les François ou qui les avoient "reçus, que la Convention n'envoyoit les armées chez eux, "*que pour les spolier et les tyranniser*.„ Vie de Dumouriez, Tom. III. p. 373. He even protested against the decree, as he himself relates, Memoires Tom. I. Pref. p. XV. though without effect: for, as he further relates p. 101. "Le décret du 15. Decembre, bien loin d'être désapprouvé dans le Conseil, *étoit appuyée par tous les membres*.„

18. That is, in plain English, "the promotion of our plans of conquest and aggrandizement.„

19. Is not this a manifest declaration, that the rulers of France were resolved, not to lay down their arms, till all the governments of Europe were gradually overturned? And have they not acted to the present hour agreably to that resolution?

20. "Il est évident qu'un peuple assez amoureux de ses "fers, assez entêté de son abrutissement pour refuser la rest-"auration de tous ses droits, est le complice, non seulement "de ses propres despotes, mais même de tous les usurpateurs "couronnés, qui se partagent le domaine de la terre et des "hommes; que ce peuple servile est l'ennemi déclaré non "seulement de la république Française, mais même de toutes

It was further ordered on the 15. of Dec. that the French generals, on entering any country, at the same time that they published the decree, should publish likewise a proclamation, which began in the following manner. "The French people to the...... people[21]. "Brethren and friends, we have conquered our liberty "and we will maintain it. Our union and our force are "our garantees. We offer you the enjoyment of this "inestimable blessing, which has always belonged to "you, but of which you have been criminally deprived "by your oppressors. *We are come, to expel your "tyrants*[22]."

"les autres nations: qu'ainsi la distinction si justement établie "par nous entre les gouvernemens et les peuples ne doit "point être observée en faveur de celui-ci; qu'en un mot le "droit de la défense naturelle, le devoir d'assurer la conser-"vation de notre liberté et le succés de nos armes, l'interêt "universel de rendre à l'Europe une paix, *qu'elle ne peut ob-"tenir que par l'anéantissement des despotes et de leurs satellites,* "tout nous fait une loi, *de traiter un tel peuple suivant la "rigueur de la guerre et de la conquête.*" *Chaussard,* p. 225.

21. A vacant space was left, which was to be filled up with the name of each people, where the French generals should come. This is an additional proof of the universality of the decree. See the Notes 4. 10.

22. "Le Peuple français au Peuple...... Freres et amis, "nous avons conquis la liberté et nous la maintiendrons. "Notre union et notre force en sont les garans. Nous vous

That in all these measures the national convention had its eye particularly fixed on Great Britain and Holland, is too obvious to need a proof: but should any one be really disposed to entertain a doubt on this subject, the following passage in the opinion delivered and published by Chauffard [23] *on the decree in question* will probably remove it. "Without doubt it was the "interest of France, to raise, to conquer the commerce "of the Belgic provinces, swayed, and neutralised by "that of Holland: thence to alarm and menace the "United Provinces, to plant our assignats in their very "counting houses, *there to ruin the bank of England* [24], "and in short to complete the revolution of the money "system. It was of consequence to France, to engross, "as it were, the vast workhouses of trade, these manu-"factures of national prosperity [25].„ Such were the

"offrons de faire jouir de ce bien inestimable, qui vous a "toujours appartenu et que vos oppresseurs n'ont pu vous "ravir sans crime. *Nous sommes venus, pour chasser vos tyrans.*„ Moniteur 18. Dec. 1792.

23. Memoires historiques et politiques, p. 11 — 30.

24. Yet complaints were made about the assignat-bill!

25. "Sans doute il importoit à la France de relever, de "conquérir le commerce des provinces Belgiques, dominé, "neutralisé par celui de la Hollande; et de là d'inquiéter, de "ménacer les Provinces-Unies, d'implanter jusques sur leurs "comptoirs l'assignat, *d'y ruiner la banque de Londres*, — en-"fin d'achever la révolution du systême monétaire. Il impor-

remarks made by the French commiſſary Chauſſard on the decree of the 15. of December: and they ſuffi-

"toit à la France d'accaparer, pour ainſi dire, ces vaſtes at-"teliers de commerce, ces manufactures de proſperité natio-"nale,,, Chauſſard p. 17. And in a note to the words "d'y ruiner la banque de Londres,,, which is printed in the Appendix p. 417 he ſays: "Si le *projet de pouſſer les armes de la* "*république jusqu'à Amſterdam* avoit eu lieu, il auroit été fa-"cile de s'emparer de la plus grande partie des effets ſur la "banque de Londres. La banque etoit ébranlée, ſi on lui eût "préſenté à la fois tous ces effets dont Amſterdam eſt le "centre et le pivot.,, It may be obſerved in general, that the leading men at that time in France made ſo little a ſecret of their deſigns againſt Holland, and conſequently againſt England (for, as we have juſt ſeen, the ruin of the latter was to be effected by the ruin of the former), that Cambon, in the committee of general defence, ſaid openly to Abema and Van Staphorſt, two deputies of the Dutch patriots: "Vous n'avez point de biens eccléſiaſtiques à nous offrir, "pour nous indemniſer: *c'eſt une revolution de porte-feuilles,* "qu'il faudra faire.,, Briſſot à ces Commettans, p. 88. This was uttered in the true ſpirit of the national convention: for wherever eſtates of nobility and clergy have been wanting, the property of merchants and of all other men, who had any thing to loſe, has ſupplied their place, as Boyer Fonfrede ſaid at the time, when the propoſal, to reſpect the Amſterdam merchant ſhips, was rejected under the pretence of their belonging to ariſtocrats: "La maſſe des Hollandais "eſt riche, elle n'eſt donc pas amis de nos principes, et en

ciently prove, that at leaſt *one* of the tendencies of this decree was the deſtruction of Great Britain.

But as the meaſures of precaution, which the Britiſh cabinet had already begun to take, were impediments to the execution of this grand deſign, it was judged neceſſary to have again recourſe to the favourite maxim, which has rendered ſo much ſervice to modern France, "the governed muſt be excited to rebel againſt their governors.„ For this purpoſe the executive council, according to Le Brun's own report to the national convention on the 19. of December, gave *expreſs order* to the miniſter Chauvelin "to embrace every opportunity "of aſſuring the Engliſh *nation*, that, notwithſtanding "the ill humour of its *government* [26], the French people "deſired nothing more ardently, than to merit *its* (the "Engliſh nation's) eſteem [27].„ At the ſame time Le

"admettant quelques exceptions, *ſi vous y avez des amis*, *ils* "*doivent être ſeulement dans la claſſe des ſans-culottes.*„ Moniteur 5. Febr. 1793.

26. The Engliſh government therefore, after the national convention had openly avowed its intention of overturning the conſtitution, ſhould have remained in *good* humour!

27. "Le Conſeil exécutif proviſoire . . . . . a continué "d'entretenir à Londres un miniſtre de la république Fran"çaiſe; et il l'a *expreſſement* chargé de ſaiſir toutes les occaſions, "pour aſſurer *la nation Anglaiſe*, que malgré *la mauvaiſe hu*"*meur de ſon gouvernement*, le peuple Français ne deſire rien

Brun, who was himſelf member of the executive council, and miniſter for foreign affairs, gave notice in this report to the national convention, that Mr. Chauvelin, in caſe the armament, (which, by Le Brun's own acknowledgement in the very ſame report, had nothing which ought to cauſe an alarm [28]), ſhould be continued, was ordered to declare "*that a ſolemn appeal would be made to the Engliſh nation* [29].„ And at the utterance

"plus ardemment, que de meriter *ſon eſtime*, et de conſer-"ver la bonne harmonie et l'amitié qui doivent à jamais unir "deux *nations* genereuſes et libres. La Convention nationale "a reçu à diverſes repriſes des témoignages éclatans de la "reciprocité de cette bienveillance, et de la part ſincere, que "le *peuple* Anglais prenait aux ſuccès de nos armes et au "triomphe de la liberté Françaiſe. Mais ces mêmes éléne-"mens glorieux agiſſaient dans un ſens très oppoſé ſur le "miniſtere de Saint-James.„ Monit. 21. Dec. 1792. That the expreſſion "ſon eſtime„ applies not to the government, but to the people of England, is evident from the context.

28. "Il en réſulte jusqu'ici que ces armemens n'ont rien "*que doive nous allarmer*, puisque il n'excédent que de *quatre* "vaiſſeaux de ligne ceux qui ont eu lieu dans les années pré-"cedentes.„ Ib. It has been already proved in the preceding chapter, that even before Great Britain *began* to arm, France had an hundred and two ſhips of war, of which twenty one were of the line, not only commiſſioned, but actually at ſea.

29. Le Brun's own words, in his report of the 19. of December, were: "Nous ne manquerions pas de faire *un appel ſolennel à la Nation Anglaiſe*.„ Ib.

of these words the national convention applauded [30]. But what was truly ridiculous, and would really excite a smile, if the indignation excited by hypocrisy did not suppress it, Le Brun introduced them with the assertion, "that they would then have exausted every explanation, which could demonstrate *the purity of their views and their respect for the independence of other nations* [31]." This assertion is an example of insolence and hypocrisy, which is hardly to be found but in the annals of republican France: for it was made in the very week, in which the national convention had openly and solemnly declared its intention, not only of overturning all kingly governments, but of treating *whole nations* as enemies, which should refuse to take up arms against their lawful sovereigns. Nor did Brissot display less insolence and hypocrisy in his remarks on the menaced appeal: for in his report to the national convention, on the 12. of January 1793, after having related, that the executive council had signified on the 27. of December, through the organ of the minister Chauvelin, "its firm resolution of opening the eyes of the people of England by an appeal, which should be

30. Immediately after the just-quoted words, is added in the Moniteur: "On applaudit."

31. "Comme alors nous aurions epuisé toutes les explications propres à demontrer *la pureté de nos vues et notre respect pour l'indépendance des autres puissances.*"

made to them [32],, he proceeded to expreſs his ſurpriſe, that the Engliſh miniſters were offended at this menace, and regarded it as an incitement to inſurrection [33],

32. "Le 27. Décembre le Conſeil exécutif a fait notifier "au gouvernement Anglais par l'organe de notre Ambaſſa- "deur, un écrit par lequel il repouſſe vigoureuſement toutes "les inculpations élevées contre lui, par lequel il ſe plaint "des préparatifs hoſtiles de la cour d'Angleterre, et *annonce "la ferme réſolution d'ouvrir les yeux du peuple Anglais dans "un appel qu'il lui fera.*,, Moniteur 15. Janv. 1793. To this menace, which, had it been made by a Britiſh miniſter at Paris, would have been anſwered by an order to quit the country, if not by order to arreſt the perſon of the Britiſh miniſter, Lord Grenville replied on the 31. of December, with equal moderation and dignity. "Quant à ce qui regarde "moi et mes collegues, c'eſt à ſa Majeſté que ces miniſtres "doivent le compte de leur conduite; et je n'ai point de ré- "ponſe à vous donner là deſſus, non plus qu'au ſujet *de l'ap- "pel que vous vous propoſez de faire à la Nation Angloiſe.* "Cette nation, d'après la conſtitution qui lui aſſure ſa liberté "et ſa proſperité, et qu'elle ſaura maintenir contre toute at- "taque directe ou indirecte, n'aura jamais avec les puiſſances "étrangeres ni relation ni correſpondance que par l'organe "de ſon Roi, d'un Roi qu'elle chérit et qu'elle reſpecte, et "qui n'a jamais ſeparé un inſtant ſes droits, ſes interêts, et "ſon bonheur des droits, des interêts, et du bonheur de ſon "peuple.,, Moniteur 14. Janv. 1793.

33. In what other light then was it poſſible, that they ſhould have regarded it?

though, as Brissot added, it was nothing more, than "an appeal to the reason and justice of a great nation, "which was duped by the tricks of its ministers, who "wished to embroil it with a people, whose cause was *its* "*own*, and which had sworn hatred only to *tyrants* [34].„ Language thus insulting to the British cabinet would surely not have been heard in the national convention, if the government of France had been desirous of avoiding a rupture: and its falshood, notwithstanding the veil of sophistry [35], in which it is involved, is so obvious, especially when we consider that the word "tyrant„, in the mouth of the French rulers, is equi-

34. "Rappellerai-je cette fausse interpretation de cet ap-"pel à la nation Anglaise dont le ministre des affaires étran-"geres a menacé le cabinet de Saint-James, s'il persistait "dans ses projets hostiles, appel, dans lequel ce cabinet a feint "de voir un signe d'insurrection, tandis que ces mots signifie-"rent un appel à la *raison, à la justice d'une grande nation,* "*dupe du charlatanisme de ses ministres*, qui veuillent la brouil-"ler avec un peuple, dont la cause est *la sienne*, et qui n'a "juré de haine qu'aux *tyrans.*„ Monit. 15. Janv. 1793. In a former part of this speech, Brissot had said: "Il importe que la nation Anglaise, qui n'est egarée que par son gouvernement, soit promptement désabusée. C'est par respect pour *la fraternité qui nous unit*, que nous devons lui peindre avec franchise les manoeuvres de son gouvernement.

35. Brissot's sophistry, though it produced a great effect at the time, is now become proverbial.

valent to "king„ that the pretended apology affords a new proof, that the appeal to the people of Great Britain had no other object, than to promote the already expected infurrection.

On the 24. of December, five days therefore after Le Brun had given notice of the appeal, Mr. Barailon, one of the few temperate members of the national convention, obferved that the decree of the 19. of November had excited uneafinefs in the Britifh government, and in order to remove this uneafinefs, he propofed the addition of a claufe, by which the decree fhould be reftricted to thofe countries, with which France was actually at war. But the national convention not only rejected the propofal, but rejected it even without a debate: for the previous queftion was immediately demanded, and it was determined "that there was no room for deliberation [36].„ Now as the Britifh

36. Barailon. "Ce décret a déja fait beaucoup d'enne-"mis; il les multipliera encore. Le miniftere Anglais en a "témoigné fon mécontentement au nôtre, qui a été forcé de "l'interpreter dans le fens le plus raifonable. Je demande "que dans le décret du 19. Nov., après ces mots, "la con-"vention nationale déclare, au nom de la nation Françaife, "qu'elle accordera fraternité et fecours à tous les peuples„, "on ajoute, "contre les tyrans desquels elle fera en guerre.„

La queftion préalable eft invoqué contre cet amendement.

Il eft decreté, *n'y avoir pas lieu à deliberer.*

Moniteur 25. Dec. 1792.

government was particularly mentioned by Mr. Barailon, and the proposal was made with the view of removing its uneasiness, the decisive rejection of the proposal was equivalent to a formal declaration, that the national convention was resolved to apply the decree to Great Britain.

Nor did eight days elapse, before a very remarkable application of it to Great Britain was actually made: for on the 31. of December the marine minister, Monge, sent a circular letter [37] to the sea-port towns of France, containing the following passage. "The "king and his parliament wish to make war on us [38]. "But will the English *republicans* suffer it? These free "men already shew their discontent, and their abhor- "rence of bearing arms against their brethren, the

37. It is superscribed: "Lettre du ministre de la marine aux amis de la liberté et égalité dans les villes maritimes.„ Paris 31. Decembre 1792: and it is printed in the Moniteur 20. Jan. 1793. It was not printed immediately, because the French government wished to wait the effects of it: but before the 20. of January favourable answers had been transmitted from some of the sea ports. The answer sent by the community of St. Malo on the 17. of January, expressive of their readiness "to co-operate with the executive power„, will be quoted in the fourteenth chapter.

38. Of this assertion Monge neither did, nor could give a proof: for the circumstance, that a government puts itself in a posture of defence, when threatened with imminent danger, is no argument that it *wishes* for war.

"French. Well then! we will fly to their assistance; "*we will make a descent in that island*[39] *; we will hurl* "*thither fifty thousand caps of liberty; we will plant there* "*the sacred tree*[40]*, and stretch out our arms to our bro-* "*ther republicans*[41] *; the tyranny of their government* "*shall soon be destroyed. May we all be strongly animated* "*with this thought*[42] *!*„

39. A landing in England with a considerable army was even at that time regarded as a matter very easy to be executed: for Kersaint in his speech of the 1. of January 1793 said: "Les barques de nos pécheurs (sont) toujours prêtes à "y transporter *cent mille* Français, car c'est par cette expedi- "tion que nous devons terminer cette querelle, et c'est sur la "ruine de la Tour de Londres etc.„ Moniteur 3. Jan. 1793.

40. Had the sacred tree been planted in Great Britain, and borne the same fruits as it has borne in the Netherlands, in Holland, in Switzerland, in Italy, in Germany to the left of the Rhine, and likewise in France itself, we should have been no great gainers by the exchange of the old British for the new French tree of liberty.

41. In order to crush them to atoms.

42. "Le roi et son parlement veulent nous faire la guer- "re; les républicains Anglais le souffriront-ils? Déja ces "hommes libres témoignent leur mécontentement et la ré- "pugnance qu'ils ont à porter les armes contre leurs freres, "les Français. Eh bien! nous volerons à leurs secours; "*nous ferons une descente dans cette île; nous y lancerons cin-* "*quante mille bonnets de la liberté;* nous y planterons l'arbre "sacré, et nous tendrons les bras à nos freres républicains.

Nor was it not long before this thought very ſtrongly animated the garriſon of Breſt: for in the firſt week of January an attempt was made by the batteries of that port to ſink a Britiſh ſloop, which was cruiſing before the outward harbour. The attack on this veſſel was an act of open hoſtility, and it was undoubtedly made with the approbation of the French government, for otherwiſe ſome apology, or at leaſt ſome explanation would have been given of it. If the commanding officer in the forts at Breſt ſuſpected that the ſloop had been ſent with the view of reconnoitring the Breſt fleet, he might have ſent off a boat with orders to the captain to quit the road. But to hoiſt, as appears from the account given in the Moniteur [43],

"*La tyrannie de leur gouvernement ſera bientôt detruit. Que* "*chacun de nous ſe pénetre fortement de cette idée.*„ Moniteur 20. Janv. 1miere feuille.

43. The following relation of this affair is printed in the Monit. 23. Janv. 1793. "Plymouth le 5. Janvier. Le Childers étant à croiſer vendredi à deux heures de l'après-midi devant Breſt s'avança à trois quarts de mille des batteries de ce port. Il était ſans couleurs. Une des batteries lui tira un coup à boulet, qui paſſa heureuſement par deſſus, ſans lui cauſer aucun dommage. Le Childers alors *arbora pavillon Anglais.* Mais le fort arbora auſſitôt les couleurs nationales, avec un pendant *rouge* ſur l'enſeigne. Les autres forts ſuivirent ſon exemple. Pendant ce tems là le Childers avait été entrainé par la marée à un demi mille environ de ces forts, et obligé

the flag of war over the French flag, as ſoon as the Britiſh captain had hoiſted the Britiſh flag, and not merely to fire a ſingle gun, as a ſignal for departure, but to make a croſs fire from ſeveral batteries, with the view of ſinking the ſloop, was to treat it in every reſpect as the ſhip of an enemy. And if the French government had been deſirous of avoiding a rupture with Great Britain, it would have at leaſt attempted to make ſome excuſe to the Britiſh cabinet, which neceſſary felt itſelf inſulted, as well as the nation at large. But no attempt of this kind was made: and this very neglect afforded a new proof of the ſentiments entertained by the executive council and the national convention.

About this time it was reſolved, to ſend Mr. Genet as ambaſſador to the United-States of America, in order to engage them to enter into a war with Great Britain, in conjunction with France. His inſtructions, (publiſhed by Mr. Genet himſelf in the following month of December) were ſigned the 3. of January 1793, to which ſome additional inſtructions were annexed on the 17 of that month [44]. So early as the

à cauſe du calme d'avoir recours aux rames, pour ne pas arriver trop près. Tout à coup, *les batteries, à un ſignal qui fut fait, commencerent ſur lui un feu croiſé,* qui l'eût criblé, ſi un vent frais, qui s'éleva, ne l'eût mis à même de ſe dégager.

44. I have not been able to procure the edition of Mr

21. of December 1792 the executive council had given notice to the national convention, that they had fixed on Mr. Genet, to go as ambassador to the United States of America, with the view "of drawing closer the bands which united the two nations [45]." Now when we consider the avowed object of the French government in regard to Great Britain, this closer drawing of the bands, which united France and America, could have no other meaning than the engaging of the latter to concur in the hostile designs of the former: but, should any one really entertain doubts on this subject, the instructions, which Mr. Genet received from the executive council will certainly remove them. For after several passages, which have undoubtedly reference to

Genet's instructions, which he himself published: but extracts from them, on which we may certainly depend, are given in Mr. Harper's "Observations on the dispute between the United States and France,", printed at Philadelphia in 1797 and reprinted in London in 1798. For the date of Mr. Genet's instructions see p. 95. of the fourth London edition.

45. Séance du 21. Decembre. Un secretaire fait lecture d'une lettre du ministre des affaires étrangeres ainsi conçue. "Citoyen President, les preuves de talent et de civisme qu'a "données le citoyen Genet dans les differentes missions, dont "il a été chargé, ont déterminé le Conseil Executif à récom- "penser son zele en le nommant ministre plenipotentiaire au- "près des Etats Unis d'Amerique. *Il doit travailler à resserrer "les liens, qui unissaient les deux nations.*," Monit. 23. Dec. 1792.

Great Britain, ſuch as, "to puniſh thoſe powers, which "ſtill keep up an excluſive colonial and commercial "ſyſtem, by declaring that their veſſels ſhall not be "received in the ports of the contracting parties,,, it is expreſsly ſaid, "*we* (the French) have at this moment "a *particular intereſt* in taking ſteps to act *efficaciouſly* "againſt *England* and Spain, if, as every thing announ-"ces, thoſe powers ſhould attack us. In this ſituation "of affairs, *we ought to excite by all poſſible means the* "*zeal of the Americans*, etc.,, Great commercial advan-tages are then promiſed to the United States, "in ex-"pectation that the American government will finally "*make a common cauſe with us*, to take ſuch ſteps as "exigencies may require [46].,, According therefore to the clear and expreſs words of the inſtructions, the object of Genet's miſſion was to effect an alliance be-tween France and America, in order to act againſt Great Britain. It is true, that this alliance was propoſed under the title of a mere defenſive one: but it is evi-dent, that the words, "if thoſe powers ſhould attack us,,, were inſerted for no other purpoſe than to pre-ſerve an appearance of juſtice, it being wholly incon-ſiſtent with diplomatic caution, to have ſaid in plain terms, "we have formed the reſolution to overturn

46. All theſe paſſages, with others to the ſame purport, are quoted in Mr. Harper's Obſervations, p. 32. 33.

"the British government and constitution, we request "you therefore to assist us in the accomplishment of "this end.„ But that the French government, before the 3. of January 1793, the day, on which Mr. Genet's instructions were signed, really had formed this resolution, and that, on the other hand, the measures, which had been taken by the British government, were nothing more, than what was necessary for self defence, has been proved by documents, which no one can call in question. Consequently, it was the object of the executive council, in sending Mr. Genet to America, to effect, according to the *letter* of his instructions, indeed only a defensive, but according to their *spirit*, an *offensive* alliance against Great Britain [47].

We have hitherto seen only preparatory steps to the execution of the great plan, which consisted, first in the overthrow of the British and Dutch governments, and

47. The prudent Washington soon perceived this, and did not suffer himself to be drawn into the snare: on which Mr. Genet not only made bitter complaints, but endeavoured to act the same part toward the American, as his principals at home acted toward the British government; that is, he applied the favourite maxim, "the governed must be excited against their governors.„ See his Notes to Washington and Jefferson, printed in the New Annual Register 1793. Public papers, p. 108. 111. and Harper's Observations p. 9.

and then in the ſubjugation of the two countries. We have ſeen, that the national convention on the 28. of November 1792 had openly declared its ſentiments in regard to the Britiſh government, that the decree of the 19. of November, which was both confirmed and amplified by that of the 15 of December, had been particularly applied to Great Britain by the reſolution of the national convention on the 24. of December, that the French miniſter for foreign affairs had menaced the Britiſh government with an appeal to the people, that another French miniſter of ſtate had threatened a landing in Great Britain with fifty thouſand caps of liberty, and that theſe menaces were ſupported by a conſiderable fleet, which was already at ſea, even before Great Britain began to arm, not to mention other meaſures, which have been already deſcribed, and the inſolence and contempt, with which kingly government of every deſcription was treated in the national convention. Nor were the hoſtile deſigns of France leſs viſible in regard to Holland. The reſolution to open the Schelde, and the forcing of a paſſage up to Antwerp, in defiance of the proteſtation of the Dutch government, were acts of open hoſtility againſt an independent ſtate: and that before the cloſe of 1792 a plan was in agitation, for an actual invaſion of Holland, appears from ſeveral expreſſions in the Letter written on the 6. of December by the war miniſter, Pache, to

P

General Dumouriez [48]. The hostile designs of France in respect to Holland appear further from the circumstance, that a corps of Dutch patriots, as they were called, to the amount of ten thousand, were taken into the French service, under the name of the Batavian legion, that this corps was stationed on the frontiers of the Dutch territory, that a revolutionary committee of this legion was permitted to correspond with the French party in Holland, in order to promote the expected insurrection, and facilitate the entry of a French army, and lastly that a French agent was appointed to reside with the revolutionary committee, and communicate an account of its proceedings to the minister for foreign affairs in Paris [49].

48. In this Letter the following expressions occur: "Si "l'armée de la Belgique se porte *sur la Hollande*, et ne passe "point la Meuse etc.,, — "Les divers motifs ci dessus, Géné-"ral, ont déterminé le Conseil à persister dans son ancien "arrêté; il a deliberé comme mesure d'urgence, *et qui devoit* "*dévancer l'expedition de la Hollande*.,, Correspondance du Général Dumouriez avec Pache Ministre de la guerre pendant la campagne de la Belgique en 1792 (Paris 1793. 8.) p. 138. Chauffard likewise p. 278 speaks of: "operations exécutées dans la Flandre, et *projettées* sur la Hollande.,,

49. "Les réfugiés Hollandais avaient assemblé un petit *comité révolutionaire* à Anvers, ou était aussi la legion Batave. Ils avaient plus de zèle que de lumières, et quoiqu'ils dépensassent beaucoup d'argent pour entretenir des correspondan-

After all these preparatory steps, the executive council was of opinion on the 10. of Jan. 1793, that the plan, as far as it related to Holland, was ripe for execution: for *on this very day* orders were send to General Miranda, who then commanded the French army in the Netherlands, in the absence of Dumouriez, *to invade Dutch Flanders and the province of Zealand at furthest within twelve days.* Dumouriez himself was at that time in Paris, concerting measures with the executive council for the next compaign: and, as being commander in chief of the army in the Netherlands, he was commissioned to communicate the order of the council to General Miranda, which he did in the following terms [50]. "I send you at present *the resolution*

ces avec les diverses provinces de leur république, etc.,, Memoires de Dumouriez, T. I. p. 5. ed. 2. — "Il fut décidé, que les refugiés Hollandais se transporteraient à Anvers avec un *comité révolutionnaire* formé par eux. Bientôt une legion de *dix mille hommes*, que ces Hollandais avaient levés sous le nom de legion Batave, eut ordre de se porter sur la même ville, pour faire l'avant-garde de l'armée, en cas qu'on se decidât à pénétrer en Hollande. *Un agent du gouvernement* fut placé auprès de ce comité révolutionaire *pour rendre compte au Ministre Lebrun*, chargé des relations étrangeres, des mesures qu'on y prenait.,, Desodoards Hist. phil. de la Revolution Française, T. II. p. 1792. ed. 2. Paris 1797. 8. Dumouriez likewise gives the very same account, Mem. T. I. p. 136.

50. Dumouriez's Letter to Miranda is superscribed: "Le

"*of the council:* and as Valence comes to Paris, and as "you command the army in the mean time, you are "charged with the execution of the following plan, "which you muſt arrange with *the moſt profound ſe-* "*crecy.* In the firſt place General Bourdonnaye "will be diſmiſſed, that he may not counteract the "project, which you have to execute, and all the troops "in French maritime Flanders will be placed under "your command, that all the parts may be put in "motion by one will. At Bruges you have General "Deflers, who is very good, to whom you will ſend "your inſtructions, and charge him with the diſpoſition "of the troops in the lower Auſtrian Flanders, while "General Paſcal, commandant at Dunkirk, is intruſted "with the diſpoſition of the troops in the lower "French Flanders. Arrange matters in ſuch a "manner, as to be able *within twelve days at furtheſt,* "*to approach Zealand, and get poſſeſſion of Dutch* "*Flanders, at the ſame time that you will order your* "*troops to enter the iſland of Zuyd-Beveland and thence* "*croſs over to the iſle of Walcheren, of which we wiſh* "*to make ourſelves maſters*, before the Stadtholder has

général Dumouriez au général Miranda, Paris le 10. Janvier: and is printed p. 3 — 8 of the following publication printed at Paris in 1793: Correſpondance du Général Miranda avec le Général Dumouriez, et les miniſtres de la guerre, Pache et Beurnonville, depuis Janvier 1793.

"time to retreat thither, and before it is fortified, "and has received a garrison. *There is no time to lose:* "and, though the patriots pretend that the Zealanders "are prepared, and that in all Zealand there are not "more than fifty five companies of infantry, consisting "each of only forty men, and no cavalry, and conse-"quently that this expedition does not require above "three thousand men, I am of opinion, that we shall "want eight battalions of infantry, the Batavian legion, "Moultson's flotilla, two regiments of cavalry, eight "twelve-pounders, four howitzers, a company of flying "artillery, and sixteen battalion pieces. You will go "to Antwerp, where you will be joined by the Dutch "patriots, who will bring you their maps, and serve as "your guides, as they themselves have already acknow-"ledged the facility of the expedition. *The minister of "the marine gives orders to prepare furnaces and grates in "each of the three gun vessels, in order to fire with red "hot balls.* These three vessels draw but little water, "and will easily beat off the frigates by the superiority "of their four and twenty pounders, and their red hot "balls [51]." After a few lines relative to a forced loan

51. "Voici à present *la résolution du Conseil:* et comme Valence vient à Paris, comme vous êtes chargé par interim du commandement de l'armée, voici dont vous êtes chargé, et que vous devez arranger dans le plus profond secret. 1mo On donne congé au Général Bourdonnaye, pour qu'il n'en-

at Antwerp, by which the expences of the expedition were to be defrayed, was then added. "Contrive like-

trave point ce que vous avez à faire, et on met à votre disposition toutes les troupes de la Flandre maritime, pour qu'une seule volonté fasse agir toutes les parties. Vous avez à Bruges le Général Deflers, qui est fort bon, à qui vous enverrez vos ordres et que vous chargerez de la disposition des troupes sur la basse Flandre Autrichienne, pendant que vous ferez faire celle de la basse Flandre Française au Général Pascal, commandant à Dunquerque. Arrangez les troupes de maniere à pouvoir *sous douze jours au plus se rapprocher de la Zélande, et s'emparer de la Flandre Hollandaise, pendant que vous ferez entrer vos troupes dans l'isle de Zuyd-Beveland, et de là dans l'isle de Walcheren, dont on veut s'emparer*, avant que le Stadthouder ait le tems de s'y refugier, qu'elle soit fortifiée, et qu'elle ait reçu garnison. *Il n'est pas de tems à perdre:* et quoique les patriotes prétendent, que les Zélandais sont préparés, qu'il n'y a dans toute la Zélande que cinquante cinq compagnies d'infanterie tout au plus, à quarante hommes chacune, et point de cavalerie, et que par conséquent cette expedition n'exige que 3000 hommes, je crois qu'il faut huit battaillons d'infanterie, la legion Hollandaise, la flotille de Moultson, et deux régimens de cavalerie, huit pieces de douze, quatre obusiers, une compagnie d'artillerie à cheval, et seize piéces de battaillon. Vous irez à Anvers, vous y serez joint par les patriotes Hollandais, qui doivent vous apporter des cartes, et vous guider, ayant reconnu eux mêmes toutes les facilités de cette expedition. *Le Ministre de la marine donne ordre de préparer des fourneaux et des grils sur chacune des trois chaloupes canonières,*

"wiſe, that Deflers aſſemble at Bruges four or five "thouſand infantry, with four twelve-pounders, two "hundred cavalry, two howitzers, two four-pounders "for each battalion, *and advance with the utmoſt celerity* "to Middlebourg, and thence to the iſle of Cadſand, "and Biervliet. Send me a courier, to inform me of "the difficulty or facility, which may preſent itſelf in "the execution of the plan. This you will know to a "certainty, when you have ſeen the Dutch patriots, "and have examined their maps and their projects. "*The whole depends on promptitude and ſecrecy* [52].,,

Now, when we conſider that the States General had hitherto obſerved the moſt ſtrict neutrality, that

pour pouvoir tirer à boulets rouges. Ces trois batimens tirent peu d'eau, et chaſſeront facilement les frégattes, par la ſupériorité de leur calibre de vingt-quatre, et par leurs boulets rouges.,,

52. "Arangez auſſi dans votre plan, que Deflers faſſe à Bruges un raſſemblement de quatre à cinq mille hommes d'infanterie, avec quatre pieces de douze, deux cens hommes de cavalerie, deux obuſiers, deux canons de quatre par bataillon, *et ſe porte avec la plus grande promptitude* à Middlebourg et de là dans l'iſle de Cadſand, et Biervliet. Expediez moi un courier pour me donner connoiſſance de ce qui ſe rencontrera d'obſtacles, ou de facilités, dans l'exécution de ce plan. C'eſt ce que vous ſaurez poſitivement, quand vous aurez vu les patriotes Hollandais, et que vous aurez examiné leurs cartes et leurs projets. *Tout dépend de la promptitude et du ſecret.,,*

they not only had given no indications of a deſign of attacking France, but on the contrary, on the ſuppoſition that the neutrality, which they themſelves had obſerved, would ſecure them from an attack on the part of any other power, had taken no meaſures to put their garriſon towns on the frontiers in a proper ſtate of defence, we muſt acknowledge that the order of the executive council, which was given on the 10. of January, was an act of perfidy, which very little accorded with the boaſted magnanimity of the French rulers, or with the declaration at that time too generally believed, that they fought only for their own preſervation, and the political liberty of France. It was in fact worſe than an *open* declaration: for an open declaration gives the attacked power at leaſt a ſhort notice of the intended hoſtilities, whereas the *ſecret* order given by the executive council had no other object, than to take a neighbouring country by ſurpriſe in the midſt of peace. It is true, that the order was not executed immediately, becauſe General Miranda, as he mentioned in his anſwer of the 15. of January [53], could not inſtantly put his

53. Je crois votre plan bien difficile à exécuter, dans la ſituation de nudité et manque abſolu de magazins, où nos armées ſe trouvent. Correſpondance du Général Miranda, etc. p. 8. On the receipt of this Letter the executive council came on the 18. of January to the following reſolution, which was communicated to General Dumouriez. "Le

troops in motion on account of the want of magazines: but this circumſtance is of no more importance to our preſent inquiry, than when, after a *public* declaration of war, a general, to whom orders for an attack are ſent by his government, does not find himſelf in a ſituation, to comply with them at the inſtant. In our judgement of French politicks therefore, the whole depends on the time of the order, and not on the time of its execution. Conſequently it muſt be admitted, that the executive council, on the 10. of Jan. 1793, declared itſelf in a ſtate of war with Holland.

Conſeil exécutif proviſoire, Général, a reçu la lettre que vous lui avez écrite concernant l'operation de la Zélande, avec la copie de celle du Général Miranda. Le Conſeil, après avoir déliberé ſur leur contenu, a arrêté qu'il ferait ſurcis *de nouveau* à l'expedition projettée ſur la Zélande, et il vous prie de le mander au Général Miranda, en y ajoutant, qu'il déſirerait que ce Général attendît les patriotes Hollandais, qui doivent ſe rendre à Liege, et qu'il prît des meſures pour vérifier les diſpoſitions annoncées des Zélandais et leurs differens rapports. *Le Général Miranda conſervera d'ailleurs la diſpoſition des troupes qui ont été miſes en mouvement pour cette opération*, et qui ſont hors du territoire François.,, Ib. p. 10. The expreſſion "de nouveau,, affords an additional proof, that even before the 10. of January an invaſion of Holland had been in agitation; and the laſt period clearly ſhews, that the execution of the order given on that day was not abandoned, but merely *poſtponed.* This is further

But France, by declaring itself in a state of war with Holland, virtually declared itself in a state of war with England. The common interest, and the mutual obligations, which then united these two countries [54], made them really *one* nation, in regard to an invasion on the part of France: and an attack on Holland in January 1793 was as much an attack on Great Britain, as a declaration of war against Holland in the present year would be a declaration of hostilities against France. This was not unknown to the national convention: and accordingly when war was *openly* declared three weeks afterwards, it was declared against Great Britain and Holland at the same time. Brissot likewise acknowledged in his speech of the 1. of February that a declaration of hostilities against the British government alone involved in it a similar declaration against that of Holland [55]: consequently, as the con-

confirmed by Dumouriez's Letter to Miranda of the 23. of January, in which it is said: "Je vous ai mandé, mon cher Miranda, que j'abandonnai comme vous le projet de Zélande, mais c'est une raison de plus de pousser très vigoureusement celui de l'attaque de Mastricht, Venlo et Nimegue. Ib. p. 14.

54. See what has been said in the eleventh chapter on this subject.

55. Brissot's own words were: "En déclarant, que la France est en guerre avec le gouvernement Anglais, c'est déclarer qu'elle l'est avec le Stadhouder.,, Monit. 3. Febr. 1793.

verse of this proposition must be equally true wich the proposition itself, the interest being common, and the obligations mutual, it follows from Brissot's own concessions, that the order of the 10 of January was equivalent to a declaration of hostilities against Great Britain. Further, that the rulers of France not only had their eyes constantly fixed on these two countries at the same time, but that it was their design to make the ruin of the one subservient to the ruin of the other, appears both from their speeches and actions. "Assurances, that I received at this time from Paris,, says Mr. Miles [56], speaking of the 18. of January 1793, "convinced me that the great object of the ex-"ecutive council was to throw this country into an in-"surrection, and that the explosion was expected to "happen first in Ireland. *The projected invasion of "Holland*, preceded by the opening of the Schelde, as "a preparatory step to the fall of Amsterdam, were "measures, that would not have been attempted, but "for the firm persuasion that the people in England "were on the eve of revolt, and that a revolution "would inevitably happen the very instant, if not soo-"ner, that war was declared. The entire conduct of "the convention, and of its executive council, the ef-"forts of private individuals, *all tended to this solitary "but important object*,,. In what manner the conquest

56. Authentic corrispondence, Appendix p. 115.

of Holland was to be made ſubſervient to the deſtruction of England, may be ſeen in two paſſages of Chauſſard's Memoirs. The one, by which it appears that the bank of England was to be ruined by certain finance operations in Holland, has been already quoted in this chapter [57]. The other paſſage, which Chauſſard has taken from a ſpeech delivered in the national convention, ſhews not only that the members of the convention regarded the fall of Holland as a preparatory ſtep to the fall of England, but that they were well aware, their views were not unknown to the Engliſh government. For the orator, ſpeaking of England and Pruſſia, ſaid: "Theſe two powers well "know that France has the greateſt intereſt to ſubſti-"tute a popular and repreſentative government to the "ariſtocratic and degenerate one, that actually exiſts in "Holland; *that, with the forces of that country, France* "*would irrevocably deſtroy the commerce of England,* "and by means of its navy ſoon command the Baltic; "that nothing more would be wanting, than a renew-"al, in that part of the North, of an alliance of ſi-"tuation then become neceſſary; *and, that after an in-*"*timate union of France and Holland, the ſupremacy of* "*the Engliſh commerce in the two Indies would rapidly* "*diſappear*„ [58].

57. Note 25.

58. "Ces deux puiſſances ſavent très-bien que la France

Under theſe circumſtances it would have been perfectly juſtifiable to have declared war againſt France in the middle of Ian. 1793. The exiſtence of the Britiſh empire was now at ſtake: for not only had the plan been laid for its deſtruction, but the wheels of the machine, by which its deſtruction was to be effected, were already in motion. It was not merely the ruin of an ally, the order for whoſe political annihilation had been ſigned on the 10 of Ianuary: it was not merely the loſs of a balance of power, or the effects of an aggrandizement, which might be dangerous to Britain at a future period: it was the immediate downfall of Britain itſelf, of its conſtitution, its laws, its liberty, its commerce, which was now in agitation, and in agitation by an enterpriſing, a reſtleſs, and implacable foe. The meaſure of iniquity was already full: yet the Britiſh government, deſirous of maintaining peace to the very laſt, ſtill waited with

a la plus grande intérêt à ſubſtituer un gouvernement populaire et répréſentatif au gouvernement ariſtocratique actuel et dégeneré de la Hollande; *qu'avec les forces de ce pays, la France écraſerait ſans retour le commerce de l'Angleterre* et qu' avec ſes forces navales elle dominerait bientôt dans la Baltique; qu'il ne faudrait que renouer dans cette partie du Nord une alliance de ſituation, dès-lors rendue néceſſaire; *et qu'après l'intime union de la France et de la Hollande, la ſuprématie du commerce Anglais dans les deux Indes diſparaîtrait rapidement.*„ Chauſſard, p. 277.

patience, till the meaſure was not only full, but overflowed. That miniſters therefore *precipitated* their country in a war with France, is an opinion which nothing but party malevolence could ſuggeſt.

Laſtly, within three days after the order was ſigned for the invaſion of Holland, the national convention decreed, that in addition to the twenty two ſhips of the line, and the thirty two frigates, which were already in actual ſervice, thirty ſhips of the line and twenty frigates ſhould be inſtantly put in commiſſion, beſide forty five ſhips of the line and frigates, which were ordered to be built with the utmoſt diſpatch [59]. Now it is impoſſible that merely ſelf-defence could have been the object of this additional armament, which enabled France to operate in a very ſhort time with fifty two ſhips of the line, and an equal number of frigates, not to mention the ſhips

59. The two firſt articles of the decree of the 13. Jan. 1793, are as follows.

1. Le Miniſtre de la marine donnera incontinent des ordres dans tous les ports pour armer 30 vaiſſeaux de guerre, et 20 frégates, independamment de 22 vaiſſeaux de ligne et 32 frégates *déja armées*; ce qui portera l'armée navale à 52 vaiſſeaux de ligne et 52 frégates. Les vivres ſeront ordonnés en conſéquence.

2. Il ſera mis incéſſamment en conſtruction 25 vaiſſeaux de ligne, 5 de cent canons, 6 de quatre vingt, 14 de ſoixante quatorze; et 20 frégates. Moniteur 16. Janv. 1793.

of inferior force, which amounted to more than fifty even in the preceding month of September [60]. For on the 13. of January, 1793 France had a greater number of ſhips of the line and frigates in actual ſervice, than the Britiſh cabinet had at that time even ordered to be put in commiſſion [61]: nor had theſe orders been given till three months after the French had begun to arm, and till after the national convention had publickly declared its deſign of overturning the Britiſh conſtitution, whereas the French naval armament was commenced at a time, when by the avowal of the convention itſelf on the very day, on which the additional armament was ordered, the Britiſh government had in no reſpect violated the laws of neutrality toward France [62]. Further not only Le

60. See Ch. X. Note 5.

61. In the very ſame number of the Moniteur, in which the decree of the 13 of January is printed, by which it appears, that the French ſhips of the line and frigates *already* in commiſſion amounted to *fifty four*, is given a liſt of the Britiſh ſhips of the line and frigates, which were either already commiſſioned, or had been ordered to be put in commiſſion: and their *whole* number amounted only to *forty five*.

62. The introduction to the decree of the 13 of January 1793 ran thus. "La convention nationale informée par le miniſtre des affaires étrangeres des préparatifs extraordinaires de l'Angleterre, conſidérant le changement de conduite relativement au caractere de neutralité, qu'il avait conſervée

Brun, the minister for foreign affairs, had on the 31, as well as on the 19. of December, represented the British armament, as a matter, at which France had no reason to be alarmed [63], but, what deserves particularly to be noticed, Brissot *on the day which preceded the order for the additional French armament*, delivered a report to the national convention, in the name of the marine and diplomatic committees, relative to the British armament, in which there occurred the following passage. "*Can we suppose, that these demonstrations of war are serious*, when we see that the English ministry carry on the negotiations with those very agents whose official character they affect not to acknowledge; *when we see that they have ordered only the same number of men and of ships, which were ordered in the pretended armaments against Spain and Russia, and particularly when we see, that they abstain from the terrible expedient of impressing, without which it is impossible to man a fleet of any considerable force?*" [64]. Nor could the marine and diplomatic com-

jusqu'ici touchant les affaires de la France etc.,, Moniteur 16. Jan. 1793.

63. See Ch. XI. Notes 47. 48.

64. "*Peut-on croire que ces demonstrations de guerre soient serieuses*, quand on voit le ministere Anglais continuer les negotiations même avec les agens, dont il feint de ne pas

committees have ſpoken to a different purport: for they were conſcious, that only nine thouſand ſeamen had been voted by the Britiſh parliament, in addition to the peace eſtabliſhment [65]. It is clear therefore that the additional French armament, which was ordered on the 13. of January had not merely ſelf defence for its object: and it is equally clear, when we reflect on the conduct of the national convention, as deſcribed in the tenth and twelfth chapters of the preſent work, that it was deſtined to act offenſively againſt Great Britain [66].

reconnoitre le caractere; *quand on voit n'ordonner que l'addition du même nombre d'hommes et de vaiſſeaux, qu'il ordonna dans les préparatifs ſimulés contre l'Eſpagne et la Ruſſie, et s'abſtenir ſur tout de ce terrible moyen de la preſſe, ſans lequel il lui eſt impoſſible d'équipper même une flotte peu conſidérable.*" Moniteur 15. Janv. 1793.

65. No further addition was made till ten days after the French had declared war. See the ſupplies granted by parliament for the year 1793, printed in the New Annual Regiſter, Public papers, p. 121.

66. The important and deciſive facts recorded in this chapter, which place the ſentiments and conduct of the French government in the cleareſt point of view, are *wholly omitted* by a celebrated oppoſition writer, whoſe pamphlet in the year 1797 met with a very unuſual ſale. The ſame pamphlet contains likewiſe *not a ſyllable* of what has been related in the latter part of the ſeventh chapter, where the

The French government however attempted by various explanations to give its actions a colour of justice, and to alleviate the uneasiness expressed by the British cabinet. We will examine therefore in the following chapter, in which the diplomatic communications between Great Britain and France shall be fully considered, whether the explanations, given by the French government, were of such a kind, that the British cabinet could depend on them, or whether

hostile views of the republican rulers of France have been proved from their own declarations: nor does it take notice of the conduct of the national convention on the 28. of Nov. with many other acts recorded in the tenth chapter, which shew a decided resolution to overturn the British government and constitution. In like manner, the facts related in the first, second, fourth and fifth chapters, which prove beyond a doubt the pacific sentiments of the British cabinet, as also the numerous acknowledgements made on this very subject by the French themselves, with their concessions, that the British cabinet had observed the strictest neutrality, and that a war with Great Britain might have been avoided, if they had chosen it, all which acknowledgements and concessions have been quoted at large in the fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth and eleventh chapters of the present work, are in the said pamphlet *passed over in total silence.* Nor is the reader even informed there, that the public declaration of hostilities proceeded from the part of France. — Yet it is called, on the title-page, a view of the *causes* of the war!

they were not designed, merely to amuse the ministers, and to impose on the nation, till the plan of the convention was as ripe for execution against Great Britain, as we have already seen that it was against Holland.

END OF VOL. I.